Rules and Military Regimes

This chapter evaluates the way in which three types of rules—operational, relational and constitutive—have functioned in three corporate military regimes, Argentina (1976–83), Brazil (1964–85), and Chile (1973–88). These regimes are compared one with another and with the communist single-party states. The chapter shows how the different rules operated in these different regimes, drawing out the different patterns of operation and thereby showing the variations that can occur within the one regime type. The chapter also raises the question of the relationship between observance of rules and regime survival.

Conclusion: Rules and Autocracy

This chapter summarizes the main conclusions, showing how the established picture of the situation within dictatorial leaderships is misleading and explaining how and why rules are a more satisfactory explainer of this than a focus on power. The chapter then returns to the question of the relationship between rules and regime longevity, using the cases of the two regimes studied in the book that ended unexpectedly, the Soviet Union and Argentina, to suggest that there is a relationship between observance of those rules with their constraining and enabling functions, and regime survival.

“Defection-Proofing” the Military and Authoritarian Regime Survival

The question of loyalty in autocratic regimes has drawn a sustained scholarly interest, especially as autocratic leaders need to secure the support of their militaries to survive in office and to minimize the risk of a coup. Among the commonly employed mechanisms in this regard is the extension of extra-budgetary financial rewards, including “Military-Owned Businesses (MOBs)”. Nevertheless, under the increasingly significant threat of an uprising from below, military defection remains the key for the success of the revolution. The question then becomes: under what conditions would a military defect from an autocratic ruling alliance? This paper presents one novel answer to this question, which is: militaries are “defection-proofed” in the face of mass uprisings when they develop financial dependency on the regime. This hypothesis is tested comparatively against the cases of mass protests in China (1989), Indonesia (1998), Thailand (2006), and Iran (2009).

Global South Leaders and Foreign Policy: The Acceptability Constraint and Transnational Considerations in the Decision Context

Foreign Policy Analysis research documents that foreign policy decisions have internal and external influences. In the Global South (GS), interests and identities are transnational in nature. The acceptability heuristic from poliheuristic (PH) theory is the jumping-off point for exploring this idea. Leaders reject policy choices that risk political loss. Key concepts from GS scholarship offer insight into the unrecognized transnational nature of two of PH theory's acceptability considerations, regime survival, and legitimacy. Leaders judge how a policy protects regime survival and legitimacy based on ideas about threats and constituents. Foreign policy paths are understood by investigating the transnational strategies they use to address regime security and legitimacy concerns. The strategy concept developed in previous work is applied to Museveni's Uganda. We see GS leaders evaluate but also create acceptability by engaging in intermestic policy driven by these transnational concerns. They also manipulate more powerful states, increasing their significance beyond expectations.

Clubs of autocrats: Regional organizations and authoritarian survival

While scholars have argued that membership in Regional Organizations (ROs) can increase the likelihood of democratization, we see many autocratic regimes surviving in power albeit being members of several ROs. This article argues that this is the case because these regimes are often members in “Clubs of Autocrats” that supply material and ideational resources to strengthen domestic survival politics and shield members from external interference during moments of political turmoil. The argument is supported by survival analysis testing the effect of membership in autocratic ROs on regime survival between 1946 to 2010. It finds that membership in ROs composed of more autocratic member states does in fact raise the likelihood of regime survival by protecting incumbents against democratic challenges such as civil unrest or political dissent. However, autocratic RO membership does not help to prevent regime breakdown due to autocratic challenges like military coups, potentially because these types of threats are less likely to diffuse to other member states. The article thereby adds to our understanding of the limits of democratization and potential reverse effects of international cooperation, and contributes to the literature addressing interdependences of international and domestic politics in autocratic regimes.

The Cost of Regime Survival: Political Instability, Underdevelopment, and (Un)natural Disasters in Haiti Before the 2010 Earthquake

This article critically examines the underlying political and structural conditions that lead to Haiti’s underdevelopment and the vulnerability of the country to natural disasters. Using the scholarship of Percy Hintzen and Michel-Rolph Trouillot, the article argues that disjunctures in the post-revolutionary governance of Haiti created conditions of precarity, vulnerability, and preempted possibilities for development. Those disjunctures were exacerbated under the Duvaliers and continue to be part of the fabric of Haiti. The explanation rests in the policies and practices of powerful domestic and foreign actors with vested interests in maintaining conditions of underdevelopment. This explains the failure of the county to effectively respond to extreme natural events such as earthquakes and hurricanes, thereby transforming them into pervasive natural disasters. The calamities that the world noticed on January 12, 2010 were simply an epiphenomenon of those deeply underlying conditions.

Securitization as a Tool of Regime Survival: The Deployment of Religious Rhetoric in Bashar al-Asad's Speeches

This article analyzes the role of Sunni Islam in speeches given to religious scholars by Syrian president Bashar al-Asad in 2014 and 2017. I discuss how religion was used in these speeches as a security tool to consolidate authority, legitimize the Ba'thist regime, and marginalize political dissidents. I specifically highlight the emphasis Asad placed on convincing government-recognized 'ulama to support state security measures and to the novel links he constructed between Islam and national unity.