scholarly journals The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?

2010 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-897 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Douglas A. Irwin

The Great Depression was marked by a severe outbreak of protectionist trade policies. But contrary to the presumption that all countries scrambled to raise trade barriers, there was substantial cross-country variation in the movement to protectionism. Specifically, countries that remained on the gold standard resorted to tariffs, import quotas, and exchange controls to a greater extent than countries that went off gold. Just as the gold standard constraint on monetary policy is critical to understanding macroeconomic developments in this period, exchange rate policies help explain changes in trade policy.

2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-202

Simon J. Evenett of University of St. Gallen reviews, “Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s” by Douglas A. Irwin. The EconLit abstract of this book begins: “Examines the trade policy disaster of the 1930s and considers the logic behind the policy response. Discusses the Great Depression and the rise of protectionism; resolving the trilemma—protection or depreciation; and trade restrictions and exchange rate adjustment—choice and consequences. Irwin is Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College. Index.”


Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Peter Temin

The Great Depression is one of those seminal events in the modern world economy on which policy-makers and market participants rely when formulating their conceptions of how market economies behave. This chapter examines the international monetary policy formation during the Great Depression. It argues that the ideology of the gold standard led policy-makers to take actions that accentuated economic distress in the 1930s.


1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerardo Della Paolera ◽  
Alan M. Taylor

Did macroconomic interventions make any contribution to Argentina's revovery from the Great Depression? Macroeconomic policy deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. Fiscal policy was conservative. Monetary policy became unorthodox after 1931, when the Caja de conversión began rediscounting to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflation. This change predated the creation of the central bank in 1935. A wider literature links the interwar depression in the core to flaws in the gold standard, and active monetary policy to escape from defaltion and slump; our work extends this idea to the periphery.


2020 ◽  
pp. 23-40
Author(s):  
I. V. Prilepskiy

Based on cross-country panel regressions, the paper analyzes the impact of external currency exposures on monetary policy, exchange rate regime and capital controls. It is determined that positive net external position (which, e.g., is the case for Russia) is associated with a higher degree of monetary policy autonomy, i.e. the national key interest rate is less responsive to Fed/ECB policy and exchange rate fluctuations. Therefore, the risks of cross-country synchronization of financial cycles are reduced, while central banks are able to place a larger emphasis on their price stability mandates. Significant positive impact of net external currency exposure on exchange rate flexibility and financial account liberalization is only found in the context of static models. This is probably due to the two-way links between incentives for external assets/liabilities accumulation and these macroeconomic policy tools.


1999 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 624-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Peter Ferderer ◽  
David A. Zalewski

This study examines the interplay between financial crises, uncertainty, and economic growth during the interwar period. Comparing the experiences of ten countries, we provide evidence that reductions in the credibility of a country's commitment to the gold standard generated capital flight and higher interest rate volatility. This volatility, in turn, was inversely correlated with economic growth. These results suggest that financial crises helped propagate the Great Depression, in part, by increasing uncertainty.


2000 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Karol

Scholars assert that divided government impedes the liberalization of U.S. trade policy. They claim that presidents favor freer trade and will use the negotiating authority Congress delegates to them to reach agreements lowering trade barriers. Since presidents gain more support from their congressional co-partisans, less liberalization ensues under divided government. This theory rests on the premise that party is unrelated to congressional trade policy preferences beyond legislators' tendencies to support their presidential co-partisans. Yet before 1970 congressional Democrats were relatively free trading regardless of the president's party affiliation. Since then, the same has been true of Republicans. Divided government facilitates the trade policies of presidents from the protectionist party since they win more support from their “opposition” in this area. Divided government does impede the efforts of presidents from the free-trading party to liberalize. I conclude that divided government has no consistent effect on trade policy outcomes.


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