Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle

1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 715
Author(s):  
Anthony G. Pazzanita ◽  
S. C. Saxena
1996 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 415-416
Author(s):  
Adekeye Adebajo

2013 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Véronique Dudouet

The dynamics of conflict (de)escalation by social movements or political opposition groups have attracted cross-disciplinary interest among social scientists, but there remain several knowledge gaps to be filled. On the one hand, there is already extensive research on the shifts from unarmed expressions of collective grievances to the adoption of violent strategies by oppressed constituencies or ‘minorities at risk’, as well as on the transition from armed insurgency to negotiations, demobilization, reintegration and conventional politics. However, there is scarce scholarship on the phenomenon of armed groups shifting their conflict-waging strategies from violent to nonviolent means, especially in contexts which cannot be resolved by force but are also ‘unripe’ for conventional de-escalation methods through negotiation and political integration. This article offers a first attempt to fill this conceptual and empirical gap, by investigating the nature and the drivers of transitions from armed strategies to nonviolent methods of contentious collective action on the part of non-state conflict actors. It focuses in particular on the internal and relational/environmental factors which underpin their decisionmaking process, from a change of leadership and a pragmatic re-evaluation of the goals and means of insurgency, to the search for new local or international allies and the cross-border emulation or diffusion of new repertoires of action. This multilevel analysis draws from past research on various self-determination or revolutionary movements which fit the scope of analysis (i.e. Nepal, Egypt, Palestine, West Papua, East Timor, Mexico and Western Sahara). The article also points to the need for more systematic enquiry on these cases through in-depth comparative empirical analysis.


Asian Survey ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-220
Author(s):  
K. S. Nathan
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julius M. Gathogo

The Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), otherwise known as Mau-Mau revolutionary movement was formed after returnees of the Second World War (1939–1945) ignited the African populace to militarily fight for land and freedom (wiyathi nai thaka). John Walton’s theory of reluctant rebels informs this article theoretically, as it is indeed the political elites who inspired this armed struggle. To do this, they held several meetings in the capital city of Nairobi, drew the war structures from the national level to the sub-location level, especially in the central region of Kenya, and tasked locals with filling in the leadership vacuums that were created. In view of this, the article seeks to unveil the revolutionary history of the Mau-Mau medical Doctor, also known as Major Judge Munene Gachau (born in 1935), whose contribution in the Kenyan war of independence (1952–1960) remains unique. This uniqueness can be attested to by considering various factors. First, he is one of the few surviving leaders who joined the guerrilla forest war while he was relatively young. Normally, the Mau-Mau War Council did not encourage people below the age of 25 to join the rebels in the forest of Mt. Kenya, Aberdare Mountains and/or other places. Nor did they encourage adults past the age of 35 to join as combatants in the forest fight. Second, he is the only known Mau-Mau rebel in Kirinyaga county of Kenya to have gone back to school after the war had ended, traveled abroad, and studied up to a Masters degree level. Third, Munene Gachau belongs in the category that joined the rebels while still relatively educated and eventually got promoted to the rank of Major, upon being confirmed as the Mau-Mau Doctor.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilberto Conde

The ideological struggle deployed between the Syrian opposition groups and the government during the first year of the Syrian popular uprising is examined in this paper. Force alone was not enough for the regime to crush the revolt, at least during its first twelve months, while protesters were unable to bring down the government. The battle for cultural hegemony had to be won by one of the two sides. Protesters and the regime alike had to deploy their discourses along frames that resonated with the values, hopes and fears of Syrians. The effectiveness of the regime in securing the support of large sections of urban dwellers and its systematic violent repression led to frustration on the part of demonstrators, who ended up supporting at least morally the armed struggle. A stalemate was reached. This led to divergent framing activity within the opposition, which in turn led to its division.Spanish El artículo examina la lucha ideológica que se dio entre los grupos sirios de oposición y el gobierno durante el primer año del levantamiento popular en Siria. Durante los primeros 12 meses a partir de marzo de 2011, al régimen no le bastó con la fuerza bruta para aplastar la revuelta, aunque los manifestantes tampoco lograron tumbar al gobierno. Se dio un combate por la hegemonía cultural y uno de los bandos necesitaba ganarla. Tanto los opositores como el régimen frasearon sus discursos alrededor de aristas conceptuales (frames) en armonía con los valores, esperanzas y temores de la población siria. La e ficacia del régimen en obtener el apoyo de amplios sectores de los habitantes de las principales ciudades y la represión violenta sistemática condujeron a un sentimiento de frustración entre los manifestantes, que terminaron ofreciendo un apoyo al menos moral a la lucha armada. Se llegó a un impasse. Esto a su vez llevó a que diferentes grupos de oposición reconstruyeran su discurso en torno de aristas distintas, lo que generó división.French L'article étudie la lu e idéologique menée entre les groupes d'opposition et le gouvernement pendant la première année du soulèvement populaire en Syrie. Pendant les douze premiers mois, à dater du mois de mars de 2011, la force brute n'a pas suffiau régime pour écraser le mouvement, bien que les manifestants à leur tour n'aient pas réussi à faire tomber le gouvernement. Une lu e pour l'hégémonie culturelle s'est développée et un des deux côtés devait la gagner. L'opposition ainsi que le régime ont encadré (frame) leurs discours de sorte à qu'ils parlent aux valeurs, espoirs et peurs des syriens. Le succès du régime à gagner l'appui (ou le recul) de grands secteurs de la population des villes principales et la répression violente systématique ont produit un sentiment de frustration parmi les manifestants, qui ont fini par soutenir la lu e armée au moins moralement. La situation est arrivée à une impasse. Dans cet état, différents groupes d'opposition ont reformulé leurs discours au tour d'encadrements divergents, ce qui a mené à leur division.


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