Taxation: Administrative Law: Judicial Review of Determinations of United States Tax Court: The Rule of the Dobson Case

1946 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 192
Author(s):  
Rosemary Scott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Tax Court

scholarly journals Means And Ends In City Of Arlington v. FCC: Ignoring The Lawyer's Craft to Reshape the Scope of Chevron Deference

2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael P. Healy
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Means And Ends ◽  
Chief Justice

In last year’s term, the United States Supreme Court considered the question of the scope of Chevron deference in City of Arlington v. FCC. This article discusses how the decision is an example of the work of an activist Court. The case should have been resolved by a straight forward determination under the analysis of United States v. Mead that Chevron deference simply did not apply to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) legal determination. The Court ignored this restrained approach to the case and instead addressed the question the Justices desired to decide: the reach of Chevron deference. The article discusses and criticizes the approach of Justice Scalia writing for the majority and of Chief Justice Roberts writing for three dissenting Justices.Practitioners and scholars of administrative law can only be confused by the Court’s willingness to apply Chevron in City of Arlington, given the informal administrative action being reviewed and the fact that neither reviewing court actually applied each of the two parts of the Mead test. The Court’s flawed administrative law analysis results from the activist concerns of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Scalia uses the case as a vehicle to undermine Mead, a decision that Justice Scalia loathes. Chief Justice Roberts uses the case as a vehicle to advocate for less judicial deference and less law defining power for increasingly powerful agencies. Neither member of the Court allowed the applicable rules of contemporary administrative law to hinder his efforts to achieve his broader goals. Administrative law would have been better served if a properly restrained Court had considered and applied the previously determined rules for judicial review of administrative agencies. 

James Bryce and the Australian Constitution

2015 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200
Author(s):  
Stephen Gageler
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Practical Operation ◽  
Responsible Government ◽  
Shed Light

James Bryce was a contemporary of Albert Venn Dicey. Bryce published in 1888 The American Commonwealth. Its detailed description of the practical operation of the United States Constitution was influential in the framing of the Australian Constitution in the 1890s. The project of this article is to shed light on that influence. The article compares and contrasts the views of Bryce and of Dicey; Bryce's views, unlike those of Dicey, having been largely unexplored in contemporary analyses of our constitutional development. It examines the importance of Bryce's views on two particular constitutional mechanisms – responsible government and judicial review – to the development of our constitutional structure. The ongoing theoretical implications of The American Commonwealth for Australian constitutional law remain to be pondered.

Judicial Review and Merits Review: Are the Boundaries Being Eroded?

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 627-652
Author(s):  
Robin Creyke
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
Law System

Courts and tribunals have distinct roles within the Australian administrative law system at the federal level, and to a lesser extent, in the states and territories. Questions of law are for the courts, and questions of fact are for the executive and tribunals. From time to time this orthodoxy is questioned. Suggestions are made that the courts are increasingly tending to intrude into the province of tribunals. Using cases as illustrations, this article explores five relevant jurisdictional areas —from appeals on a question of law to deference under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 10(2)(b)(ii)—to test the accuracy of the suggestion.

Liberating Malawi's Administrative Justice Jurisprudence from Its Common Law Shackles

2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Administrative Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Administrative Justice

AbstractThe 1994 Malawian Constitution is unique in that it, among other things, recognizes administrative justice as a fundamental right and articulates the notion of constitutional supremacy. This right and the idea of constitutional supremacy have important implications for Malawi's administrative law, which was hitherto based on the common law inherited from Britain. This article highlights the difficulties that Malawian courts have faced in reconciling the right to administrative justice as protected under the new constitution with the common law. In doing so, it offers some insights into what the constitutionalization of administrative justice means for Malawian administrative law. It is argued that the constitution has altered the basis and grounds for judicial review so fundamentally that the Malawian legal system's marriage to the English common law can be regarded as having irretrievably broken down as far as administrative law is concerned.

scholarly journals The Insurance Commissioner in the United States, a Study in Administrative Law and Practice

1927 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 440
Author(s):  
D. O. McGovney ◽  
Edwin Wilhite Patterson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Administrative Law

WHAT ARE CONSTITUTIONS, AND WHAT SHOULD (AND CAN) THEY DO?

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Alexander
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Constitutional Change ◽  
Principal Function ◽  
Fundamental Law

AbstractA constitution is, as Article VI of the United States Constitution declares, the fundamental law of the land, supreme as a legal matter over any other nonconstitutional law. But that almost banal statement raises a number of theoretically vexed issues. What is law? How is constitutional law to be distinguished from nonconstitutional law? How do morality and moral rights fit into the picture? And what are the implications of the answers to these questions for such questions as how and by whom should constitutions be interpreted? These are the issues that I shall address.Alexander proceeds as follows: In section I he takes up law's principal function of settling controversies over what we are morally obligated to do. In section II he then relate law's settlement function to the role of constitutional law. In particular, he discusses how constitutional law is distinguished from ordinary law, and he also discusses the role of constitutions in establishing basic governmental structures and enforcing certain moral rights. In section III he addresses the topic of constitutional interpretation, and in section IV the topic of judicial review. Finally, in section V, he discusses constitutional change, both change that occurs through a constitution's own rules for amendments and change that is the product of constitutional misinterpretations and revolutions.

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