On the strong semantical completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus

1968 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richmond H. Thomason

In Kripke [8] the first-order intuitionjstic predicate calculus (without identity) is proved semantically complete with respect to a certain model theory, in the sense that every formula of this calculus is shown to be provable if and only if it is valid. Metatheorems of this sort are frequently called weak completeness theorems—the object of the present paper is to extend Kripke's result to obtain a strong completeness theorem for the intuitionistic predicate calculus of first order; i.e., we will show that a formula A of this calculus can be deduced from a set Γ of formulas if and only if Γ implies A. In notes 3 and 5, below, we will indicate how to account for identity, as well. Our proof of the completeness theorem employs techniques adapted from Henkin [6], and makes no use of semantic tableaux; this proof will also yield a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for the modeling.

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1109-1144
Author(s):  
Timothy J. Carlson

AbstractThe theory of ranked partial structures allows a reinterpretation of several of the standard results of model theory and first-order logic and is intended to provide a proof-theoretic method which allows for the intuitions of model theory. A version of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is central to our development. In this paper we will present the basic theory of ranked partial structures and their logic including an appropriate version of the completeness theorem.


1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter A. Carnielli

AbstractThis paper presents a unified treatment of the propositional and first-order many-valued logics through the method of tableaux. It is shown that several important results on the proof theory and model theory of those logics can be obtained in a general way.We obtain, in this direction, abstract versions of the completeness theorem, model existence theorem (using a generalization of the classical analytic consistency properties), compactness theorem and Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.The paper is completely self-contained and includes examples of application to particular many-valued formal systems.


1963 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. P. Belluce ◽  
C. C. Chang

This paper contains some results concerning the completeness of a first-order system of infinite valued logicThere are under consideration two distinct notions of completeness corresponding to the two notions of validity (see Definition 3) and strong validity (see Definition 4). Both notions of validity, whether based on the unit interval [0, 1] or based on linearly ordered MV-algebras, use the element 1 as the designated truth value. Originally, it was thought by many investigators in the field that one should be able to prove that the set of valid sentences is recursively enumerable. It was first proved by Rutledge in [9] that the set of valid sentences in the monadic first-order infinite valued logic is recursively enumerable.


2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jouko Väänänen

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness. Any set of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to κ. If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ. Interpolation Property. If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languages Lκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory.


1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 332
Author(s):  
Bruno Scarpellini ◽  
L. P. Belluce ◽  
C. C. Chang

1996 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leon Henkin

§1. Introduction. This paper deals with aspects of my doctoral dissertation which contributed to the early development of model theory. What was of use to later workers was less the results of my thesis, than the method by which I proved the completeness of first-order logic—a result established by Kurt Gödel in his doctoral thesis 18 years before.The ideas that fed my discovery of this proof were mostly those I found in the teachings and writings of Alonzo Church. This may seem curious, as his work in logic, and his teaching, gave great emphasis to the constructive character of mathematical logic, while the model theory to which I contributed is filled with theorems about very large classes of mathematical structures, whose proofs often by-pass constructive methods.Another curious thing about my discovery of a new proof of Gödel's completeness theorem, is that it arrived in the midst of my efforts to prove an entirely different result. Such “accidental” discoveries arise in many parts of scientific work. Perhaps there are regularities in the conditions under which such “accidents” occur which would interest some historians, so I shall try to describe in some detail the accident which befell me.A mathematical discovery is an idea, or a complex of ideas, which have been found and set forth under certain circumstances. The process of discovery consists in selecting certain input ideas and somehow combining and transforming them to produce the new output ideas. The process that produces a particular discovery may thus be represented by a diagram such as one sees in many parts of science; a “black box” with lines coming in from the left to represent the input ideas, and lines going out to the right representing the output. To describe that discovery one must explain what occurs inside the box, i.e., how the outputs were obtained from the inputs.


Author(s):  
Harvey Friedman

AbstractFor countable admissible α, one can add a new infinitary propositional connective to so that the extended language obeys the Barwise compactness theorem, and the set of valid sentences is complete α-r.e.Aside from obeying the compactness theorem and a completeness theorem, ordinary finitary predicate calculus is also truth-functionally complete.In (1), Barwise shows that for countable admissible A, provides a fragment of which obeys a compactness theorem and a completeness theorem. However, we of course lose truth-functional completeness, with respect to infinitary propositional connectives that operate on infinite sequences of propositional variables. This raises the question of studying extensions of the language obtained by adding infinitary propositional connectives, in connexion with the Barwise compactness and completeness theorems, and other metatheorems, proved for Some aspects of this project are proposed in (3). It is the purpose of this paper to answer a few of the more basic questions which arise in this connexion.We have not attempted to study the preservation of interpolation or implicit definability. This could be quite interesting if done systematically.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 549-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAN LANZET

AbstractThis paper presents an extended version of the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc). Quarc is a logic comparable to the first-order predicate calculus. It employs several nonstandard syntactic and semantic devices, which bring it closer to natural language in several respects. Most notably, quantifiers in this logic are attached to one-place predicates; the resulting quantified constructions are then allowed to occupy the argument places of predicates. The version presented here is capable of straightforwardly translating natural-language sentences involving defining clauses. A three-valued, model-theoretic semantics for Quarc is presented. Interpretations in this semantics are not equipped with domains of quantification: they are just interpretation functions. This reflects the analysis of natural-language quantification on which Quarc is based. A proof system is presented, and a completeness result is obtained. The logic presented here is capable of straightforward translation of the classical first-order predicate calculus, the translation preserving truth values as well as entailment. The first-order predicate calculus and its devices of quantification can be seen as resulting from Quarc on certain semantic and syntactic restrictions, akin to simplifying assumptions. An analogous, straightforward translation of Quarc into the first-order predicate calculus is impossible.


1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 659-666
Author(s):  
Judy Green

An analogue of a theorem of Sierpinski about the classical operation () provides the motivation for studying κ-Suslin logic, an extension of Lκ+ω which is closed under a propositional connective based on (). This theorem is used to obtain a complete axiomatization for κ-Suslin logic and an upper bound on the κ-Suslin accessible ordinals (for κ = ω these results are due to Ellentuck [E]). It also yields a weak completeness theorem which we use to generalize a result of Barwise and Kunen [B-K] and show that the least ordinal not H(κ+) recursive is the least ordinal not κ-Suslin accessible.We assume familiarity with lectures 3, 4 and 10 of Keisler's Model theory for infinitary logic [Ke]. We use standard notation and terminology including the following.Lκ+ω is the logic closed under negation, finite quantification, and conjunction and disjunction over sets of formulas of cardinality at most κ. For κ singular, conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of cardinality κ can be replaced by conjunctions and disjunctions over sets of cardinality less than κ so that we can (and will in §2) assume the formation rules of Lκ+ω allow conjunctions and disjunctions only over sets of cardinality strictly less than κ whenever κ is singular.


Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

We continue our study of Model Theory. This is the branch of logic concerned with the interplay between sentences of a formal language and mathematical structures. Primarily, Model Theory studies the relationship between a set of first-order sentences T and the class Mod(T) of structures that model T. Basic results of Model Theory were proved in the previous chapter. For example, it was shown that, in first-order logic, every model has a theory and every theory has a model. Put another way, T is consistent if and only if Mod(T) is nonempty. As a consequence of this, we proved the Completeness theorem. This theorem states that T ├ φ if and onlyif M ╞ φ for each M in Mod(T). So to study a theory T, we can avoid the concept of ├ and the methods of deduction introduced in Chapter 3, and instead work with the concept of ╞ and analyze the class Mod(T). More generally, we can go back and forth between the notions on the left side of the following table and their counterparts on the right. Progress in mathematics is often the result of having two or more points of view that are shown to be equivalent. A prime example is the relationship between the algebra of equations and the geometry of the graphs defined by the equations. Combining these two points of view yield concepts and results that would not be possible in either geometry or algebra alone. The Completeness theorem equates the two points of view exemplified in the above table. Model Theory exploits the relationship between these two points of view to investigate mathematical structures. First-order theories serve as our objects of study in this chapter. A first-order theory may be viewed as a consistent set of sentences T or as an elementary class of structures Mod(T). We shall present examples of theories and consider properties that the theories mayor may not possess such as completeness, categoricity, quantifier-elimination, and model-completeness. The properties that a theory possesses shed light on the structures that model the theory. We analyze examples of first-order structures including linear orders, vector spaces, the random graph, and the complex numbers.


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