scholarly journals Temporal Passage and Temporal Parts

Noûs ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
L. Nathan Oaklander
Philosophy ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 72 (279) ◽  
pp. 19-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowland Stout

A natural picture to have of events and processes is of entities which extend through time and which have temporal parts, just as physical objects extend through space and have spatial parts. While accepting this picture of events, in this paper I want to present an alternative conception of processes as entities which, like physical objects, do not extend in time and do not have temporal parts, but rather persist in time. Processes and events belong to metaphysically distinct categories. Moreover the category of events is not the more basic of the two.


Analysis ◽  
1986 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 215-216
Author(s):  
G. Spinks
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 475-488
Author(s):  
MATTHEW McKEEVER

AbstractIn this article, I argue that recent work in analytic philosophy on the semantics of names and the metaphysics of persistence supports two theses in Buddhist philosophy, namely the impermanence of objects and a corollary about how referential language works. According to this latter package of views, the various parts of what we call one object (say, King Milinda) possess no unity in and of themselves. Unity comes rather from language, in that we have terms (say, ‘King Milinda’) which stand for all the parts taken together. Objects are mind- (or rather language-)generated fictions. I think this package can be cashed out in terms of two central contemporary views. The first is that there are temporal parts: just as an object is spatially extended by having spatial parts at different spatial locations, so it is temporally extended by having temporal parts at different temporal locations. The second is that names are predicates: rather than standing for any one thing, a name stands for a range of things. The natural language term ‘Milinda’ is not akin to a logical constant, but akin to a predicate.Putting this together, I'll argue that names are predicates with temporal parts in their extension, which parts have no unity apart from falling under the same predicate. ‘Milinda’ is a predicate which has in its extension all Milinda's parts. The result is an interesting and original synthesis of plausible positions in semantics and metaphysics, which makes good sense of a central Buddhist doctrine.


Noûs ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 738-752 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric T. Olson
Keyword(s):  

KronoScope ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Hasty
Keyword(s):  

AbstractIn his "Confession of a White Widowed Male," Humbert Humbert, the fictional narrator of Nabokov's Lolita, writes: "I am not concerned with so-called 'sex' at all." In the context of a narrative that centers on his pedophilia, it is difficult to take this assertion seriously. Yet if we do, we come to appreciate that Humbert's sexuality is emblematic of a distinctly modernist response to the perennial question of how to counter temporal passage and the inevitable loss attendant on it. Nabokov's configuration of memory, consciousness, and time in Lolita shows how passage itself might be engaged in the creative enterprise of resisting loss.


2019 ◽  
pp. 72-105
Author(s):  
Christopher Peacocke

This chapter presents a metaphysics-first treatment of time and temporal concepts and language, opposed to all forms of subjectivism about time. It defends phenomenal externalism about time, and also aims to explain away temptations to subjectivism about time. It argues that we cannot explain the distinction between mere sensitivity to time and representation of time in terms of perceptual constancies. Nor can we explain it in terms of mere sensitivity to time that is coordinated with other genuinely representational states and capacities. A different theory of the distinction is developed, labelled representational preservation, which has to do with the preservation and updating of representations over time. An account of three different kinds of present-tense content in experience is developed. The correct characterization of the kinds can explain away some metaphysical illusions about time and the experience of temporal passage.


2020 ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
Anna Pakes

The chapter discusses how variability and change pose particular issues for an ontology of dance works as structures of action-types, which prompts consideration of some alternative positions. The argument (developed by Guy Rohrbaugh) that dance works are historical individuals or continuants is elaborated and critically discussed. The chapter also considers a perdurantist alternative: that dance works are fusions of their performances or temporal parts. Both endurantism and perdurantism struggle to account for the principles of continuity uniting the various embodiments or parts of works, however. The chapter reexamines the idea of persistence in the context of historical dance practice and explores the significance of processes of oral transmission for the continued existence and variability of dance works, focusing on the different levels of intention at which the action constituting a dance might be described. The relative importance of these levels at different historical moments is considered.


Author(s):  
D.H. Mellor

Events are entities like collisions and speeches, as opposed to things like planets and people. Many are changes, for example things being first hot and then cold. All lack a thing’s full identity over time: either they are instantaneous, or they have temporal parts, like a speech’s words, which stop them being wholly present at an instant; whereas things, which lack temporal parts, are wholly present throughout their lives. Events may be identified with two types of entity: facts, like the fact that David Hume dies, corresponding to truths like ‘Hume dies’; or particulars which, like things, correspond to names, for example ‘Hume’s death’. Which one they are taken to be affects the content of many metaphysical theories: such as that all particulars are things; that times, or causes and effects, or actions, are events; or that mental events are physical.


1991 ◽  
pp. 58-75
Author(s):  
Robin Le Poidevin
Keyword(s):  

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