Auditors and the Principal-Principal Agency Conflict in Family Controlled Firms

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 31-55
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Sabri Boubaker ◽  
Michel Magnan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Controlling Shareholder ◽  
Voting Power ◽  
The Public ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY This paper examines whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) affect audit fees in firms where the largest controlling shareholder (LCS) is a family. Results show that there is a negative relationship between audit fees and the presence, number, and voting power of MLS. This is consistent with the view that auditors consider MLS as playing a monitoring role over the LCS, mitigating the potential for expropriation by the LCS. Therefore, our evidence suggests that auditors reduce their audit risk assessment and audit effort and ultimately audit fees in family controlled firms with MLS. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; M42; D86.

CEO Behavioral Integrity, Auditor Responses, and Firm Outcomes

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 61-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane S. Dikolli ◽  
Thomas Keusch ◽  
William J. Mayew ◽  
Thomas D. Steffen
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Behavioral Integrity ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Confidentiality Agreement ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
High Integrity ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate the audit fee response to CEO behavioral integrity (BI). BI refers to the perceived congruence between an individual's words and deeds (Simons 2002). Because low word-deed congruence should result in more explanations when communicating, we use variation in explanations beyond firm fundamentals and CEO-specific characteristics in more than 30,000 shareholder letters to serve as a linguistic-based proxy for CEO BI. We find that audit fees increase as BI decreases, but BI is not associated with financial misstatement or litigation. These findings are potentially consistent with auditors undertaking additional work in response to low BI, which, in turn, mitigates the risk of restatements and lawsuits. The likelihood of option backdating increases as BI decreases, consistent with the contention that auditors lacked incentives to prevent backdating. Finally, BI is increasing in future performance, which suggests that CEOs partially underpin the returns to high-integrity corporate cultures. JEL Classifications: J24; L25; M14; M41; M42. Data Availability: Proprietary data from KRW International cannot be shared because of the terms of a confidentiality agreement. All other data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Compensation Disclosures and Corporate Governance through Shareholder Voting

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 27-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Richard Carrizosa ◽  
Xiaoxia Peng
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Shareholder Voting ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
The Public ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT There are several measures of equity compensation that may provide shareholders with distinct and useful information for evaluating CEO pay. We examine whether shareholders consider additional disclosures of equity compensation measures beyond the grant date fair value when participating in corporate governance. We find that CEO equity compensation expense, a distinct measure of equity compensation, is a determinant of shareholder voting for management sponsored equity plans and voting for directors that serve on the compensation committee. After controlling for ISS recommendations, we find that voting outcomes remain significantly related to abnormal equity compensation expense. Consistent with shareholders considering the equity compensation expense, we document that firms shorten equity compensation vesting periods when they are no longer required to disclose the equity compensation expense. Our findings suggest that shareholders rely on multiple, distinct measures of equity compensation when participating in corporate governance. JEL Classifications: M12; M52; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Auditor Rotation and Perceived Competence and Independence: The Effect of Fees and Industry Specialization

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-175
Author(s):  
Roger Kamath ◽  
Ting-Chiao Huang ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Perceived Competence ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Attention To Detail ◽  
Industry Specialist

ABSTRACT Regulators and practitioners argue the relative merits of firm and partner rotation, while researchers report mixed results on the consequences of rotation. This study uses an experiment to examine the effect of an upcoming rotation on perceptions of auditor competence and independence and finds that participants appear to be indifferent to whether rotation is at the firm or partner level; they only react to concurrent changes in audit fees and the industry specialization status of the new auditor. Specifically, participants assess auditor competence and independence (specifically attention to detail, effort, and skeptical attitude) to be higher when fees increase rather than decrease significantly at the time of a rotation, and they assess auditor competence to be higher when rotation is to an industry specialist rather than a nonindustry specialist. These findings hold regardless of whether rotation is at the firm or partner level. JEL Classifications: M42. Data Availability: Data and the tasks used in this study are available on request.

Hiring Auditors with a Part II Quality Control Report: An Opportunity for Increased Earnings Management or Lower Audit Fees?

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-93
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Megan M. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Quality Control ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
The Public ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Public Company ◽  
General Demand ◽  
Systemic Quality

ABSTRACT The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) Part II inspection reports, which disclose systemic quality control issues that auditors fail to remediate, signal poor audit quality for triennially inspected audit firms. Auditors that receive a Part II inspection report typically experience a decrease in clients, which demonstrates a general demand for audit quality. However, some companies hire auditors that receive Part II inspection reports. We examine potential reasons for hiring these audit firms. We find that relative to companies that switch to auditors without Part II reports, companies that switch to auditors with Part II reports have higher discretionary accruals in the first fiscal year after the switch, which indicates lower audit quality and a heightened risk for future fraud. We find no difference in audit fees. Our results suggest that PCAOB Part II inspection reports may signal low-quality auditors to companies that desire low-quality audits. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Friends in Need Are Friends Indeed: An Analysis of Social Ties between Financial Analysts and Mutual Fund Managers

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaoyang Gu ◽  
Zengquan Li ◽  
Yong George Yang ◽  
Guangqing Li
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Social Ties ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Fund Manager ◽  
Mutual Fund Managers ◽  
Business Decisions ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine how hometown, school, and workplace ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers affect their business decisions. We show that a fund manager is more likely to hold stocks covered by analysts with whom she is socially connected, and that she also makes higher profits from these holdings. Such social tie-related holding returns are higher among more opaque firms. In return, a fund manager tends to cast her star analyst votes in favor of her connected analysts, and her fund company is more likely to allocate trading commissions to her connected analysts' brokerages. Additional tests indicate that analysts more actively acquire information (through conducting corporate site visits) and issue more optimistically biased recommendations for stocks held by fund managers with whom they are connected. Overall, our results illustrate the pronounced influence of social networks on the behaviors of analysts and fund managers. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M40. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Investor Sentiment for Corporate Social Performance

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (4) ◽  
pp. 401-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Naughton ◽  
Clare Wang ◽  
Ira Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Performance ◽  
Social Performance ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Investor Sentiment ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Time Varying ◽  
The Public ◽  
Valuation Uncertainty ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We document time-varying investor sentiment for corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We show that announcements of CSR activities generate positive abnormal returns during periods when investors place a valuation premium on CSR performance. In addition, we find that firms boost CSR performance in response to investor sentiment, and that this response is more pronounced for those firms that are more inclined to respond to investor sentiment due to valuation uncertainty and investor horizon. Our results suggest that investor sentiment plays a role in firms' commitment to CSR. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G14; G30; G31; G32; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Compensation Consultants and the Level, Composition, and Complexity of CEO Pay

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 311-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin J. Murphy ◽  
Tatiana Sandino
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Suggestive Evidence ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Equity Incentive ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We provide fresh evidence regarding the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. First, firms that employ consultants have higher-paid CEOs—this result is robust to firm fixed effects and matching on economic and governance variables. Second, while this relation is partly due to consultant conflicts of interest, it is largely explained by the impact consultants have on the composition and complexity of CEO pay plans; notably, this impact fully mediates the consultant-CEO pay relation. Third, firms with higher-paid CEOs and more complex pay plans are more likely to hire a consultant. Last, Say-on-Pay voting patterns suggest shareholders view positively the advice consultants provide, but only when consultants provide no other services. We also find suggestive evidence of boards “layering” new equity incentive plans over existing ones, thereby increasing the impact of composition and complexity on CEO pay beyond the premium the CEO would demand for bearing additional compensation risk. JEL Classifications: J33; M12; M52; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Product Market Competition and Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 139-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuequan Wang ◽  
Andy C. W. Chui
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Product Market Competition ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Competitive Industry ◽  
The One ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY Existing theories posit two contradictory predictions on the relation between product market competition and audit fees. On the one hand, product market competition can mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers and increase the accuracy of financial reporting, thus decreasing auditors' assessments of audit risk. Hence, auditors tend to charge lower fees to firms in a more competitive industry. On the other hand, product market competition can increase auditors' assessments of business risk. Therefore, audit fees are expected to increase with industry competitiveness. This study empirically tests the relation between product market competition and audit fees and finds that auditors charge more to firms in a more competitive industry. JEL Classifications: D4, G30, M41, M42.

scholarly journals Relevant but Delayed Information in Negotiated Audit Fees

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 95-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl E. Hackenbrack ◽  
Nicole Thorne Jenkins ◽  
Mikhail Pevzner
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Delayed Information ◽  
Audit Fee ◽  
News Events ◽  
Jel Classifications

SUMMARY: Audit fee negotiations conclude with the signing of an engagement letter, typically the first quarter of the year under audit. Yet investors do not learn the audit fee paid until disclosed in the following year's definitive proxy statement. We conjecture that negotiated audit fees impound auditors' consequential private, client-specific knowledge about “bad news” events investors will learn eventually. We demonstrate that a proxy for the year-to-year change in the negotiated audit fee has an economically meaningful positive association with proxies for public realizations of “bad news” events that occur during the roughly 12-month period between the negotiation of the audit fee and the disclosure of the audit fee paid. Our results suggest that negotiated audit fees contain information meaningful to investors and that if disclosed proximate to the signing of the engagement letter instead of the following year, information asymmetry between managers and investors would be reduced. JEL Classifications: G19, D89, M40. Data Availability: Available from public sources identified in the text.

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