scholarly journals Ownership structure and voluntary disclosures: the case of French-listed firms

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faten Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
Earnings Disclosures ◽  
The Relationship

This paper investigates the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary earnings disclosures under high ownership concentration of French-listed firms. The findings show that French managers are less likely to make voluntary disclosures when they are controlled by a large shareholder or by a family, suggesting that low legal protection leads to expropriation of minority shareholders. The results also show that the proportion of foreign institutional investors in capital is likely to mitigate this relationship since institutional investors signal good minority shareholders’ protection to the market.

scholarly journals The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: An Application in Vietnam Stock Exchange

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-146
Author(s):  
Thi Xuan Anh Tran ◽  
Quoc Tuan Le
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
H Index ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Composition ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This research examines the possible association between ownership structure and Vietnam listed companies’ dividend payout policy over the period of 2009 – 2015. We have investigated 642 listed firms in Hochiminh stock exchange and Hanoi stock exchange, using pannel data analysis. Ownership structure is described with two main sub-variables: ownership concentration and ownership composition. Specifically, the Herfindahl index (or H-index) was applied to measure the level of ownership concentration /dispersion for all major shareholders in the company, including the five biggest investors, corporate institutional investors, the ownership concentration level, and foreign investors. It has been observed that the H-index of all major shareholders has an average of less than 0.5 but the value of the H-index of institutional investors at 0.594 indicates that institutional investors are more likely to be concentrated in the hands of large institutional investors. The result showed linear relationship between institutional ownership and the dividend rate, but not statistically significant for the relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio.

Board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment: the moderating role of ownership concentration

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shoukat Ali ◽  
Ramiz Ur Rehman ◽  
Bushra Sarwar ◽  
Ayesha Shoukat ◽  
Muhammad Farooq
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Random Effect ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Institutional Investment ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Foreign Institutional Investors ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of board financial expertise on the shareholding of foreign institutional investors in an emerging equity market of China and to explore whether ownership concentration moderates the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypothesized relationships, this study uses panel data regression models, i.e. static (fixed effect and random effect) and dynamic (two-step generalized methods of moments) models. Further, to control the possible endogeniety issue, this study uses two instrumental variables, namely, board size and industry average financial expertise of board to proxy board financial expertise. This study covers a period from 2006 to 2015 for 169 listed Chinese firms. Findings The results revealed that foreign institutional investors positively perceived board financial expertise and holds more shareholdings with the increasing level of financial experts at boards of directors. Moreover, ownership concentration positively moderated this relationship. It means that in highly concentrated firms, the board financial expertise conveys a stronger signal to foreign institutional investors that firms can manage financial resources rationally by controlling negative effects of ownership concentration. Further, the robustness model also confirmed the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional shareholdings. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board-level financial expertise as a determinant of foreign institutional ownership. Further, no previous study has used ownership concentration as a contextual variable on the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment.

scholarly journals Corporate Disclosure, Ownership Structure And Earnings Management: The Case Of French-Listed Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nadia Lakhal
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Management Practices ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance devices on earnings management for French-listed firms. Particularly, it examines the relationship between corporate disclosure practices, ownership structure features and earnings management by French managers. Results show that the relationship between earnings management measures and disclosure scores is negative suggesting that less transparent firms are likely to engage in earnings management practices. The findings also show that families, institutional investors and multiple large shareholders negatively influence earnings management, and hence, act as good corporate governance devices to limit managerial discretion. This paper shed light on the monitoring role of corporate disclosures and ownership structure in the French context where minority shareholders interests are less protected than in common law countries.

A cross-country comparison of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance: does judicial system efficiency matter?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luigi Lepore ◽  
Francesco Paolone ◽  
Sabrina Pisano ◽  
Federico Alvino
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
System Efficiency ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Judicial Efficiency ◽  
The Relationship

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, including judicial system efficiency as a moderator to investigate the joint effects of both explanatory variables. Although prior studies have considered judicial system efficiency by examining de jure investor protection, this study identifies another useful proxy and explores de facto legal protection. Design/methodology/approach Ordinary least square multiple regression models were used to examine the influence of judicial efficiency, which was measured using the disposition time (DT) and legal origin, as a moderator of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance for a sample of 565 non-financial companies listed in Italy, France, Germany and Spain in 2013. Findings This paper shows that de facto investor protection ensured by an efficient judicial system is relevant to the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure. As a moderator variable, DT strengthens the intensity of this relationship in countries with low judicial efficiency, showing that ownership concentration leads to a better enhancement of firm performance and is, therefore, a more efficient governance mechanism in countries in which investor protection is weak. Originality/value The evidence presented expands the understanding of the link between firm performance and ownership structure. The institutional deficiencies suggest that internal governance mechanisms may substitute for external mechanisms in facilitating efficient governance. This study corroborates policymakers’ concerns regarding the efficiency of judicial systems and their role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. The results suggest a need for more efficient external mechanisms of investor protection to facilitate investment in equity capital. Moreover, this study shows that DT is a more accurate measure of investor protection than the traditional measure of de jure legal protection.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance Quality, Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance. Evidence from an Emerging Economy

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 154
Author(s):  
Haroon ur Rashid Khan ◽  
Waqas Bin Khidmat ◽  
Osama Al Hares ◽  
Naeem Muhammad ◽  
Kashif Saleem
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Governance Quality ◽  
Corporate Governance Quality ◽  
The Relationship

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency–performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency–performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency–performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized.

scholarly journals Board composition, ownership structure and voluntary disclosure: An empirical study of the listed companies in Egypt

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammed Moustafa Soliman ◽  
Aiman A. Ragab ◽  
Mohammed B. Eldin
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Voluntary Disclosures ◽  
Board Size ◽  
The Relationship

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board composition and ownership structure variables on the level of voluntary information disclosures of companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange. Board composition is examined in terms of board independence; board size; and CEO duality; also, ownership structure is examined in terms of ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership. The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and voluntary disclosures. However, board independence; board size; ownership concentration; institutional ownership; and managerial ownership are not associated with voluntary disclosures. Also, the results of the regression analyses show that size and leverage of firms are significantly and positively associated with the level of voluntary information disclosures. Profitability of a firm is not significantly associated with voluntary disclosures. Finally, this paper indicates the relationship among board composition, ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure, and provides evidence for Egyptian regulators to improve corporate governance and optimize ownership structure.

scholarly journals Shareholding by venture capitalists and R&D investment of start-up firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 142-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hiroyuki Okamuro ◽  
Jian Xiong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Research And Development ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Venture Capitalists ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Start Up ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
D Investment ◽  
Unique Dataset

We analyze the influence of ownership structure on the R&D (research and development) investment of start-up firms. Previous studies on the relationship between ownership and R&D have targeted on large listed firms and focused on ownership concentration, regardless of the types of large shareholders. We argue that shareholder’s type is an important factor of R&D investment under asymmetric information, and that R&D projects, particularly those of start-up firms, strongly depend on the financing from venture capitalists (VCs). Using a unique dataset of Japanese start-up firms, we find that the shareholding by VCs have, in fact, positively affects the R&D investment and that the impact of VCs funding is especially large when the shareholding by the lead VC exceeds 10%.

The Relation Between Stock Repurchase And Ownership Structure In France

2013 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 149
Author(s):  
Rim El Houcine ◽  
Adel Boubaker
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Stock Repurchase ◽  
Interest Alignment ◽  
The Relationship

The aim of this article is to study the relationship between the type of shareholders of French companies and their stock repurchase policy. According to the financial theory, the presence of institutional investors negatively influences the policy of purchasing the fact of preference of these investors over the reinvestment projects. The theoretical hypotheses of interest alignment and entrenchment have been used to justify the relationship between management stockholding and repurchasing policy. We have tested the validity of our hypotheses on a sample of 77 French companies during 2003-2008. The results have shown that the institutional investors affect negatively the repurchase, which can explain the priority of these latter for dividends compared to repurchasing and with holding the profit to invest it again. Moreover, we have found a positive relationship between the management stockholding and the repurchase, which has been explained by the power of entrenchment that can perform the repurchase by raising the stockholding percentage of managers who repurchase the stocks.

scholarly journals Ownership structure and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of Malaysian listed firms

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poh-Ling Ho ◽  
Gregory Tower
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms. The result shows that there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms over the eleven-year period from 1996 to 2006. Ownership concentration consistently shows positive association with voluntary disclosure. Firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership have a significantly positive association with voluntary disclosure levels while firms with family ownership exhibit lower voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, different ownership structures have varied monitoring effects on agency costs and clearly influence firm’s disclosure practices. The findings provide insights to policy makers and regulators in their desire to increase transparency and accountability amidst the continual enhancement of corporate governance. The findings provide evidence that optimized ownership structure in any jurisdiction should be considered in any regulatory process that seeks to improve transparency.

scholarly journals The structure of corporate ownership and firm performance: Sri Lankan evidence

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 723-734 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athula Manawaduge ◽  
Anura De Zoysa
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Performance Measures ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Sri Lankan ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Strong Positive Relationship ◽  
The Impact

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure and concentration on firm performance in Sri Lanka, an emerging market in Asia. The study estimates a series of regressions using pooled data for a sample of Sri Lankan-listed firms to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and structure on firm performance based on agency theory framework, using both accounting and market-based performance indicators. The results of the study provide evidence for a strong positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting performance measures. This suggests that a greater concentration of ownership leads to better performance. However, we found no significant impact using market-based performance measures, which suggests the existence of numerous market inefficiencies and anomalies. Furthermore, the findings of the study show that ownership structure does not have a significant distinguishable effect on performance.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document