scholarly journals Random Actions in Experimental Zero-Sum Games

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1(J)) ◽  
pp. 69-81
Author(s):  
Jung S. You
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Zero Sum Games ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Matching Pennies ◽  
Business Politics ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Zero Sum

A mixed strategy, a strategy of unpredictable actions, is applicable to business, politics, and sports. Playing mixed strategies, however, poses a challenge, as the game theory involves calculating probabilities and executing random actions. I test i.i.d. hypotheses of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium with the simplest experiments in which student participants play zero-sum games in multiple iterations and possibly figure out the optimal mixed strategy (equilibrium) through the games. My results confirm that most players behave differently from the Nash equilibrium prediction for the simplest 2x2 zero-sum game (matching-pennies) and 3x3 zero-sum game (e.g., the rock-paper-scissors game). The results indicate the need to further develop theoretical models that explain a non-Nash equilibrium behavior.

The Experimental Research on 2×2 Game with Unique Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

2011 ◽  
Vol 121-126 ◽  
pp. 1125-1129
Author(s):  
Hong Cheng ◽  
Mei Ping Huang ◽  
Ying Sheng Su ◽  
Xian Yu Wang
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Payoff Function ◽  
Risk Attitudes ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

This paper reports the results of an experimental study of playing a simple 2×2 non-zero sum game with asymmetrical payoff function. Subjects make decisions about their estimation for their opponent, and then each of them chooses a strategy after their roles are changed at random. As a result, steady states which subjects estimates are quite different from those predicted by the Nash equilibrium theory. Through comparative analysis, it is found that the selections of strategies are related to others’ payoff as well as subjects’ own return. And what is more, the subjects’ risk attitudes influence the choice of game.

scholarly journals Multi-objective Optimization of Accommodation Capacity for Distributed Generation Based on Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Considering Distribution Network Flexibility

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (20) ◽  
pp. 4395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weisheng Liu ◽  
Jian Wu ◽  
Fei Wang ◽  
Yixin Huang ◽  
Qiongdan Dai ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Distributed Generation ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Distribution Network ◽  
Distribution Networks ◽  
Multi Objective Optimization ◽  
Multi Objective ◽  
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Network Flexibility ◽  
Strategy Nash Equilibrium

The increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG) brings about great fluctuation and uncertainty in distribution networks. In order to improve the ability of distribution networks to cope with disturbances caused by uncertainties and to evaluate the maximum accommodation capacity of DG, a multi-objective programming method for evaluation of the accommodation capacity of distribution networks for DG is proposed, considering the flexibility of distribution networks in this paper. Firstly, a multi-objective optimization model for determining the maximum accommodation of DG by considering the flexibility of distribution networks is constructed, aiming at maximizing the daily energy consumption, minimizing the voltage amplitude deviation, and maximizing the line capacity margin. Secondly, the comprehensive learning particle swarm optimization (CLPSO) algorithm is used to solve the multi-objective optimization model. Then, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is introduced to obtain the frontier solution with the optimal joint equilibrium value in the Pareto solution set. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated with an actual distribution network in China. The simulation results show that the proposed planning method can effectively find the Pareto optimal solution set by considering multiple objectives, and can obtain the optimal equilibrium solution for DG accommodation capacity and distribution network flexibility.

On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium

1996 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Jørgen Jacobsen
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Positive Theory ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Pure Strategies

The most important analytical tool in non-cooperative game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a collection of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player, with the property that each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. If we do not go into normative game theory, which concerns itself with the recommendation of strategies, and focus instead entirely on the positive theory of prediction, two alternative interpretations of the Nash equilibrium concept are predominantly available.In the more traditional one, a Nash equilibrium is a prediction of actual play. A game may not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and a mixed strategy equilibrium may be difficult to incorporate into this interpretation if it involves the idea of actual randomization over equally good pure strategies. In another interpretation originating from Harsanyi (1973a), see also Rubinstein (1991), and Aumann and Brandenburger (1991), a Nash equilibrium is a ‘consistent’ collection of probabilistic expectations, conjectures, on the players. It is consistent in the sense that for each player each pure strategy, which has positive probability according to the conjecture about that player, is indeed a best reply to the conjectures about others.

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