Mali's transition to elections will be prolonged

Significance Malian authorities on January 1 proposed a five-year delay to elections that were due to take place in February. The proposal came after Mali’s National Conference on Reconstruction formally recommended that the transition be extended by at least six months or up to five years beyond February. Impacts Despite army claims that soldiers are eliminating scores of jihadists, much of Mali's territory is outside government control. The now-confirmed presence of Russian military trainers may give the junta more bargaining power in negotiations on the electoral timetable. The government is weak on economic policy and will struggle to stem the rise in food prices.

Cursory Viewpoint on Transnistria as the Focus of the Russian Federation Policy

The article outlines cursory viewpoint on Transnistria as the focus of the Russian Federation policy. Russia pursues political interests in Transnistria connected with its geostrategic ambitions on the post-Soviet state. It is revealed that Moscow has a great impact on the life of Transnistria and cooperates with Tiraspol in political, military, social, cultural, and economic spheres. It is discussed that Russian military presence in this de facto state helps not only to control Transnistria but also Moldova concerning its geopolitical choice. In the article Russia’s activity concerning conflict resolution in Transnistria is shown. A special attention is paid to the Kozak Plan aiming at unification of Transnistria and Moldova, according to which too-extensive rights to Transnistria had to be given. Although this plan was not implemented, in fact now its idea is promoted gradually through convergence of Moldova and Transnistria. In the article it is stressed that russification of the region influences on the mood of the population concerning the future status of the region. Social and economic relations between Russia and Transnistria are researched. It is revealed that all three presidents of this de facto state had close ties with the Russian government and coordinated their politics with it. It is discussed that officially Russia supports territorial integrity of Moldova but at the same time it gives comprehensive support of Transnistria. Although it is not declared in the documents, now the Russian Federation favours status quo in Transnistria.

Political Self-Identification of Russian Military Personnel in Finland in Spring 1917

The socio-psychological characteristics of the behavior of the Russian military in Finland in the initial period of the 1917 revolution were revealed, including the formation of behavioral stereotypes, new “images of the enemy”, a change in their ideas about “friends” and “foes”, and the transformation of social and moral norms. The relevance of the study is due to the need to apply a relatively new historical and anthropological approach to the study of the role of the military factor in the history of Russia and Finland. Based on the materials of the revolutionary Helsingfors and non-capital garrisons, the process of ideological and organizational self-determination of the supporters of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Bolshevik parties is considered, information about the number and the beginning of the activities of these party organizations is systematized and analyzed. The novelty of the research is seen in the fact that addressing the problem of “Revolution and man” and studying the images of “Friends”, “Foes”, “Other” in the perception of participants and eyewitnesses of events in connection with their participation in social transformations of a revolutionary time allows for the first time to get an idea of the mentality of privates and officers — the most active part of the Russian population of Finland. The author comes to the conclusion that the role of the Russian military in the events of the spring of 1917 is much more significant than was previously assumed.

The Belarusian-Russian Military Alliance in the Context of the Geostrategic Importance of Belarus for Russia as a Way to the West and Its Role in Achieving Its Geopolitical Goals (Part 1)

This article by Grzegorz Baziur concerns the geostrategic importance of Belarus in the context of the „Russian road to the West” in the light of the neo-imperial policy of the Russian Federation, implemented by the authorities under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. In the introduction, the author presented the aims of the article, research methods and his theses, and in the first part he described Belarusian-Russian relations in terms of military cooperation and the Russian vision of security policy in the West. In the last part of the text, the author asks the question - is there anything to fear from Belarus in the context of the Belarusian-Russian alliance under Russia's hegemony? In this part, he discusses the meanders of Polish-Belarusian relations with Russia in the background, and the whole article concludes with conclusions on the security perspectives of Belarus and its neighboring countries, including Poland.

Influence of cooperative ideologies on the origin of credit societies in Russia

The aim of the research was to examine the influence of cooperative ideologies on the origin of credit societies in Russia. The emergence of a legal framework for consumer and, later, credit cooperation in Russia came in two ways. The first formal credit union was established in 1831 by Russian military officers banished to Siberia after the December 1825 revolt. Other cooperatives were organized in a Western model by enthusiasts from the wealthy strata. Later, the history of cooperation in consumer credit before the revolution in Russia can be divided into three stages: first, 1831-1860 (before the peasant reform); second, 1861-1904 (after the peasant reform); and third, 1905-1917 (adoption of government regulations on cooperation). To solve the objective set, the authors used the documentary method close to the historical method. It is concluded that analysis of the preconditions of the first cooperative organizations in Russia shows that there were some known forms of primitive cooperation or pre-cooperation over the centuries.

RUSSIAN FORTRESSES AS NAVAL BASES IN THE 1740-s ZAPOROZHIAN HOST: DNIEPER FLOTILLA SHIPS STORAGE

Studies of Russian military presence in the lands of Zaporozhia during the New Sich era (1734–1775) pay relatively little attention to the uses of Russian fortresses between the RussoTurkish wars of 1735–1739 and 1768–1774. From 1739 to 1768 the military importance and defense capability of the Russian fortresses diminished, thus their main purpose shifted to information gathering on the Russian-Ottoman borderlands and the Zaporozhian Host of the Lower Dniper itself. Furthermore, another quite understudied function of these fortresses was to serve as military depots, both acting and reserve. This article concentrates on the understudied aspect of the history of Russian fortresses and the Zaporozhia lands during the New Sich era – the storage of vessels of the liquidated Dnieper flotilla after the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-1739. The primary source base for this article consists of the documents from “Kyiv Provincial Chancellery” (Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, fund 59). The Ust’-Samara retrenchment was a main naval base of the Dnieper flotilla located at the mouth of the Samara River (present-day Dnipro). The reorganization of the Dnieper flotilla material base and fleet supplies took several years after the end of the 1735-1739 war. Subsequently, various fleet supplies (military vessels; ship equipment like ropes, blocks, oars, flags, anchors; naval artillery and related supplies; tools for ships repairs and maintenance like "konopatky"; building materials, ship nails, resin; food stocks for ship crews, etc) were stored in the special fortress warehouses. However, storage conditions were inadequate, naval depots could be destroyed, while equipment and watercraft could be stolen by the Russian officers to be resold later. Relying on documentary sources, an attempt was made to clarify the number of Dnieper flotilla vessels, that were stored in the Ust’-Samara retrenchment. To that end, the article introduces into scientific circulation a document that most fully reflects the number of military vessels, stored at the Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia as of November 1, 1742 - a report compiled by Captain I. Stepanov at the request of the Ust’-Samara retrenchment commander A. Chichagov, commander of all Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia. At that time, the total number of vessels (both suitable and unsuitable for use) amounted to 350. These vessels were stored in the Kamianskyi, Khortyts’kyi, Malyshevs’kyi and Nenasytets’kyi retrenchments. Comparison of data from several documents reveals that for unknown reasons this number (350) did not include boats stored in the Ust’-Samara retrenchment. This article further indicates that the study of exact number of the vessels is complicated by the specifics of the source base. Further elaboration of the issues outlined in the present article would allow not only to explore the functions of Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia during the New Sich era and their role as centers of the Russian military presence, but would also reveal the everyday relations of Russian soldiers with the Cossacks and the peasants (“pospolyti”). The crucial need to study original documentary sources on the history of Russian fortresses in Zaporozhia is emphasized once more.

Production of and Supply of the Army with Small Arms on the Eve of the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). A Brief Overview of the Russian Military Industry

In the wake of the Crimean War, the upper military circles in Russia changed their thinking with regard to firearms. General Milyutin became Minister of War. It was the time when Alexander II reigned over Russia. In 1856, the calibre of Russian firearms was reduced to 6 inches, or 15.24 mm. The process of re-equipping the Russian army with M1856 rifles using expanding Minié bullets was launched. These rifles demonstrated that the percussion systems had reached the limit of their capacity for improvement. Nothing else could be improved in terms of their firing speed. Despite the resistance of the conservative military circles, Milyutin encouraged new inventions, and the 1860s became a period of experimentation with firearms. Some new cartridge systems were introduced. The high-quality M1856 percussion rifle was not destined to take part in war times, but the Russian army had been fully equipped with it for a short period of time. Almost all systems of the 1860s were based on this rifle. Over 10 systems of firearms with an internal needle fuse were proposed to the weapons commission. In 1866, the Englishman Karle proposed his own system with an internal needle fuse. Krnka, Berdan I, and Berdan II came next. After 1866, the Terry-Norman, Karle, and Krnka rifles entered the Russian army. These systems were developed on the basis of the 6-line M1856/58 rifle. The latter was converted into a rear-loading rifle. In 1869, the Krnka rifle was chosen as the main system, which became the main weapon of the Russian army in the following years. At the beginning of 1877, there were 613,297 Krnka rifles, 150,868 Karle rifles, 17,810 Berdan I and 325,254 Berdan II rifles in the Russian army.

The aspects of dehumanization in the condition of hybrid war: on the example of attitudes the citizens of Ukraine to Russian soldiers – participants of the Russian-Ukrainian war

The article examines the features of dehumanization of Russian soldiers participating in the Russian-Ukrainian war in the perception of different groups of the population. Dehumanization is seen as a mechanism for denying human characteristics to individuals or groups of people, helping to justify violence, which is a necessary attribute of war. Against the background of the long Russian-Ukrainian war, it was possible to predict that the citizens of Ukraine would have blatant dehumanization of the enemy. However, one of the features of the hybrid war and in particular the information component in it is the blurring and weak personification of the image of the enemy, which is often labeled as an invading state. The aim of the article was to find out whether and how the mechanism of dehumanization works in these conditions. Achieving the goal required a clear personification of the object of dehumanization. The Russian military was chosen as such as the direct participants in the conflict, representing the attacking state. A qualitative method of pseudo-experimental research and in-depth interviews were chosen to identify the level and form of dehumanization. The experimental group was made up of internally displaced persons from the East, who represented the category of the population most affected by the actions of the Russian military due to the destruction of their homes, the loss of relatives or friends, and so on. The reference group was formed of people who were not directly injured during the war. To analyze the dehumanization of the Russian military, a scale of dehumanization has been developed, with blatant dehumanization at one extreme and subtle unconscious dehumanization at the other. It turned out that both in the experimental and in the reference group there was almost no blatant dehumanization, which may be due to the peculiarities of hybrid warfare, in particular the blurring of ideas about how the war is fought and who the enemy is. Instead, subtle forms of dehumanization, such as robotization and heroism, prevailed, confirming the influence of propaganda, which is one of the most important components of hybrid warfare. At the same time, in both groups, after the intervention, there was a shift from subtle forms of dehumanization to more blatant.