Accounting Information Quality, Financing Constraints, And Company Innovation Investment Efficiency By Big Data Analysis

This paper takes the listed companies in China from 2008 to 2017 as the research sample to study the relationship between accounting information quality (AIQ) and company innovation investment efficiency. The results show that AIQ is negatively correlated with both the underinvestment and overinvestment of corporate innovation. Further, AIQ can alleviate financing constraints and reduce the lack of innovation investment; At the same time, AIQ can also alleviate the agency conflict and reduce the excessive investment in innovation. Finally, AIQ can promote the innovation investment efficiency of companies with low information environment.

Does Corporate Social Responsibility Impact on Corporate Risk-Taking? Evidence from Emerging Economy

This study analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) fulfillment on corporate risk-taking to assist stakeholders in identifying the “double-edged sword” role of CSR activities and provide empirical evidence for enterprises to properly carry out CSR activities. The results show that the self-interest instrumentalization of CSR activities intensifies agency conflict, and CSR fulfillment weakens risk-taking to a certain extent. When CSR fulfillment reaches a certain value, CSR activities can improve risk-taking. Then, CSR fulfillment and risk-taking show a U-shaped relationship. Further analysis shows that the impacts of CSR on debt financing and R&D input reflect the U-shaped effect pathways of CSR fulfillment on risk-taking. Finally, it is suggested that CSR activities should be avoided to become the “self-interest tool” of the management. The regulators guide enterprises to break through the inflection point of the U-shaped effect and consider more for the stakeholders’ overall interests. Additionally, the regulators establish an effective compensation system to ensure that the enterprises with adequate CSR fulfillment obtain high-quality capital resources and promote the sustainable development of the capital market.

Independent Directors' Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value

This chapter analyses the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and firm value and whether independent directors' tenure (IDT) strengthens or weakens this relationship. Further, it examines ownership concentration's role on this moderating effect of IDT in Malaysian family and non-family corporations. It is found that that IDT weakens the relationship between RPT and firm value. However, ownership concentration strengthens this moderating effect of IDT. Interestingly, family corporations are more likely to show a stronger impact of ownership concentration which we allude to concerns of maintaining reputation. The research results remain after controlling for technology corporations. The findings' have important implications for policy makers, practitioners and regulators, especially in emerging economies globally.Keywords: Agency Conflict, Corporate Financial Valuation, Independent Directors' Term in the Office, Corporate Governance, Family Corporations, Emerging Markets

The association between ownership concentration and payout behaviour: Evidence from South Africa

Orientation: The study investigated the association between ownership concentration and different payout methods of selected companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa for the financial reporting periods 2012 to 2019.Research purpose: The research objective was to investigate whether payout behaviour differed when low and high ownership concentration was compared.Motivation for the study: An understanding of the association between ownership concentration and payout policies is an important corporate governance aspect that could reveal the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders. No previous South African empirical study has considered testing or investigating the two opposing agency-based hypotheses, namely the monitoring and rent extraction hypotheses, with reference to different payout methods.Research design, approach, and method: An empirical research design was followed, which is descriptive in nature. Descriptive statistics and a mixed-model analysis of variance were employed to describe the different payout methods – that is ordinary dividends, special dividends, capital distributions, additional shares, general share repurchases, and specific share repurchases – employed by companies listed on the JSE based on a distinction between low and high ownership concentration.Main findings: High ownership concentration was found to be associated with statistically significant lower ordinary dividends and capital distributions in support of the rent extraction hypothesis. Rent extraction highlights the agency conflict between majority and minority shareholders.Practical/managerial implications: Findings of the present study revealed agency conflicts that may be informative to those charged with corporate governance to help them resolve agency conflict.Contribution/value-add: This study is the first to consider the association between ownership concentration and payout behaviour in South Africa subsequent to the introduction of the dividends tax regime in 2012. The descriptive evidence submitted can serve as a basis for further explanatory research relating to ownership concentration and payout behaviour of companies.

Top managers and problems of managing organizations

The article investigates the problem of the management crisis caused by the low efficiency of management personnel in the conditions of economic crisis. The system of management methods is dominated by administrative methods to the detriment of economic and socio-psychological ones. The purpose of the study is to find ways to solve the crisis and improve the efficiency of management personnel. The objectives of the research are to develop approaches to the professional development of personnel and the transformation of the system of labor relations based on the principles of trust management. The study of agency conflict in the management system of organizations was carried out on the basis of desk research, surveys of managers and employees of the management system. The tactical and strategic solutions to improve the management system in organizations have been proposed. The authors conclude that the risk of causing the greatest damage to the management system is associated with the problem of trust. The main principle of management should be the trust of the staff to their managers and their integration into management processes at least at the level of management of the main production business processes. The study reveals the lack of growth of social skills of managers, for whom employees are not partners, but employees-opportunists. According to the authors, it is necessary to unite employees, give them a common goal and make them members of a single team.

Effect of Blockholder Ownership on the Related Party Transactions to the Financial Industries

This study aimed to find out blockholder ownership effect on tunnelling or propping related party transactions. Sample researchs were 82 financial industries that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2017-2019 with 246 observations as panel data. Based on panel data regression test, this study found blockholder ownership had positive effects on tunnelling related party transactions that proxied by related party transactions related to accounts receivable and related party transactions related to assets other than account receivables. Meanwhile, blockholder ownership had no effect on propping related party transactions that proxied by related party transactions related to accounts payable and liabilities other than accounts payable. The study also found blockholder ownership effect on tunnelling related party transactions was bigger than propping. These findings were appropriate with the relevant agency theory about blockholder ownership effect on related party transactions which had the potency on the emergence of agency conflict among the shareholders.

Competition and Agency Problems Within Banks: Evidence from Insider Lending

This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By exploiting interstate branching deregulation, we then show that banks react to greater competition by reducing insider lending, especially when the entry of new competitors may more strongly affect bank profitability. Results are robust to using various identification approaches and alternative indicators of agency conflict. We conclude that competitive pressure reduces managerial self-dealing. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.