Recess Appointments to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation

1984 ◽  
Vol 84 (7) ◽  
pp. 1758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Curtis
2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 455-492 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosalind Dixon

A ‘functional’ approach to constitutional interpretation is well-accepted in many other jurisdictions, including the United States, and offers a promising middle path between the extremes of pure formalism and pragmatism. It is, however, under-developed as an approach to constitutional interpretation, rather than doctrine, in Australia. The article offers an exploration of what it would mean to adopt a more explicitly functionalist approach to the interpretation of the Constitution, drawing on constitutional cases decided by the High Court in 2014.


Author(s):  
Greg Anderson

The book then presents its philosophical case for an ontological turn. It begins by directly questioning the modern philiosophical orthodoxies which sustain conventional historical practice. Enlisting the help of numerous prominent authorities in a wide array of fields, from posthumanist studies to quantum physics, it directly challenges modernity’s dualist metaphysical and ontological certainties from a variety of different critical perspectives. Then drawing together ideas from some of the most influential of these “ethnographers of the present,” it goes on to propose an alternative, non-dualist metaphysics, a “meta-metaphysics” that would authorize us to to take an ontological turn in our practice, whereby we can historicize each past way of life on its own terms, in its own distinct world of experience.


1990 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-112
Author(s):  
Peter H. Halewood

Is there the possibility of a critical standpoint from which to adjudicate the correctness or validity of constitutional interpretation? This basic question has been given considerable attention in contemporary constitutional theory and has been the focus of the pragmatist law as literature movement born of the interpretive turn in legal theory. At issue is the very purpose of constitutional practice: is it to recover the truth of a set of foundational, moral ideals from the constitution and apply it to a particular factual conflict? Or is it to preserve continuity between the various elements of our cultural practices, to keep the peace?


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