scholarly journals The determinants of the succession in Taiwan’s family business groups

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-436
Author(s):  
Hsi-Mei Chung ◽  
Yunshi Liu
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Group Performance ◽  
Panel Data Analysis ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Chinese Family ◽  
The Family ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Family Business Group ◽  
Succession In Family Business ◽  
Leader Change

Based on the panel data analysis of Taiwan’s family business groups from 1988 to 2002, this research attempts to investigate the relationships among overlapping investment, use of particularistic ties, group performance, and succession in family business group. The results show that the family business group’s overlapping investment between the owner-managers and family members occupying the decisive positions of group affiliates significantly influence its leader change. This study highlights the importance of alternative control choices within the family business. Furthermore, it also provides a good comparing start-point for researches interested in understanding the succession issue of Chinese family business in Great China

scholarly journals How to Invest in Stocks of Family Business Groups? Case Study of WALSIN Group in Taiwan

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Yu-Wei Lan ◽  
Dan Lin ◽  
Lu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Family Group ◽  
Leverage Effect ◽  
The Family ◽  
Trading Profits ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Family Business Group ◽  
The Impact

<p><em>The impact of family business groups on the industry has drawn different views. A major challenge for investors is to understand the business model of enterprises and enhance the trading performance in the financial market. Using the data of WALSIN family group, this article adopts generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model (EGARCH) to investigate the volatility of stock prices of WALSIN family group. </em></p><p><em>The overall evidence suggests that the relationship between the leverage effect after including the leading company variable and the absence of the leading company appears to be significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the leverage effect after including the leading company has a certain effect on the financial operation of the family business group. In other words, it is helpful to include the leverage effect of the leading company in the portfolio, which can stabilize the trading performance of the WALSIN family group.</em></p><p><em>Furthermore, this study adopts Granger causality and program trading to test the strategy of following the leader of WALSIN family group. The net trading profit during this period is 71.03%. The results show that the technical analysis tested in this study can lead to trading profits and investors can increase their trading profits by following the leader in the family owned business.</em></p>

Defining the New Professional: The Family Business Counselor

1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 349-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joe M. Goodman
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Business Enterprise ◽  
Valuable Resource ◽  
New Professionals ◽  
Business Ownership ◽  
Professional Boundaries ◽  
The Family ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Business Counselors

After years of development, family business counselors have emerged as multidimensional and holistic advisors serving the needs of families in business. These unique technically trained advisors have expanded their professional boundaries to encompass a broad range of skills that are required to address the multiple and complex issues associated with family business ownership, successorship, and continuity of the business enterprise. Their successful experience over a number of years with many family business clients is a rare and valuable resource. These new professionals are prepared to meet the needs of family business groups. The family business counselor has finally arrived.

scholarly journals Governance Structure and Related Party Loan Guarantees: The Case of Chinese Family Business Groups

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 599-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Chen ◽  
Jakob Arnoldi ◽  
Chaohong Na
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Governance Structure ◽  
Chinese Family ◽  
Senior Executives ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Family Governance ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Loan Guarantees

ABSTRACTLoan guarantees to related parties by affiliated subsidiaries within family controlled pyramids form a means by which the controlling family expropriates value from minority shareholders. The controlling family, however, will attempt to escape blame for the behavior. Using a sample of 1785 listed Chinese firms affiliated with family-controlled business groups, we explore how family governance structure affects the use of related party loan guarantees. As hypothesized, we find that affiliates with non-family chairmen, but with family directors or senior executives, issue larger volumes of loan guarantees to related parties, whereas affiliates with family chairmen and those with non-family interlocking chairmen do not. The behavior is moderated by regional institutional development.

Auditor Appointment Strategy and Intragroup Value Transfers: Evidence From Family Business Groups

2021 ◽  
pp. 0148558X2199265
Author(s):  
Yan-Leung Cheung ◽  
In-Mu Haw ◽  
Weiqiang Tan ◽  
Wenming Wang
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Divide And Conquer ◽  
Alternative Measure ◽  
Family Business Groups ◽  
Audit Effectiveness ◽  
Financial Reporting Comparability

Family business groups (FBGs) typically control several member firms and can hire a single auditor or multiple auditors to audit their member firms. This article examines what type of auditor appointment strategy constrains intragroup value transfers within FBGs. Analyzing related-party transactions (RPTs) within FBGs in Hong Kong, this study provides evidence that FBGs with multiple auditors undertake more intragroup value transfers than FBGs with a single auditor. However, the adverse effect of multiple-auditor appointments is mitigated by a stronger board and higher financial reporting comparability among member firms. Using an alternative measure of intragroup value transfers, we also find that the market perceives multiple-auditor appointments as impairing audit effectiveness. Overall, our findings offer the new insight that controlling families can exploit the appointment of multiple auditors as a “divide and conquer” strategy which undermines the monitoring role of auditors against intragroup value transfers, but stronger corporate governance of member firms can mitigate the adverse effect.

scholarly journals The Dynamics and Complexity of Family Business Groups

2018 ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kajari Mukherjee ◽  
Marita Rautiainen ◽  
Timo Pihkala ◽  
Peter Rosa
Keyword(s):  
Family Business ◽  
Business Groups ◽  
Family Business Groups
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