Russian Security and Air Power, 1992-2002: The Development of Russian Security Thinking under Yeltsin and Putin and Its Consequences for the Air Forces. By Marcel de Haas. Cass Series on Soviet (Russian) Military Theory and Practice, no. 9. London: Frank Cass, 2004. xix, 237 pp. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. Maps. $19.99, paper.

Slavic Review ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 159-160
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Cimbala

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
Dóra Dévai

After the infamous cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 and the Ukrainian conflict in 2014–15, the Russian military theory, and in particular, Information Warfare (IW) doctrines, have come into the center of attention. IW has played a very peculiar role in the Russian political and military theory and practice, and its current state can be regarded as a climax in its evolution. To gain an in-depth understanding of the Russian strategic thinking, the second part of this article strives to give an overview of the current phase of the process.





Orbis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael B. Petersen ◽  
Rebecca Pincus


1963 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 60-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gunther E. Rothenberg

In the late fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century the revival of interest in classical civilization had a distinct effect on military theory and practice. The study of Roman military methods especially became a source of inspiration for reformers and Machiavelli's Arte della Guerra ranks only as the most famous in a long line of treatises which intended to revive the art of war as the ancients had understood it. During this era military theorists steeped themselves in classical lore, rediscovered the virtues of the Roman legion, became familiar once more with cohort and maniple.



2020 ◽  
pp. 007327532095895
Author(s):  
Adam L. Storring

This article integrates the history of military theory – and the practical history of military campaigns and battles – within the broader history of knowledge. Challenging ideas that the new natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the so-called Scientific Revolution) fostered attempts to make warfare mathematically calculated, it builds on work showing that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural philosophy was itself much more subjective than previously thought. It uses the figure of King Frederick II of Prussia (reigned 1740–1786) to link theoretical with practical military knowledge, placing the military treatises read and written by the king alongside the practical example of the Prussian army’s campaign against the Russians in summer 1758 at the height of the Seven Years War (1756–1763), which culminated in the battle of Zorndorf. This article shows that both the theory and practice of war – like other branches of knowledge in the long eighteenth century – were fundamentally shaped by the contemporary search for intellectual order. The inability to achieve this in practice led to a reliance on subjective judgment and individual, local knowledge. Whereas historians have noted attempts in the eighteenth century to calculate probabilities mathematically, this article shows that war continued to be conceived as the domain of fortune, subject to incalculable chance. Answering Steven Shapin’s call to define concretely “the subjective element in knowledge-making,” the examples of Frederick and his subordinate, Lieutenant General Count Christoph zu Dohna, reveal sharply different contemporary ideas about how to respond to uncertainty in war. Whereas Dohna sought to be ready for chance events and react to them, Frederick actively embraced uncertainty and risk-taking, making chance both a rhetorical argument and a positive choice guiding strategy and tactics.





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