scholarly journals he influence of shareholder voting rights on internal control mechanisms: a comparative study of publicly traded firms in Portugal and United Kingdom

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-367
Author(s):  
J. Augusto Felício ◽  
Ricardo Rodrigues
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Company Size ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Developed Economies ◽  
The United Kingdom

This work analyses the role of shareholder voting rights on the adoption of internal control mechanisms by firms from both a small emerging and developed economies. It also studies the influence that sector of activity and company size have on these mechanisms. The sample is comprised of publicly traded companies from Portugal and the United Kingdom. Data analysis using path analysis and multiple linear regression shows that shareholder ownership has a weak influence on control mechanisms. It also reveals that sector of activity and company size have differing influences on control mechanisms in differing contexts.

scholarly journals Analysis on the participation of the main sovereign wealth funds in European listed companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
L. Gómez-Pavón Durán
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Home Country ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Company Size ◽  
Economic Sector ◽  
Sovereign Wealth Funds ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Determining Factors ◽  
The One

The aim of this study is to conduct an analysis of the investment made by the fifteen largest sovereign wealth funds on listed European companies. The analysis is divided into two sections: a descriptive one and a statistical one. The methodology used for this purpose consisted of mining data from Orbis database and running a binomial logistic regression. The main results show that, in the first place, the Norwegian fund is the one that invests in a larger amount of companies and European countries. Another significant result indicates that the United Kingdom is the country that receives the most investment. Finally, the results lead also to the conclusion that, concerning investing, sovereign wealth funds are influenced by a set of factors such as company size, profitability, and leverage, whereas the company’s home country and the economic sector it belongs are not determining factors.

Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber)

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Public Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Grand Chamber

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber). This note concerns the provisions limiting the voting rights of prisoners, and the extent to which the United Kingdom is bound to follow the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

scholarly journals Influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Financial Reporting Quality: An Overview of EU Firms Cross-Listed in the USA

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ujkan Bajra ◽  
Rrustem Asllanaj
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Novel Approach ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa

Abstract This paper investigate whether compliance with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) Sect. 302 (financial reporting) and 404 (internal controls) enhances financial reporting quality (FRQ). This study focuses on EU publicly traded companies that are cross-listed in the US markets. Using a novel approach with respect to operationalization of the SOX, the empirical research integrated into this paper advances the understanding of financial reporting quality for both practitioners and policymakers. The study argues that financial reporting quality increased after SOX entered into force but, notably, we find that FRQ improves with compliance with SOX302 but not with SOX404. Examination of the latter relationship at the subsection level also reveals that compliance with certain SOX requirements is not satisfactory. We find that three out of six subsections of SOX302 are directly associated with financial reporting, while subsections (1), (5) and (6) of SOX302 are not related with FRQ, indicating that the management team, albeit not entirely, provides a reliable financial reporting systems. We also find that compliance with some SOX404’s subsections has been relatively low (i.e. subsections (1) and (3) of SOX404)), suggesting that corporations have not established and are not maintaining suitable internal control systems over financial reporting.

Takeovers by Scheme of Arrangement

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoff O’Dea ◽  
Julian Long ◽  
Alexandra Smyth
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Public Company

Historically, the most popular mechanism to effect a takeover of a public company incorporated in the United Kingdom (particularly one publicly traded in the United Kingdom) was via a contractual offer whereby a bidder makes a general offer to all shareholders on the register of members of the target to acquire their shares. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, this has been shifting and in more recent times schemes of arrangement appear to have become the structure of choice (at least with respect to higher value transactions) for implementing a recommended takeover of a public company that is both incorporated and traded in the United Kingdom.

Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Webb
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Case Note ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
European Court ◽  
Grand Chamber

Essential Cases: Public Law provides a bridge between course textbooks and key case judgments. This case document summarizes the facts and decision in Hirst v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681, European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber). This case note concerns the provisions limiting the voting rights of prisoners, and the extent to which the United Kingdom is bound to follow the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The document also includes supporting commentary from author Thomas Webb.

Using a Movie to Study the COSO Internal Control Framework: An Instructional Case

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arline Savage ◽  
Carolyn Strand Norman ◽  
Kathryn A. S. Lancaster
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Control Framework ◽  
Accounting Graduates

Following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives 2002), public accounting firms and publicly traded companies are much more focused on internal controls. Accordingly, many accounting graduates will be asked to evaluate, document, and perhaps test the adequacy of an organization's internal control structure. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations' (COSO 1992) Internal Control—Integrated Framework is the most widely used tool for this purpose. This instructional case, based on the movie, Rogue Trader, gives students the opportunity to see the consequences of lax corporate governance and weak internal controls at the Barings Bank. Students view the movie and then use the COSO framework to critically analyze the collapse of a well-established financial institution.

scholarly journals Agency costs, ownership structure, and corporate governance in pre-and post-IPO firms

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 88-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wallace N. Davidson III ◽  
Amani Khaled Bouresli ◽  
Manohar Singh
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Venture Capital Firms ◽  
The Impact

Following the approach in Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000), we estimate the impact of CEO ownership on agency costs in pre-IPO firms and again in the post-IPO period when they have become publicly traded companies. We find that CEO ownership is large in both the pre and post-IPO firms. Greater CEO ownership is associated with lower agency costs both before and after the IPO, and CEO ownership in these firms seems to dominate all other agency control mechanisms. Board composition and involvement by venture capital firms does not appear to mitigate agency costs.

Control Mechanisms in Cross-border Acquisitions: An International Comparison

1994 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Calori ◽  
Michael Lubatkin ◽  
Philippe Very
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
National Culture ◽  
International Comparison ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
International Acquisitions ◽  
Integration Process ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Formal Control

This paper analyzes the influence of national culture on the integration mechan isms exercised in international acquisitions. The study of 75 international acquisi tions in Europe (France and the United Kingdom) shows that firms are influenced by their national administrative heritage when they acquire companies abroad. For instance, the French exercise higher formal control of the strategy and the operations, and lower informal control through teamwork than the Americans when they buy firms in the United Kingdom. The Americans exercise higher formal control through procedures than the British when they buy firms in France. As some of these aspects of control were found to be linked with the attitudinal and/or economic performance of the acquired company, we argue that being conscious of the influence of a national administrative heritage should help anticipate cultural problems in the integration process following international acquisitions.

scholarly journals Are Canadian closely-held firms perceived to report low quality accounting information? Empirical evidence

2006 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 195-208
Author(s):  
Yves Bozec
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Publicly Traded Companies ◽  
Earnings Informativeness ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Reported Earnings

The objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence as to how corporate ownership structure in Canada affects earnings informativeness, as measured by the earnings-return relationship. Like those in many countries around the world, Canadian publicly traded companies are characterized by both concentrated ownership and divergence between voting rights and cash-flow rights. Like those in many other countries, their main agency problem resides in the conflict between large controlling blockholders and minority shareholders. These large dominant shareholders, with their imposing block of voting rights, are likely to influence accounting-information reporting. In this paper, we test whether large dominant shareholders are perceived to report low quality earnings. We show that earnings informativeness depends directly on the ownership structure of publicly traded firms. Furthermore, we show that investors perceive reported earnings as least credible when a controlling blockholder has both the power and impetus to expropriate minority shareholders, which suggests a non-monotonic relationship between earnings informativeness and ownership structure

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