scholarly journals Dictatorship, liberalism and the Pareto rule: Possible and impossible

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (181) ◽  
pp. 45-54
Author(s):  
Branislav Boricic
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Economic Crisis ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Free Market ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
First Order ◽  
Current Economic Crisis ◽  
Unrestricted Domain

The current economic crisis has shaken belief in the capacity of neoliberal 'free market' policies. Numerous supports of state intervention have arisen, and the interest for social choice theory has revived. In this paper we consider three standard properties for aggregating individual into social preferences: dictatorship, liberalism and the Pareto rule, and their formal negations. The context of the pure first-order classical logic makes it possible to show how some combinations of the above mentioned conditions, under the hypothesis of unrestricted domain, form simple and reasonable examples of possible or impossible social choice systems. Due to their simplicity, these examples, including the famous 'liberal paradox', could have a particular didactic value.

Social Welfare Functions

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Weymark
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Comparative Evaluation ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Welfare Economics

This chapter provides an introduction to the use of social welfare functions in welfare economics and social choice theory for the comparative evaluation of social alternatives. With a social welfare function, social preferences depend on individual well-beings. These well-beings are expressed in terms of either preferences or utilities. Three main approaches are considered: Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions, Arrovian social welfare functions, and Sen’s social welfare functionals. How the measurability and comparability of utility can be modeled and how limitations on the types of utility comparisons that are possible restrict the kinds of social welfare functions that can be considered is also discussed. Extensive social choice theory is used to deal with heterogeneous opinions about how to make utility comparisons.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

scholarly journals How to Judge Voting Schemes

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amartya Sen
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Axiomatic Method ◽  
Voting Procedures

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters’ preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.

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