Unconstitutional Legislation by Congress

1945 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-61
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
South Dakota ◽  
North Dakota ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Hampshire ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
General Period

The paragraphs that follow answer the same questions with respect to unconstitutional legislation by Congress that were answered with respect to unconstitutional legislation in the ten states (Colorado, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Illinois, Indiana, and New York) included in my study published in 1943 under the title, Unconstitutional Legislation in Ten Selected States. The congressional statutes and the decisions of the Supreme Court analyzed herein are based upon the list found in Professor Charles Grove Haines, The Doctrine of American Judicial Supremacy. The reason why this list was chosen as the basis for analysis was that it covers approximately the same period, namely, from the beginnings to the early thirties, not including the period of the New Deal which formally began in 1933. This does not mean that there is no point in analyzing the later statutes and decisions, but that for purposes of comparison it was thought safer to restrict this analysis to the same general period for both state and national materials. The three cases under No. 1 in the Haines list have been omitted because no decrees based on invalidity followed their decision.

The Mandate of the Ninth Amendment: Why Footnote Four Is Wrong

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randy E. Barnett
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
New Deal ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Ninth Amendment ◽  
The New Deal

This chapter examines the revival of the presumption of constitutionality and its almost immediate qualification in the form of Footnote Four, which it argues is inconsistent with the Ninth Amendment. The era in which the Supreme Court attempted to scrutinize the necessity and propriety of state and federal restrictions on liberty came to a close as the perceived legitimacy of legislative activism continued to grow. The doctrinal vehicle used by the New Deal Court to overturn the Progressive Era precedents was the adoption of a presumption of constitutionality. The chapter first provides an overview of Footnote Four before discussing the Ninth Amendment, which mandates that unenumerated rights be treated the same as those that are listed. It shows that Footnote Four runs afoul of the text of the Constitution, and more specifically the Ninth Amendment.

Candidatus Phytoplasma fraxini. [Distribution map].

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
North Carolina ◽  
North America ◽  
West Virginia ◽  
South Dakota ◽  
North Dakota ◽  
Geographical Distribution ◽  
New Hampshire ◽  
Distribution Map ◽  
New Distribution

Abstract A new distribution map is provided for "Candidatus Phytoplasma fraxini". Bacteria. Hosts: Fraxinus and Syringa species. Information is given on the geographical distribution in North America (Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan, Canada, and Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming, USA).

The Supreme Court and Political Eras: A Perspective on Judicial Power in a Democratic Polity

1992 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-368
Author(s):  
John B. Taylor
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Current Trend ◽  
Dominant Party ◽  
Democratic Polity ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The New Deal ◽  
The Normative Question

American political history is often conceived as a series of stable eras, controlled by dominant party coalitions and demarcated by realigning elections, most often identified as those of 1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932. Since there is a lag in the corresponding reconstitution of the Supreme Court, it is often deemed a countermajoritarian drag on the workings of electoral democracy. An examination of judicial review in relation to political eras shows that view to be correct only in the New Deal era. Judicial review most commonly occurs within eras rather than across them, with a Court reconstituted by the prevailing coalition negating legislation passed by that coalition. This reality significantly alters the normative question of the Court's role in a democracy, and it raises questions about the concept of stable eras. The current trend of political party dealignment calls into question the continuing validity of the critical-elections approach.

The Supreme Court and the New Deal

Thought ◽  
1941 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 582-582
Author(s):  
Walter B. Kennedy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The New Deal

Constitutional Law in 1935–36: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1935

1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-279
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
New Deal ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Authority ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Laws ◽  
Constitutional Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Construction ◽  
The New Deal

As was pointed out a year ago in this Review, the Supreme Court was able to deal with the cases involving the New Deal which came before it during its 1934 term without any striking enlargement of judicial power and without the announcement of any novel constitutional doctrine. The N.R.A., the Gold Clauses, the Farm Bankruptcy Act, were dealt with by the familiar processes of deciding whether Congress had actually exercised a power not granted to it by the Constitution, or had exercised a granted power in a forbidden way. The New Deal issues which came to the Court during the 1935 term were quite as far-reaching in significance and were certainly not of a routine variety. They involved, in some cases, constitutional clauses never before interpreted by the Court. Some of the federal laws under attack were obviously exercises of delegated powers, but at the same time, they exercised delegated powers for purposes which were novel and which had been commonly supposed not to be within the reach of federal authority. In dealing with laws of this type, the Court brought forward and established as a working implement of constitutional construction the so-called doctrine of “dual federalism.”

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