How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1099-1120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Hurwitz ◽  
Mark Peffley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Hierarchical Model ◽  
Core Values ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Belief Structure ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Mass Public ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Lisrel Model ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

It has long been assumed that foreign-policy attitudes of the mass public are random, disorganized, and unconstrained if they exist at all. Further, foreign-policy thinking has not been found to be structured along standard ideological (liberal-conservative) lines, partisan lines, or class lines. We attempt to move the discussion from a question of whether foreign-policy attitudes are structured to a question of how they are structured. We propose and estimate (using a LISREL model) a hierarchically organized foreign-policy belief structure in which specific policy preferences are derived from postures (broad, abstract beliefs regarding appropriate general governmental strategies). These postures, in turn, are assumed to be constrained by a set of core values about the international community.

Patriotism, Nationalism and China's US Policy: Structures and Consequences of Chinese National Identity

2011 ◽  
Vol 205 ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Hays Gries ◽  
Qingmin Zhang ◽  
H. Michael Crowson ◽  
Huajian Cai
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Identity ◽  
Chinese Foreign Policy ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Us Military ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
The Us ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

AbstractWhat is the nature of Chinese patriotism and nationalism, how does it differ from American patriotism and nationalism, and what impact do they have on Chinese foreign policy attitudes? To explore the structure and consequences of Chinese national identity, three surveys were conducted in China and the US in the spring and summer of 2009. While patriotism and nationalism were empirically similar in the US, they were highly distinct in China, with patriotism aligning with a benign internationalism and nationalism with a more malign blind patriotism. Chinese patriotism/internationalism, furthermore, had no impact on perceived US threats or US policy preferences, while nationalism did. The role of nationalist historical beliefs in structures of Chinese national identity was also explored, as well as the consequences of historical beliefs for the perception of US military and humiliation threats.

Nationalism, Patriotism and Foreign Policy Attitudes among Chinese University Students

2013 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. 1045-1063 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elina Sinkkonen
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
University Students ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Linear Regression Models ◽  
Explanatory Factors ◽  
Chinese University ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Chinese University Students ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

AbstractDoes empirical evidence support treating “nationalism” and “patriotism” as separate concepts in China and is there a relationship between strong nationalist/patriotic attitudes and foreign policy preferences? To analyse the construction of Chinese national identity, Chinese university students (N = 1346) took part in a survey in Beijing in spring 2007. The data supported the assumption of a conceptual separation between nationalism and patriotism. CCP members and students from rural backgrounds were more nationalistic than non-members and students with urban upbringings. Moreover, nationalism had a stronger link to foreign policy preferences than patriotism, and respondents with a greater degree of nationalism were less likely to favour international cooperation and more likely to prefer protectionist policies. The associations of nationalism and patriotism with foreign policy attitudes, and the contribution of other potential explanatory factors to the relationship between nationalism, patriotism and policy attitudes were explored with linear regression models.

Foreign Policy Attitudes as Networks

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua D. Kertzer ◽  
Kathleen E. Powers
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Individual Characteristics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Foreign Affairs ◽  
Political Sophistication ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Specific Policy ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Multiple Dimensions ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

Since at least 1964, public opinion scholars have searched for signs of “constraint” in the American public’s foreign policy attitudes. This chapter reviews these attempts and suggests that the ensuing work has ultimately fallen into two research traditions that have largely been conducted in isolation of one another: horizontal models that portray attitudes as being sorted along multiple dimensions on the same plane and vertical models that imply a hierarchical organization in which abstract values determine specific policy positions. It then offers a new—networked—paradigm for political attitudes in foreign affairs, leveraging tools from network analysis to show that both camps make unrealistically strict assumptions about the directionality and uniformity of attitude structure. The chapter shows that specific policy attitudes play more central roles than existing theories give them credit for and that the topology of attitude networks varies substantially with individual characteristics like political sophistication.

In the Shadow of Conflict: How Emotions, Threat Perceptions and Victimization Influence Foreign Policy Attitudes

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
A. Kupatadze ◽  
T. Zeitzoff
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Exposure To Violence ◽  
Internally Displaced ◽  
Threat Perceptions ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Direct Exposure ◽  
Stratified Sample ◽  
Differential Exposure ◽  
To Receive ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

AbstractWe investigate how emotions, threat perceptions and past violence influence foreign policy attitudes via a survey experiment in Georgia. Using a stratified sample across areas with differential exposure to the conflict and the presence of internally displaced persons, we randomly assign respondents to receive emotional primes about Russian aggression in the region. We find that exposure to violence, as well as simply being primed about past Russian aggression, both increase the perceived threat from Russia, and to a lesser extent anger towards Russia. Individuals who receive the primes are more supportive of a hardline foreign policy. In contrast, we find that exposure to violence does not have a direct effect on foreign policy attitudes, but increases hardline attitudes indirectly, through increased anger and threat. Taken together our results provide evidence that reminders of past violence have different effects than direct exposure to violence on foreign policy attitudes.

The Structure of Western European Attitudes Towards Atlantic Co-operation: Implications for the Western Alliance

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 457-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew H. Ziegler
Keyword(s):  
Factor Analysis ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
The West ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Single Item ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Defence Spending ◽  
Western European ◽  
Cross National ◽  
Foreign Policy Attitudes

Previous studies of Western European foreign policy attitudes rely almost exclusively on single-item measures, such as support for defence spending, support for the new missiles in Europe, opinions on NATO, and so on. This article, using a multi-country data set, aggregates several survey items and explores the manner in which Europeans structure their attitudes towards one aspect of foreign policy: Atlantic co-operation. A factor analysis uncovers two underlying conceptual dimensions: military and non-military co-operation. These dimensions provide the axes to construct a four-fold typology of viewpoints, consisting of Atlanticists, Military Allies, Dovish Partners and Isolationists. Respondents are classified within this typology, and the European-wide and cross-national distributions of opinion are presented. The highest support for Atlantic co-operation is found among the West Germans, and the lowest is found among the French.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document