Constitutional Law in 1918–1919. II: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1918

1920 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
The State ◽  
Personal Property ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Extra State ◽  
Foreign Corporation

Several of the cases already considered under the commerce clause involved further questions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Georgia's misuse of the mileage ratio in applying the unit rule to the taxation of wandering cars was found so arbitrary as to violate the requirement of due process. The minority insisted that “the case presents no question of taxing a foreign corporation with respect to personal property that never has come within the borders of the state.” This was not specifically denied by the majority who seem to base their decision on excessive valuation of property within the jurisdiction rather than on taxation of property outside the jurisdiction. Yet in substance the case is one of taxing extra-state values though not extra-state tangible objects.Missouri's excessive fee for certificates authorizing the issue of bonds secured by railroad property within the state, which was held an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce, was alleged by complainant to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment as well. The opinion of the court did not pass on the due-process question, but the cases cited under the commerce clause relied also on the Fourteenth Amendment.

Constitutional Law in 1917–1918. II: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1917

1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-250
Author(s):  
Thomas Reed Powell
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Eminent Domain ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process Of Law ◽  
Pennsylvania Hospital ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Proper Interpretation

There is little or no homogeneity to the questions to be considered under the head of retroactive legislation. A dispute whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligation of contracts may turn on a question as to the proper interpretation or application of language, or on opposing views of what is sufficient consideration or what agreements are against public policy. It was under the obligation-of-contracts clause that the Pennsylvania Hospital case decided that the power of governmental authorities to exercise eminent domain could not be bargained away. The crucial question is more often whether alleged rights existed than whether undoubted rights have been impaired. The Fourteenth Amendment and the doctrine of vested rights combine to make the obligation-of-contracts clause almost superfluous, as it is difficult to think of any impairment of the obligation of contracts which that clause inhibits which could not equally well be held deprivations of liberty or property without due process of law.This is apparent from the fact that retroactive legislation by Congress is questioned under the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment, a contract being regarded as a property right that can be interfered with only when there is sufficient justification for what is done.

Constitutional Law in 1909-1910: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1909

1910 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 483-497
Author(s):  
Eugene Wambaugh
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Successful Attempt ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
State Statutes ◽  
The Supreme Court

It is indeed a substantial grist that the Supreme Court of the United States at the last term of court has ground for students of political science. The first opinion was delivered on November 1, 1909, and the last on May 31, 1910, and the court decided no less than sixty-five constitutional cases. Notice that with caution it is merely said that the court decided no less than that number; for it is often somewhat a matter of opinion whether a case should be classed as constitutional, and it may well be that there are readers who will find that the court exceeded sixty-five. And how were those sixty-five divided? Many turned on more constitutional points than one, and thus an enumeration of the cases bearing on the several clauses of the Constitution will reveal a total exceeding sixty-five. The enumeration, subject to amendment in accordance with each student's views, gives the following results: The Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-four cases; the Commerce Clause, twenty-one; the Obligation of Contracts Clause, eight; whether cases arise “under the laws of the United States,” eight; Full Faith and Credit Clause, five; and sixteen other clauses, from one to four cases each, aggregating twenty-seven.Through these dull figures some important facts shine distinctly. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause clearly took a vast part of the court's energy, and each of these provisions has to do with the curtailment of functions which prima facie belong to the several states. In other words, the chief feature of this term, as of every recent term, has been a more or less successful attempt of litigants to overthrow state statutes as denials of due process and equal protection or as interferences with interstate commerce.

Legal Aid for Children: Some Reflections

1979 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 29-32
Author(s):  
Brian Lucas
Keyword(s):  
United States Of America ◽  
Due Process ◽  
Juvenile Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Court System ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Legal Aid ◽  
Legal Representation ◽  
The Supreme Court

In its Second Main Report, Law and Poverty in Australia, the Commission of Inquiry into Poverty expressed the view that “legal representation for children appearing before the children's court, whether in the criminal or protective jurisdiction, is necessary if justice is to be done.”This view coincides with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in In re Gault. It has been said that this decision “unleashed a frontal assault on the juvenile court system.” It confirmed that juveniles were entitled to “due process” and the same protection which the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights afforded to adults.

scholarly journals Conflict of Laws, Choice of the Forum Court in the us, and the Due Process in Family Law Disputes

2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 184-210
Author(s):  
Zia Akhtar
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
Family Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
The State ◽  
Equal Protection Clause ◽  
Federal Constitution ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Law ◽  
Marriage Laws

Summary In the United States (US) the family law litigant will have to consider the implications of laws that are federally recognised and those which the state embodies in its own family law statutes. The function of the equal protection clause and due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution protects the parties in family disputes that reach the court. The operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is an important consideration and is central to the question if the court can apply the law of the forum court (lex fori) or that of the state where the dispute emanated. The federal constitution allows the state courts to apply marriage laws of another state. If the issue is procedural, then the law of the state will be applied where the dispute that gave rise to the litigation (lex loci). This paper examines the interstate in family law by considering marriages, child custody, and adoption rules and it enquires whether the courts have been sufficiently consistent in interpreting family law of the state in accordance with Article IV, Section 1. There is also a section that compares the law in the US with the application of the lex fori rules in family cases in the Scottish jurisdiction and how that influences parties in family law disputes.

Constitutional Law in 1924–1925: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1924

1926 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-106
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
The United States ◽  
Motor Vehicle Theft ◽  
National Authority ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Foreign Commerce

The decisions arising under the commerce clause of the Constitution during the 1924 term of the Supreme Court did not involve any striking extension of national authority in that field. There was no case approaching in significance the Recapture Clause Case decided in the previous term. However, the reinforcement of a familiar principle through a striking application of it, or the lucid and pungent expression of an old doctrine, lends some significance to several cases which otherwise have no far-reaching importance.In the case of Brooks v. United States the court sustained the constitutionality of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act of 1919. The act subjected to heavy penalties any one who transported or caused to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any motor vehicle, knowing it to have been stolen, and any one who, with the same guilty knowledge, “shall receive, conceal, store, barter, sell, or dispose of any motor vehicle, moving as, or which is a part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce.” It is certainly no surprise to learn from the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that the power to regulate commerce which is broad enough to enable Congress to bar from interstate transportation lottery tickets, diseased cattle, adulterated food, prize-fight films, and the like, and to penalize the interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes, is a power which can likewise be used to punish those who abuse the privileges of interstate and foreign commerce by using them in the furtherance of larceny or the disposal of stolen goods.

Constitutional Law in 1921–1922: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1921

1922 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 612-639
Author(s):  
Edward S. Corwin
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
The Past ◽  
Point Of Interest ◽  
Commerce Clause ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
National Power ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Construction

The central point of interest in the work of the court the past term is supplied by the large attention given to the question of the rights and duties of labor under the law. The problem is approached repeatedly, both from the side of the state's police power and that of national power, and in the field of statutory as well as that of constitutional construction. Important results were also reached in interpretation of the “commerce” clause, both in its aspect as a source of national power and in its aspect—because of the doctrine of the exclusiveness of the power of Congress—as a restriction on the states; but especially in the latter aspect. However, the most interesting single decision of the term for students of constitutional theory and of government was one dealing with the national power of taxation.

Constitutional Law in 1929–30: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Couet of the United States in the October Term, 1929

1931 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-102
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Interstate Commerce ◽  
Bill Of Lading ◽  
Local Taxation ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Oil Company

The Supreme Court continues its century-long task of drawing the line that separates commerce which is interstate or foreign from that which is local. The realistic nature of the test which it uses is made clear in two cases decided during the present term. In Superior Oil Company v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, the plaintiffs, by a cleverly devised arrangement of technicalities, sought to make it appear that they were selling gasolene in interstate commerce. They hoped thus to escape the payment of the tax of three, and later four, cents a gallon imposed by Mississippi law upon the sale of gasolene within the state. The device used was as follows: The plaintiffs sold oil and gasolene to fish packers in Mississippi and delivered it to them at their wharves. The packers loaded this onto their own boats and sent it to a point in Louisiana where they in turn delivered it to shrimp fishermen who used it in fishing. The fishermen brought back their catch and sold it to the packers and were charged for the oil and gasolene. In each case the oil company gave the packers a bill of lading stipulating that the gasolene remained the company's property until delivered to the consignee's agent at the point of destination. In other words, a Mississippi seller deliberately takes gasolene outside the state of Mississippi in order to deliver it to a Mississippi buyer in the expectation that the transaction will have the appearance of interstate commerce and escape local taxation as such.

How Trains Became People: Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s Networked Rhetorical Culture and the Dawn of Corporate Personhood

2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-213
Author(s):  
Nicholas S. Paliewicz
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Human Subject ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Corporate Personhood ◽  
Legal Discourses ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Pacific Railroad ◽  
Southern Pacific Railroad

This essay analyzes how a rhetorical culture emerged in which the Supreme Court of the United States assumed corporations were constitutional persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. Approaching rhetorical culture from a networked standpoint, I argue that corporate personhood emerged from Southern Pacific Railroad Co.’s networks and alliances with environmental preservationists, politicians, publics, lawyers, judges, and immigrants in the late 19th century. Contributing to literatures on rhetorical culture and agency, this study shows how Southern Pacific Railroad Co., through networks of influence and force, was a rhetorical subject that shaped a networked rhetorical culture that expanded the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment even though the Supreme Court of the United States had not worked out the philosophical underpinnings of corporate personhood. Corporate personhood remains theoretically restrained by legal discourses that reduce subjectivity to a singular, speaking, human subject.

Plessy’s Long Shadow

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derrick Bell
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Fourteenth Amendment ◽  
Equal Protection ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Race Riots ◽  
Black And White ◽  
The Law

The supreme court’s 1896 Decision in Plessy v. Ferguson served to bring the law into a dismal harmony with the nation’s view of race in life. The Court decided that segregation in public facilities through “separate but equal” accommodations for black citizens would satisfy the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. The years since the sporadically enforced policies of Reconstruction ended in 1876 had been hard for those former slaves and their offspring whose slavery had legally ended with the passage of the Thir­teenth Amendment in 1865. To ensure their rights to due process and the equal protection of the law, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provided that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Despite legislation intended to provide enforcement of these rights, the laws were poorly enforced and most were subsequently declared unconstitutional. Corrupting law but relying on intimidation and violence, southern governments stripped blacks of political power. Given meaningful if unspoken assurances that the federal government would not protect black civil rights, conservative southerners regained power utilizing racial fear and hatred to break up competing populist groups of poor black and white farmers. In addition to the disenfranchisement of blacks, whites sought to secure their power through intensive anti-Negro propaganda campaigns championing white supremacy. Literary and scientific leaders published tracts and books intended to “prove” the inhumanity of the Negro. In this hostile climate, segregation laws that had made a brief appearance during Reconstruction were revived across the South, accompanied by waves of violence punctuated by an increase in lynchings and race riots. In an effort both to protest the indignity of segregation and challenge its validity, Homer Plessy, acting for a New Orleans civil rights group, attempted to ride in a railroad car reserved for whites. He was arrested and convicted of violating Louisiana’s 1890 segregation law. On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment required absolute equality of the two races before the law, adding: “but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”

6 Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Curtis A
Keyword(s):  
Due Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Prosecution ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Guantanamo Bay ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Right

This chapter considers the application of federal and state law to conduct that takes place outside the territory of the United States. It begins by discussing the territorial scope of U.S. constitutional rights. Special consideration is given to the extraterritorial application of the right of habeas corpus in light of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush, concerning the habeas corpus rights of detainees at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba. The chapter then discusses the “presumption against extraterritoriality” that the Supreme Court applies when interpreting federal statutes. For situations in which the presumption is overcome or is inapplicable, the chapter explains how customary international law principles relating to prescriptive jurisdiction can be relevant in U.S. litigation through application of the Charming Betsy canon of construction. In addition, the chapter discusses the role of “universal jurisdiction” in U.S. litigation and criminal prosecution. Possible constitutional limitations on the extraterritorial application of both federal statutes and state laws, based on due process and other considerations, are also considered.

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