A contextualist treatment of negative existentials

In this paper, I want to vindicate the contextualist treatment that is typically applied by artefactualists on fictional entities (ficta) both to general and to singular negative existentials. According to this treatment, the truth value of a negative existential, whether general or singular, changes according to whether the existential quantifier or the first-order existence predicate is contextually used as respectively ranging over and applying to a restricted or an unrestricted domain of beings. In (2003), Walton has criticized this treatment with respect to singular negative existentials in particular. First of all, however, as (Predelli, Stefano. 2002. ‘Holmes’ and Holmes. A Millian analysis of names from fiction. Dialectica 56. 261–279) has shown, this treatment can be applied to singular predications in general, independently of the existential case. Moreover, not only does applying it to singular negative existentials explain why we may contextually use the quantifier restrictedly in general negative existentials, but also it accounts for why comparative negative existentials, both singular and general, may have different truth values as well depending on the comparison group they mobilize.

Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and a form of weak continuity. Roberts (Rev Econ Stud 47(2):421–439, 1980) claimed that the induced welfare ordering on social states has a one-way representation by a continuous, monotonic real-valued welfare function defined on the Euclidean space of interpersonal utility vectors—that is, an increase in this welfare function is sufficient, but may not be necessary, for social strict preference. A counter-example shows that weak continuity is insufficient; a minor strengthening to pairwise continuity is proposed instead and its sufficiency demonstrated.

Faceted Classifications as Linked Data: A Logical Analysis

Faceted knowledge organization systems have sophisticated logical structures, making their representation as linked data a demanding task. The term facet is often used in ambiguous ways: while in thesauri facets only work as semantic categories, in classification schemes they also have syntactic functions. The need to convert the Integrative Levels Classification (ILC) into SKOS stimulated a more general analysis of the different kinds of syntactic facets, as can be represented in terms of RDF properties and their respective domain and range. A nomenclature is proposed, distinguishing between common facets, which can be appended to any class, that is, have an unrestricted domain; and special facets, which are exclusive to some class, that is, have a restricted domain. In both cases, foci can be taken from any other class (unrestricted range: free facets), or only from subclasses of an existing class (parallel facets), or be defined specifically for the present class (bound facets). Examples are given of such cases in ILC and in the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC).

Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences

We propose multi-type probabilistic serial (MPS) and multi-type random priority (MRP) as extensions of the well-known PS and RP mechanisms to the multi-type resource allocation problems (MTRAs) with partial preferences. In our setting, there are multiple types of divisible items, and a group of agents who have partial order preferences over bundles consisting of one item of each type. We show that for the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences, no mechanism satisfies both sd-efficiency and sd-envy-freeness. Notwithstanding this impossibility result, our main message is positive: When agents' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-nets, MPS satisfies sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, ordinal fairness, and upper invariance, while MRP satisfies ex-post-efficiency, sd-strategyproofness, and upper invariance, recovering the properties of PS and RP. Besides, we propose a hybrid mechanism, multi-type general dictatorship (MGD), combining the ideas of MPS and MRP, which satisfies sd-efficiency, equal treatment of equals and decomposability under the unrestricted domain of partial order preferences.

Interpreting presuppositions in the scope of quantifiers: "every" vs. "at least one"

This paper experimentally investigates presupposition projection from the scope ofthe quantifiers every and at least one, as triggered by the factive verb be aware and the iterativeadverb again. The first issue we are concerned with is whether presuppositions projectuniversally or existentially from quantified sentences. Different theoretical accounts endorseopposing views here (e.g., Heim, 1983; Geurts, 1999; Beaver, 2001; Schlenker, 2008, 2009;Fox, 2012), while recent experimental work (Chemla, 2009; Tiemann, 2014) suggests thatthe force of the projected presupposition varies by quantifier. The second issue we look atis how the descriptively observed readings arise—in particular, as a direct result output fromthe projection mechanism, or via additional, independent mechanisms such as domain restriction(e.g., Geurts and van Tiel, 2016): if the domain of the quantifier is restricted, this canyield what looks like non-universal inferences in light of the overall, unrestricted domain, evenif the projection mechanism itself yields a universal presupposition. Finally, we test whetherthe presupposed content also forms part of the entailed content, at least for certain triggers(Sudo, 2012; Klinedinst, 2016; Zehr and Schwarz, 2016). Our results yield clearly differentpatterns for every and at least one, with every giving rise to universal presuppositions, which,to a very limited extent, can be weakened by domain restriction, and at least one overwhelminglygiving rise to non-universal presuppositions. Our results also indicate the availability ofpresupposition-less readings for both triggers in the task at hand, apparently more prevalentthan domain restriction. Thereby, we present novel evidence that helps to pinpoint which of thetheoretical options can be substantiated experimentally.Keywords: Presupposition projection, quantifiers, domain restriction, entailment.

Natural Law and Universality in the Philosophy of Biology

Several philosophers of biology have argued for the claim that the generalizations of biology are historical and contingent.1–5 This claim divides into the following sub-claims, each of which I will contest: first, biological generalizations are restricted to a particular space-time region. I argue that biological generalizations are universal with respect to space and time. Secondly, biological generalizations are restricted to specific kinds of entities, i.e. these generalizations do not quantify over an unrestricted domain. I will challenge this second claim by providing an interpretation of biological generalizations that do quantify over an unrestricted domain of objects. Thirdly, biological generalizations are contingent in the sense that their truth depends on special (physically contingent) initial and background conditions. I will argue that the contingent character of biological generalizations does not diminish their explanatory power nor is it the case that this sort of contingency is exclusively characteristic of biological generalizations.

Dictatorship, liberalism and the Pareto rule: Possible and impossible

The current economic crisis has shaken belief in the capacity of neoliberal 'free market' policies. Numerous supports of state intervention have arisen, and the interest for social choice theory has revived. In this paper we consider three standard properties for aggregating individual into social preferences: dictatorship, liberalism and the Pareto rule, and their formal negations. The context of the pure first-order classical logic makes it possible to show how some combinations of the above mentioned conditions, under the hypothesis of unrestricted domain, form simple and reasonable examples of possible or impossible social choice systems. Due to their simplicity, these examples, including the famous 'liberal paradox', could have a particular didactic value.