The Fixed Law of Patents as Established by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Nine Circuit Courts of Appeals

1913 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
J. L. S. ◽  
William Macomber
Author(s):  
Scott Timcke

American politics is at a decisive historical conjuncture, one that resembles Gramsci’s description of a Caesarian response to an organic crisis. The courts, as a lagging indicator, reveal this longstanding catastrophic equilibrium. Following an examination of class struggle ‘from above’, in this paper I trace how digital media instruments are used by different factions within the capitalist ruling class to capture and maintain the commanding heights of the American social structure. Using this hegemony, I argue that one can see the prospect of American Caesarism being institutionally entrenched via judicial appointments at the Supreme Court of the United States and other circuit courts.


1966 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheldon Goldman

Voting behavior of public decision-makers has been of central concern for political scientists. For example, studies of legislatures (notably of Congress) have investigated such research problems as: (1) the extent to which voting on one issue is related to voting on other issues; (2) the potency of party affiliation as an organizer of attitudes and a predictor of voting behavior; and (3) the relationship of demographic characteristics to voting behavior. These and related concerns have more recently occupied the attention of students of the judiciary whose focus has primarily been on the United States Supreme Court. State courts of last resort have also provided a testing ground primarily for problems (2) and (3). However, the United States courts of appeals, second only to the Supreme Court in judicial importance, have been largely neglected. This paper considers the above research problems with reference to the voting behavior on all eleven courts of appeals from July 1, 1961 through June 30, 1964.


1915 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 519-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Carpenter

The intent of the framers of the judiciary act of 1801 has been to the present day a matter of some doubt. On the one hand it has been shown that alterations in the judiciary system of the United States had long been agitated before the failure of the Federalist party in the elections of 1800. Soon after the establishment of federal courts in 1789 relief had been sought by the justices of the supreme court from the arduous duties necessitated in riding the circuits. In 1799 a bill designed to establish a system of circuit courts was reported upon which action was postponed. But this later became the basis for the act of 1801. It has, therefore, been contended that, quite apart from the political advantage given the Federalists by the passage of the act of 1801, such changes in the judiciary system were warranted by necessity.At the same time it is equally clear that the amount of business before the courts of the United States, although it had been excessive, had begun to decline. No further prosecutions were to be expected under the alien and sedition acts, and a decrease in the number of suits before the federal courts involving other questions was observed even before the accession of Jefferson to the presidency.


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