The Dominant Firm: A Study of Market Power

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 628
Author(s):  
Stephen Martin ◽  
Alice Patricia White
Keyword(s):  
2018 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 98-115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rolf Golombek ◽  
Alfonso A. Irarrazabal ◽  
Lin Ma

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Francisco J. André ◽  
Luis Miguel de Castro

This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot and two versions of the Stackelberg model, depending on whether the permit dominant firm is a leader or a follower in the output market. In all three models, the firm that dominates the permit market is more sensitive to its initial allocation than its competitor in terms of abatement and less sensitive in terms of output. In all three models, output is decreasing and the permit price is increasing in the permit dominant firm’s initial allocation. In the Cournot model, permit dominance is fruitless in terms of output and profit if the initial allocation is symmetric. Output leadership is more relevant than permit dominance since an output leader always tends to, ceteris paribus, produce more and make more profit whether it also dominates the permit market or not. This leadership can only be overcompensated for by distributing a larger share of permits to the output follower, and only if the total number of permits is large enough. In terms of welfare, Stackelberg is always superior to Cournot. If the initial permit allocation is symmetric, welfare is higher when the same firm dominates the output and the permit market at the same time.


Author(s):  
Ingo Vogelsang

AbstractGerman telecommunications reform came late because of high institutional constraints, powerful beneficiaries and reasonable functioning of the old system. It finally occurred because (1) the beneficiaries had less to lose, (2) Germany was falling behind, (3) reform was proven to work abroad and (4) the EC exerted pressure. The reform, particularly separation of posts from telecommunications, privatization of Deutsche Telekom and the creation of the RegTP, brought radical changes and the formation of new beneficiaries. The current sector crisis should spur research in the stability of competition in network industries and a reevaluation of the current reforms. Further reforms are required by new EC rules that will provide a more unified framework for the entire telecommunications sector. In the long run, privatization and liberalization will be completed, while some kinds of telecommunications-specific regulation will continue. Dominant firm regulation of end-user services is likely to be abolished down the road, while bottleneck regulation may persist. The remaining amount of dominant firm regulation and the pace of deregulation will depend heavily on market boundaries between (a) wireless and fixed networks, (b) high and low capacity subscriber access and (c) high-density and lowdensity networks. Assessing the interaction between market boundaries and market power requires economic research of intermodal competition and market power.


1996 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-517 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simran K. Kahai ◽  
David L. Kaserman ◽  
John W. Mayo

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malú N.P.S. Cerqueira ◽  
Danilo R.D. Aguiar ◽  
Adelson Martins Figueiredo

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate firm strategies and the exertion of market power in the brewing sector in Brazil following a merger between the two largest brewers (Brahma and Antarctica) that created Ambev and given that the existing literature is inconclusive on this subjectDesign/methodology/approachIn this study the authors apply cointegration analysis to price series of beer brands. The authors use the reduced form vector error correction (VEC) model to measure the price responses of beer brands in terms of direction, magnitude and speed. The authors use monthly retail prices for the primary brands of beer in the city of São Paulo, Brazil's largest consumer market. Specifically, the authors use two sets of retail prices, one from bars (the main point of beer sales, with roughly 50% of market share) and another from supermarkets. The series range from 1994 to 2014, depending on the brand.FindingsThis study indicates that Ambev's two major brands (Skol and Brahma) behave as market leaders, while its third brand (Antarctica) has been used to challenge the low-price competitor (Nova Schin). The authors also found evidence that the pricing policies of Brahma and Antarctica have changed toward cooperation following the creation of Ambev.Research limitations/implicationsThe main limitation of this article is that the authors only had access to retailer data. As the merger involved brewers, the authors would ideally use manufacturer beer prices in their econometric analysis. However, the consistency of our results suggests that retailers have been passively transmitting brand strategies launched at a manufacturer level.Social implicationsAs the dominant firm created following the merger of the two largest brewers appears to use one of its brand to restrict entry of competitors and the premium brands to enjoy high profits, consumers tend to be harmed by high beer prices and lack of options. Furthermore, small and medium-size companies cannot grow due to entry barriers created by the dominant firm.Originality/valueThis paper is the first to apply cointegration analysis to examine the effect of mergers on pricing strategies. The robustness of this study suggests that this approach could be used for antitrust agencies to monitor post-merger strategies.


Author(s):  
Sonia Schwartz

Abstract This paper discusses market power effects in ambient permit markets. We consider a dominant firm in a position to exert market power in several markets. A first conclusion is that the distortion observed on manipulated markets spreads to other markets. We find that the manipulated prices could be lower than their competitive level if the dominant firm acts as a monopolist, and higher if it acts as a monopsonist. We show that the efficient outcome is not reached, except if the number of firms is the same as the number of markets whatever the initial endowment of permits. If not, the efficient outcome can be reached by means of initial endowments.


Author(s):  
Francisco Alvarez ◽  
Francisco J. André

Abstract We analyze emission permit auctions in a framework in which a dominant firm enjoys market power both in the auction and in the secondary market while its competitor behaves in a competitive way. We obtain linear equilibrium bidding strategies for both firms and a unique equilibrium of the auction, which is optimal ex-post for the dominant firm. Under specific distributional assumptions we conclude that the auction always awards less permits to the dominant firm than the cost-effective amount. Our results serve as a warning about the properties of auctioning under market power. Under interior solution the auction allocation is dominated by grandfathering in terms of aggregated cost with probability one. As a policy implication, the specific design of the auction turns out to be crucial for cost-effectiveness. The chances of the auction to outperform grandfathering require that the former is capable of diluting the market power that is present in the secondary market.


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