scholarly journals A deliberative solution to the social choice problem

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
The Social

Is there a sense in which society makes rational decision in a democratic way that is similar to individual rational decision-making? Social choice theory claims that rational social choice is not possible. Or, at least, that if possible, then the social choice must be dictatorial. I shall present a deliberative solution to the social choice problem. This solution is called deliberative, because it is based on the assumptions of deliberative democracy.

scholarly journals Individual decision making, group decision making and deliberation

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Making ◽  
Group Members

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory. The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization of public hearings.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

scholarly journals Contemporary theories of democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Theoretical Framework

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyze several contemporary theories of democracy, and secondly, to propose a theoretical framework for further investigations based on analyzed theories. The following four theories will be analyzed: pluralism, social choice theory, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy.

A Decision Model for Selecting the Optimum Oil Production Profile Using Multi Criteria Decision Making and Social Choice Theory

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samira Keivanpour ◽  
Hassan Haleh ◽  
Hamed Shakouri Ganjavi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Oil Field ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Multi Criteria Decision Making ◽  
Statistic Model ◽  
Development Plans ◽  
Decision Making Model

Applying a MCDM model has many benefits for decision makers in the course of oil field master development plans preparation and evaluation. In this study, a multi-criteria decision making model is proposed in order to achieve an optimum production profile. The most important criteria and parameters for selection of best production profile are identified. These parameters are derived by several interviews with Iranian oil Industry’s experts. The candidate alternatives for production profile are ranked using a combination of group decision making approach and social choice theory. The degree of group consensus is evaluated by using a statistic model to confirm the validity of decision making model.

Bargaining in Legislatures

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1206 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron ◽  
John A. Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Free Model ◽  
Sequential Nature ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Formal Rules

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

An application of social choice theory to U.S.D.A. forest service decision making

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade E. Martin ◽  
Deborah J. Shields ◽  
Boleslaw Tolwinski ◽  
Brian Kent
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Forest Service

Social Choice Theory and the Reconstruction of Elections: A Comment on Levesque's Analysis

1983 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Woolstencroft
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Individual Preferences

The import of social choice theory lies in its examination of the various choice rules available for the recording and weighing of preferences in an election and the consequences of those rules for democratic political life. A choice rule is a method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective determination. Choice rules vary in their capacities to maximize (and minimize) various values desired in a system of decision-making. They also vary in their capacities to reveal information about preferences.

scholarly journals Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 315-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Endriss ◽  
N. Maudet ◽  
F. Sadri ◽  
F. Toni
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Multiagent System ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Artificial Society ◽  
The Social ◽  
Optimal Allocations

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually.

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