Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Comment

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 747-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN ALDRED
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Form Part ◽  
Mistaken Assumption ◽  
Critical Scrutiny

In a recent paper, Dryzek and List attempt a reconciliation of Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy. Such an attempt is certainly long overdue and their original article is an important first step. In some ways it succeeds. In particular, they show that much of the imagined tension between the two theoretical frameworks is illusory and due to the mistaken assumption that many of the claims of rational choice theory form part of social choice theory (SCT) too. But in the nature of a Comment, I shall concentrate on aspects of their discussion which in my view warrant more critical scrutiny.

scholarly journals AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM ON RATIONAL CHOICE AND PHILOSOPHY

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-173
Author(s):  
Samir Okasha ◽  
John A. Weymark
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Philosophical Work ◽  
Vanderbilt University ◽  
Selection Of

This symposium contains a selection of the papers that were presented at a conference we organized on Rational Choice and Philosophy that was held at Vanderbilt University on 16 and 17 May 2014. The aim of the conference was to provide an inter-disciplinary forum for philosophical work that uses ideas and tools from rational choice theory, understood broadly to include decision theory, game theory and social choice theory.

scholarly journals Contemporary theories of democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Participatory Democracy ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Theoretical Framework

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyze several contemporary theories of democracy, and secondly, to propose a theoretical framework for further investigations based on analyzed theories. The following four theories will be analyzed: pluralism, social choice theory, deliberative democracy and participatory democracy.

Economics is whatever the comparative advantage of economists is: a comment on Leeson (2020)

2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 553-556
Author(s):  
Ryan H. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Comparative Advantage ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Applied Econometrics ◽  
Theoretical Frameworks ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Comparative Advantages

AbstractLeeson (2020) objects to the conflation of economics with applied econometrics, and argues that economics instead should be thought of as the implications of the assumption that individuals maximize, i.e. rational choice theory. But, narrowly defining economics in terms of method demands that we ignore alternative theoretical frameworks which potentially hold explanatory power about topics thought of as economics, all for the sake of a definition. I suggest that applying rational choice theory and applying econometrics became the comparative advantage for economists relative to other social scientists by accidents of history. These comparative advantages largely persist. It is reasonable to call applications of both rational choice theory and econometrics to topics outside conventional economic topics ‘economics’ simply because these applications remain the comparative advantage of economists.

Rational Choice Theory in Political Decision Making

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott H. Ainsworth
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Models ◽  
Personal Identification ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Game Theoretic

Rational choice theory builds from a very simple foundation. To wit: individuals are presumed to pursue goal-oriented behavior stemming from rational preferences. Rational choice theory benefits from the very precise formulations of its assumptions. Individual-level rationality is generally defined as having complete and transitive preferences. Both completeness and transitivity have precise, formal definitions. From complete and transitive preferences, one can develop utility function presentations reflecting those preferences. Utility functions have the advantage of establishing a measure and allowing one to assess attitudes toward risk. That is, utility functions can reflect risk acceptance, risk neutrality, or risk aversion. Although some rational choice theorists focus on individual-level decision making, most rational choice theorists consider the ways in which individuals’ decisions are aggregated into some sort of social outcome or social preference order. The aggregation of individuals’ preferences occurs in both social choice and game theoretic models. Arrow’s theorem is the best-known result in social choice theory. Arrow showed that the rationality of individuals’ preferences could not be readily preserved at the group level when those individuals’ preferences were aggregated. That is, individual-level rationality does not ensure group-level rationality. Put slightly differently, irrationality at the group level cannot impugn rationality at the individual level. Other examples highlighting the difficulty of aggregating individuals’ preferences into a collective outcome abound. For instance, game theoretic presentations of the collective action problem highlight how individually rational decisions can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Rational choice models have been used to model interactions in a wide array of political institutions. Rational choice models have been developed to tackle some of the most challenging concepts in the social sciences, even in areas long thought impenetrable to rational choice theorizing. For instance, concepts such as ideology or personal identification have typically been used as preestablished descriptors. In contrast to treating those concepts as extant descriptors, rational choice theorists have modeled the endogenous development of ideologies and personal identification. Given the complexity of social phenomena, the relative parsimony and the clarity of rational choice models can be particularly helpful. The usefulness of rational choice models stems from their parsimony and their applicability to a wide range of settings.

The Nature of Utility Functions in Mass Publics

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry E. Brady ◽  
Stephen Ansolabehere
Keyword(s):  
Public Opinion ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Mass Publics ◽  
The Media

Survey data are used to test the basic tenets of rational choice theory. We find that (1) voters' preferences are orderly but voters do not always have preferences. When the perceived difference between two candidates is below some threshold, voters are indifferent between them. (2) Most voters choose candidates whose issue positions are congruent with their own. (3) Lack of knowledge about candidates affects choice and utility through two routes—indifference and risk aversion.Most voters have highly structured utility functions, but the thresholds and risk aversion in these functions place relatively unknown candidates at a disadvantage in presidential primaries and other electoral situations. Moreover, the importance of knowledge in these functions suggests that social choice theorists must take seriously the classic concerns of public opinion research—the operation of the media and the dynamics of information in elections.

scholarly journals Individual decision making, group decision making and deliberation

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Making ◽  
Group Members

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory. The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization of public hearings.

scholarly journals Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Response to Aldred

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 752-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN S. DRYZEK ◽  
CHRISTIAN LIST
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Independence Of Irrelevant Alternatives ◽  
Independence Condition ◽  
Universal Domain ◽  
The Way

Jonathan Aldred shares our desire to promote a reconciliation between social choice theory and deliberative democracy in the interests of a more comprehensive and compelling account of democracy. His comments on some details of our analysis – specifically, our use of Arrow's conditions of universal domain and independence of irrelevant alternatives – give us an opportunity to clarify our position. His discussion of the independence condition in particular identifies some ambiguity in our exposition, and as such is useful. We are less impressed by the way Aldred characterizes the overall terms of the reconciliation we propose. We believe that his argument on this matter should be resisted because it provides deliberative democrats with a bad excuse to dismiss social choice theory altogether, which is surely not what he intends.

Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice

1992 ◽  
Vol 40 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 54-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Miller
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Liberal Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Strategic Voting ◽  
Liberal Conception ◽  
Common Opinion ◽  
Open Discussion

The paper contrasts the liberal conception of democracy as the aggregation of individual preferences with the deliberative conception of democracy as a process of open discussion leading to an agreed judgement on policy. Social choice theory has identified problems – the arbitrariness of decision rules, vulnerability to strategic voting – which are often held to undermine democratic ideals. Contrary to common opinion, I argue that deliberative democracy is less vulnerable to these difficulties than liberal democracy. The process of discussion tends to produce sets of policy preferences that are ‘single peaked’; and within a deliberative setting it may be possible to vary the decision rule according to the nature of the issue to be decided.

scholarly journals A deliberative solution to the social choice problem

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
The Social

Is there a sense in which society makes rational decision in a democratic way that is similar to individual rational decision-making? Social choice theory claims that rational social choice is not possible. Or, at least, that if possible, then the social choice must be dictatorial. I shall present a deliberative solution to the social choice problem. This solution is called deliberative, because it is based on the assumptions of deliberative democracy.

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