Administrative Law. Judicial Review. Defendant Has Right to Trial by Jury and Trial De Novo in Action Seeking Civil Penalties for Violation of Federal Trade Commission Order. United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F. 2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974)

1975 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1035 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Healy

In last year’s term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straight forward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article discusses and criticizes the approach of Justice Scalia writing for the majority and of Chief Justice Roberts writing for three dissenting Justices.Practitioners and scholars of administrative law can only be confused by the Court’s willingness to apply Chevron in City of Arlington, given the informal administrative action being reviewed and the fact that neither reviewing court actually applied each of the two parts of the Mead test. The Court’s flawed administrative law analysis results from the activist concerns of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia uses the case as a vehicle to undermine Mead, a decision that Justice Scalia loathes. Chief Justice Roberts uses the case as a vehicle to advocate for less judicial deference and less law defining power for increasingly powerful agencies. Neither member of the Court allowed the applicable rules of contemporary administrative law to hinder his efforts to achieve his broader goals. Administrative law would have been better served if a properly restrained Court had considered and applied the previously determined rules for judicial review of administrative agencies. 


2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-652
Author(s):  
Robin Creyke

Courts and tribunals have distinct roles within the Australian administrative law system at the federal level, and to a lesser extent, in the states and territories. Questions of law are for the courts, and questions of fact are for the executive and tribunals. From time to time this orthodoxy is questioned. Suggestions are made that the courts are increasingly tending to intrude into the province of tribunals. Using cases as illustrations, this article explores five relevant jurisdictional areas —from appeals on a question of law to deference under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 10(2)(b)(ii)—to test the accuracy of the suggestion.


2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa

AbstractThe 1994 Malawian Constitution is unique in that it, among other things, recognizes administrative justice as a fundamental right and articulates the notion of constitutional supremacy. This right and the idea of constitutional supremacy have important implications for Malawi's administrative law, which was hitherto based on the common law inherited from Britain. This article highlights the difficulties that Malawian courts have faced in reconciling the right to administrative justice as protected under the new constitution with the common law. In doing so, it offers some insights into what the constitutionalization of administrative justice means for Malawian administrative law. It is argued that the constitution has altered the basis and grounds for judicial review so fundamentally that the Malawian legal system's marriage to the English common law can be regarded as having irretrievably broken down as far as administrative law is concerned.


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