scholarly journals Corporations: Separation of the Voting Power from Legal and Beneficial Ownership of Corporate Stock

1949 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 547
Author(s):  
Richard V. Ehrick
2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.


1998 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 549-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tapio Raunio ◽  
Matti Wiberg
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 496-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Filippo Noseda

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