The Exchange Rate and the International Transmission of Business Cycle Disturbances: Some Evidence from the Great Depression

1980 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ehsan U. Choudhri ◽  
Levis A. Kochin
2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Douglas A. Irwin

The Great Depression was marked by a severe outbreak of protectionist trade policies. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, exchange rate policies help explain changes in trade policy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 909-933 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shingo Watanabe

Standard productivity measures indicate large fluctuations in technology during the Great Depression. This article's historical technology series (1892–1966), controlled for aggregation effects, varying input utilization, non-constant returns, and imperfect competition, does not indicate technology regress such that could trigger the downturn. In contrast, technology improvements in the recovery were so rapid that, over the whole Great Depression period, technology growth was highest among pre-WWII decades. This article also finds that output changed little and inputs fell when technology improved in the pre-WWII period. Real-business-cycle models have difficulty in explaining pre-WWII business cycles characterized by such responses.


2011 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 362-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriel P. Mathy ◽  
Christopher M. Meissner

2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-28
Author(s):  
Gulzar Khan ◽  
Ather Maqsood Ahmed

Notwithstanding the level of improvement in understanding the complexities of an economy, it is now well accepted that the ultimate incidence of various policy interventions leads to varied outcomes in terms of magnitude and persistence depending upon the structure of the economy. The objective of the present study is to disentangle the relative contributions of various exogenous and domestic shocks that contribute to business cycle fluctuations in Pakistan. The study is based on the New-Keynesian Open economy model, which is an extended version of (Gali & Monacili 2005). Keating’s two-step approach (1990, 2000) is employed to capture the dynamic behaviour of the variables of interest. Impulse response functions, along with forecast error variance decomposition analyses, are used to gain useful insights into the understanding of the transmission mechanism of policy and non-policy shocks. It is observed that fiscal policy does matter, at least in the short-run. The interest rate shock leads to the exchange rate appreciation thereby confirming the exchange rate puzzle. In response to adverse supply shocks, the Monetary Authority responds with a monetary contraction that prolongs the recessionary periods. Furthermore, it has a limited power to control inflation as inflation in Pakistan stems from supply-side factors as well as fiscal dominance. JEL Classification: C32, E52, E62, F41 Keywords: Open Economy, New Keynesian Model, Rational Expectations, Exchange Rate Puzzle


2011 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 827-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT INKLAAR ◽  
HERMAN DE JONG ◽  
REITZE GOUMA

Technology shocks and declining productivity have been advanced as important factors driving the Great Depression in the United States, based on real business cycle theory. We estimate an improved measure of technology for interwar manufacturing, using data from the U.S. census reports. There is clear evidence of increasing returns to scale and we find no statistical proof that technology shocks led to changes in hours worked or other inputs. This contradicts a key prediction of real business cycle theory. We find that increasing returns to scale are not due to market power but to labor and capital hoarding.


2003 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Myung Soo Cha

Takahashi Korekiyo is remembered as a wise finance minister saving Japan from the Great Depression. The contribution of his policy measures however remains to be rigorously measured, with proper control of other forces also driving the recovery. Structural vector autoregression analysis of previously unexploited monthly data confirms the pivotal role of Takahashi's debt-financed fiscal expansion. Monetizing the public debts, the Bank of Japan maintained a neutral stance. The recovery was aided by exchange-rate shocks generated during the transition from the gold standard to the floating-exchange-rate regime and, to a smaller extent, by the world recovery.


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