scholarly journals Contemporary theories of democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyze several contemporary theories of democracy, and secondly, to propose a theoretical framework for further investigations based on analyzed theories. The following four theories will be analyzed: pluralism, social choice theory, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy.

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 747-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN ALDRED

In a recent paper, Dryzek and List attempt a reconciliation of Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Such an attempt is certainly long overdue and their original article is an important first step. In some ways it succeeds. In particular, they show that much of the imagined tension between the two theoretical frameworks is illusory and due to the mistaken assumption that many of the claims of rational choice theory form part of social choice theory (SCT) too. But in the nature of a Comment, I shall concentrate on aspects of their discussion which in my view warrant more critical scrutiny.


2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory. The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization of public hearings.


2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 752-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN S. DRYZEK ◽  
CHRISTIAN LIST

Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy. His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow's conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are less impressed by the way Aldred characterizes the overall terms of the reconciliation we propose. We believe that his argument on this matter should be resisted because it provides deliberative democrats with a bad excuse to dismiss social choice theory altogether, which is surely not what he intends.


1992 ◽  
Vol 40 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 54-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller

The paper contrasts the liberal conception of democracy as the aggregation of individual preferences with the deliberative conception of democracy as a process of open discussion leading to an agreed judgement on policy. Social choice theory has identified problems – the arbitrariness of decision rules, vulnerability to strategic voting – which are often held to undermine democratic ideals. Contrary to common opinion, I argue that deliberative democracy is less vulnerable to these difficulties than liberal democracy. The process of discussion tends to produce sets of policy preferences that are ‘single peaked’; and within a deliberative setting it may be possible to vary the decision rule according to the nature of the issue to be decided.


2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic

Is there a sense in which society makes rational decision in a democratic way that is similar to individual rational decision-making? Social choice theory claims that rational social choice is not possible. Or, at least, that if possible, then the social choice must be dictatorial. I shall present a deliberative solution to the social choice problem. This solution is called deliberative, because it is based on the assumptions of deliberative democracy.


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