Constitutional Law in 1921–1922: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1921

1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-639
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin

The central point of interest in the work of the court the past term is supplied by the large attention given to the question of the rights and duties of labor under the law. The problem is approached repeatedly, both from the side of the state's police power and that of national power, and in the field of statutory as well as that of constitutional construction. Important results were also reached in interpretation of the “commerce” clause, both in its aspect as a source of national power and in its aspect—because of the doctrine of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress—as a restriction on the states; but especially in the latter aspect. However, the most interesting single decision of the term for students of constitutional theory and of government was one dealing with the national power of taxation.

1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-279
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

As was pointed out a year ago in this Review, the Supreme Court was able to deal with the cases involving the New Deal which came before it during its 1934 term without any striking enlargement of judicial power and without the announcement of any novel constitutional doctrine. The N.R.A., the Gold Clauses, the Farm Bankruptcy Act, were dealt with by the familiar processes of deciding whether Congress had actually exercised a power not granted to it by the Constitution, or had exercised a granted power in a forbidden way. The New Deal issues which came to the Court during the 1935 term were quite as far-reaching in significance and were certainly not of a routine variety. They involved, in some cases, constitutional clauses never before interpreted by the Court. Some of the federal laws under attack were obviously exercises of delegated powers, but at the same time, they exercised delegated powers for purposes which were novel and which had been commonly supposed not to be within the reach of federal authority. In dealing with laws of this type, the Court brought forward and established as a working implement of constitutional construction the so-called doctrine of “dual federalism.”


1920 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-658
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin

The work of the Supreme Court during the term concluded last June was quite unusual both in the nature of the problems involved and the importance of certain of the results achieved. The center of interest in constitutional interpretation has swung, for the time being at least, decidedly from questions of state power to those of national power. This is partly the aftermath of the war, partly the corollary of recent amendments to the Constitution. By the same sign, the court has been confronted in recent months with not a few problems of considerable novelty—some indeed being questions of first impression—with the result that it has been called upon to enunciate principles which must guide its interpretation of important provisions of the Constitution for years to come. In preparing this review, the unique quality of the court's work during the period under consideration ought to determine the procedure. Accordingly the greater part of the space is devoted to a few outstanding cases, all of which involve questions of national power, while less striking results have received much briefer consideration, often only cursory mention.


1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 278-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The 1936 term of the Supreme Court will probably be rated a notable one. This is due both to the Court's own work, and to certain extraneous occurrences which could hardly fail to have some impact upon it. In any attempt to evaluate the work of this term, one should bear in mind the following facts: First, a month after the Court convened President Roosevelt was reëlected by one of the most impressive popular and electoral majorities in our political history. Second, in February the President submitted to Congress his proposal for the reorganization of the Supreme Court, including the enlargement of its membership by the addition, up to fifteen, of a new justice for every one remaining on the Court beyond the age of seventy. This proposal aroused violent opposition, the debates on it continued for many months, and ultimately the plan was defeated largely through the efforts of the President's own party. The discussions on this proposal were going on during much of the time in which the Court was sitting. Third, in every case in which New Deal laws were attacked, they were held valid. These results were accomplished in many instances by five-to-four margins, and in the Minimum Wage Case by a five-to-four reversal of a previous five-to-three decision.


1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-308
Author(s):  
David Fellman

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1947 term. The former Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes, Avho had retired from the Court on July 1, 1941, died on August 27, 1948. Justice Hughes had served on the Court from May 2, 1910, to June 10, 1916, and was appointed Chief Justice on February 13,1930, succeeding William Howard Taft. In characteristic fashion, the justices filed during the 1947 term a very large number of dissenting and concurring opinions liberally salted with spirited and often bitter judicial invective.


1939 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 234-266
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

During the 1937 term, the Supreme Court underwent the first changes in its personnel since Mr. Justice Cardozo succeeded Mr. Justice Holmes in March, 1932. On June 1, 1937, Mr. Justice Van Devanter retired and was succeeded at the opening of the new term in October by Mr. Justice Black. On January 18, 1938, Mr. Justice Sutherland retired and was succeeded on January 31 by Mr. Justice Reed. During a substantial part of the term, Mr. Justice Cardozo was absent on account of illness, and his death occurred July 9, 1938. Mr. Justice Black, whose appointment had attracted much public comment, threw himself into the work of the Court with unusual vigor. During the term, he wrote the opinion of the Court in fifteen cases. He dissented in fourteen cases, in nine of which he wrote dissenting opinions. He concurred without substantial opinion in eleven cases, and wrote a concurring opinion in one other case. Mr. Justice Reed participated less actively, first because of the lateness of his appointment, and second because his prior service as Solicitor-General of the United States disqualified him from sitting in a considerable number of cases. These changes in the membership of the Court have altered the almost even division on the bench between the so-called conservatives and the so-called liberals. Without attempting to speculate as to the course of future decisions, it is significant that the irreconcilably conservative block of justices, consisting of Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, McReynolds, and Butler, has been broken up.


1946 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The membership of the Supreme Court did not change during the 1944 term, but Mr. Justice Roberts resigned in July after the term had ended. Divisions in the Court were as numerous and as difficult to classify as before. Four justices dissented in twenty-seven cases, while three justices dissented in sixteen cases. The Court seems to be moving toward the old practice of the pre-Marshall period by which the justices wrote seriatim opinions. There is a depressing increase in the number of cases in which three, four, and even five justices feel impelled to write separate opinions.


1934 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-64
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The Supreme Court has at last passed squarely upon the broad powers of the Federal Radio Commission over the business of broadcasting and has upheld them in a sweeping manner in the case of Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co. The general authority conferred on the Commission by the act of 1927 was enlarged in 1928 by provisions directing the Commission to maintain as great equality as possible in the allocating of broadcasting licenses among the zones created and further to distribute such licenses fairly and reasonably to the states within each zone according to population. In 1930, it appeared that Illinois had 55 per cent more than its quota of stations, while Indiana had 22 per cent under its quota. The Commission assigned to station WJKS at Gary, Indiana, operating rights on a frequency theretofore used by two Chicago stations. One of these, operated commercially by the respondent, used much National Broadcasting Company program material; the other, operated by the North Shore Church of Chicago, broadcast only religious programs. The effect of the order was to rule these stations off the air. It appeared that the Gary station had suffered from interference, and was furthermore equipped to serve its audiences with programs of unique interest.


1920 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell

Several of the cases already considered under the commerce clause involved further questions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Georgia's misuse of the mileage ratio in applying the unit rule to the taxation of wandering cars was found so arbitrary as to violate the requirement of due process. The minority insisted that “the case presents no question of taxing a foreign corporation with respect to personal property that never has come within the borders of the state.” This was not specifically denied by the majority who seem to base their decision on excessive valuation of property within the jurisdiction rather than on taxation of property outside the jurisdiction. Yet in substance the case is one of taxing extra-state values though not extra-state tangible objects.Missouri's excessive fee for certificates authorizing the issue of bonds secured by railroad property within the state, which was held an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce, was alleged by complainant to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. The opinion of the court did not pass on the due-process question, but the cases cited under the commerce clause relied also on the Fourteenth Amendment.


1940 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

The 1938 term of the Supreme Court brought substantial changes in its personnel. Mr. Justice Cardozo died on January 9, 1938. He was succeeded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who took office on January 30, 1939. On February 13, 1939, Mr. Justice Brandeis retired, and on April 17 Mr. Justice Douglas was appointed to fill his place. By the end of the term, therefore, four justices appointed by President Roosevelt had taken office. It is too early to appraise the results of these appointments upon the decisions and doctrines of the Court. One statement may be made, however, which throws some light upon the recent trend of judicial decisions. In preparing the present survey of the Court's decisions, some sixty cases were examined, all but one or two of them turning upon constitutional issues. In these sixty-odd cases, Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler, the two remaining members of the conservative “old guard,” dissented together twenty-five times. In several instances they were joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Roberts, and once or twice by the Chief Justice. In the main, however, they stood alone against a compact majority of six or seven justices. With the death of Mr. Justice Butler in the fall of 1939, Mr. Justice McReynolds stands like the boy on the burning deck amidst what obviously appears to him to be the imminent destruction of the old constitutional system.


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