A Study on the Nature and Limits of the Principle of Constitutional Interpretation of the Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 447-472
Author(s):  
Young-Woo Lee ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (101) ◽  
pp. 631
Author(s):  
Marc Carrillo

Resumen:La previsión de la jurisdicción constitucional en la Constitución de 1978 ha sido un instrumento que ha reforzado su condición de norma jurídica. El indudable prestigio institucional del Tribunal Constitucional adquirido en los primeros años se ha visto reducido posteriormente por la influencia política en su composición y funcionamiento. La interpretación constitucional forma parte de la Teoría de la Constitución y los criterios hermenéuticos del empleados por el Tribunal han tenido una notable influencia en la jurisdicción ordinaria. Por otra parte, el sentido objetivo y las nuevas reglas sobre admisión del recurso individual (amparo), han permitido que el Tribunal pueda ejercer con mayor eficacia el juicio sobre la ley del Parlamento. Por otra parte, su función de garantía de losderechos fundamentales no puede ser concebida al margen del sistemaeuropeo de jurisdicción multinivel. Abstract:The provision of constitutional jurisdiction in the 1978 Constitution has been an instrument that has reinforced its status as a legal norm. The undoubted institutional prestige of the Constitutional Court acquired in the first years has been subsequently reduced by political influence on its composition and functioning. The constitutional interpretation forms part of the Theory of the Constitution and the hermeneutical criteria of the employees by the Court have had a notable influence in the ordinary jurisdiction. On the other hand, the objective meaning and the new rules on admission of the appeal for Constitutional rigth’s legal protection (amparo), has allowed the Court to exercise more effectively the judgment on the law of Parliament. On the other hand, its function of guaranteeing fundamental rights can not be conceived outside the European system of multilevel jurisdiction. Summary:1. The constitutional justice and the Constitutional Court. 2. The constitutional interpretation. 3. The control of constitutionality of the law. 4.-The objective meaning of the appeal for Constitutional rigth’s legal protection (amparo). 5. The conflicts of competences: the constitutional jurisdiction and the ordinary jurisdiction. 6. The sentence of the Constitutional Court and the Dissenting vote’s function. 


Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-272
Author(s):  
Torben Ellerbrok

In der Rechtsprechung zum Verfassungsrecht wird mitunter der Gedanke fruchtbar gemacht, dass Normen des Grundgesetzes nicht umgangen werden dürften. Während aber im zivilrechtlichen Diskurs Bestand und methodische Verortung eines Umgehungsverbots seit Langem diskutiert werden, wurde einem „Verbot der Verfassungsumgehung“ bisher nicht näher nachgegangen. Der Beitrag zeigt auf, dass zwar ein hoher Abstraktionsgrad zahlreicher verfassungsrechtlicher Normen einer Umgehungsmöglichkeit entgegensteht und die Spezifika der Verfassungsauslegung zu berücksichtigen sind, auch das Grundgesetz aber rigide, umgehungsanfällige Normen enthält. Dort kann ein Umgehungsverbot ins Werk gesetzt werden, indem der Anwendungsbereich einer Norm über ihren Wortsinn hinaus ausgedehnt wird. Diese teleologische Verfassungsextension, eine Form richterlicher Rechtsfortbildung, ist nach hier vertretener Ansicht vorzunehmen, wenn Wortsinn und Ziel einer Verfassungsnorm divergieren, ein hoheitliches Handeln nicht dem Wortsinn, aber dem Ziel einer Norm zuwiderläuft und schließlich eine Eingriffsschwelle überschritten ist. Diese liegt bei der Verfassungsfortbildung aus näher aufgezeigten Gründen besonders hoch. Relevant werden kann hier insbesondere eine Umgehungsabsicht. Jurisprudence on constitutional law sometimes makes use of the idea that the norms of the Basic Law may not be circumvented. However, while scholarship on private law has long debated whether a prohibition of circumvention exists and how to place it methodologically, a “prohibition of constitutional circumvention” has not yet been examined in detail. As this article demonstrates, the fact that many constitutional norms are very abstract prevents circumvention, and the specifics of constitutional interpretation must be taken into account. Nevertheless, the Basic Law also contains rigid norms that are susceptible to circumvention. In this case, a prohibition of circumvention can be put into effect by extending a norm’s scope of application beyond its literal meaning. This teleological extension of the constitution, a form of judicial development of the law, must be carried out if the literal meaning and the purpose of a constitutional norm diverge, if a sovereign act runs counter not to the literal meaning but to the objective of a norm, and finally, if a threshold of interference is exceeded. This threshold is particularly high in the case of the further development of the constitution for reasons explained in greater detail. In particular, an intention to circumvent can become relevant here.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter M. Shane

This essay considers judicial independence, both as a legal and constitutional feature, and how states should seek to protect it. This essay posits that judicial independence is a universal constitutional requirement at both the federal and state levels, examining these ideas in the context of interbranch review and federal expectations of state judicial review. Further, this essay examines the limits of judicial restraint—either reflexive deference to other branches’ political decision-making or shrinking from unpopular judgments that advance constitutional rights—as strategies to protect judicial independence. It concludes that a state judiciary’s most self-protective stance is one of principled adherence to the law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fritz Edwadr Siregar

Nine Indonesian Constitutional Justices have the authority to annul a law drafted by 550 Parliament members and the President. The Constitutional  Court of the Republic of Indonesia (“the Court”), particularly in deciding cases  of judicial review, has the capability to declare words, sentences, paragraphs, articles or the law unconstitutional. Consequently, it is essential for the Court  to take into account legal arguments. The fundamental element of these legal arguments is constitutional interpretation, which serves as a parameter in determining constitutionality of the laws. However, in exercising its authority, the Court needs to interpret the Constitution as a  basis  for deciding  a case.  The standards for determining the constitutionality of a law must be the text of the Constitution, not what the judges would prefer the Constitution to mean. Constitutional supremacy necessarily assumes that a superior rule is what the Constitution says it is, not what the judges prefer it to be. [Craig R. Ducat: E3]. The Court period 2003–2008 were the Court’s the formative years, and as such are important to understand the methodology and interpretative approaches adopted by the Court. Many observers of the Court’s early decisions are still unsure of the overarching approach and methodology adopted by the Court. Thus, there is a need  for a close analysis and criticism of  the Court’s early decisions   to determine which methods and approaches it has adopted and whether these are appropriate in the Indonesian context. The Court has openly referred to the experiences of foreign jurisdiction in constitutional law, and therefore it would be appropriate to analyze the court’s decisions in a broader comparative context of constitutional interpretative approaches from around the  world.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Goldsworthy

Our duty is to declare the law as enacted in the Constitution and not to add to its provisions new doctrines which may happen to conform to our own prepossessions.1


Yuridika ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 384
Author(s):  
Eko Supriyanto

Even though an text academic was required in the bill, but an text academic is not necessarily used as an instrument by the legislators in shaping legislation and interpret the provisions of the law by the Constitutional Court. Based on consideration of the Constitutional Court the existence of an text academic was not binding on legislators and text academic as a material law also does not bind the Constitutional Court for use in interpreting the provisions of the law. So interpretation is one way to perfect the constitution. The interpretation that has binding power is the judicial interpretation. But in making that interpretation, the court is not doing it as a special activity or individually but through its decisions. Therefore, in relation to the constitutional interpretation made by the Constitutional Court in the case of decisions of the Constitutional Court is essentially the forms of judge interpretation and contains binding interpretations on various constitutional provisions relating to the case filed.


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