Turing machines and the spectra of first-order formulas

1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil D. Jones ◽  
Alan L. Selman

H. Scholz [11] defined the spectrum of a formula φ of first-order logic with equality to be the set of all natural numbers n for which φ has a model of cardinality n. He then asked for a characterization of spectra. Only partial progress has been made. Computational aspects of this problem have been worked on by Gunter Asser [1], A. Mostowski [9], and J. H. Bennett [2]. It is known that spectra include the Grzegorczyk class and are properly included in . However, no progress has been made toward establishing whether spectra properly include , or whether spectra are closed under complementation.A possible connection with automata theory arises from the fact that contains just those sets which are accepted by deterministic linear-bounded Turing machines (Ritchie [10]). Another resemblance lies in the fact that the same two problems (closure under complement, and proper inclusion of ) have remained open for the class of context sensitive languages for several years.In this paper we show that these similarities are not accidental—that spectra and context sensitive languages are closely related, and that their open questions are merely special cases of a family of open questions which relate to the difference (if any) between deterministic and nondeterministic time or space bounded Turing machines.In particular we show that spectra are just those sets which are acceptable by nondeterministic Turing machines in time 2cx, where c is constant and x is the length of the input. Combining this result with results of Bennett [2], Ritchie [10], Kuroda [7], and Cook [3], we obtain the “hierarchy” of classes of sets shown in Figure 1. It is of interest to note that in all of these cases the amount of unrestricted read/write memory appears to be too small to allow diagonalization within the larger classes.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Walicki

Abstract Graph normal form, introduced earlier for propositional logic, is shown to be a normal form also for first-order logic. It allows to view syntax of theories as digraphs, while their semantics as kernels of these digraphs. Graphs are particularly well suited for studying circularity, and we provide some general means for verifying that circular or apparently circular extensions are conservative. Traditional syntactic means of ensuring conservativity, like definitional extensions or positive occurrences guaranteeing exsitence of fixed points, emerge as special cases.


Author(s):  
Stewart Shapiro

Typically, a formal language has variables that range over a collection of objects, or domain of discourse. A language is ‘second-order’ if it has, in addition, variables that range over sets, functions, properties or relations on the domain of discourse. A language is third-order if it has variables ranging over sets of sets, or functions on relations, and so on. A language is higher-order if it is at least second-order. Second-order languages enjoy a greater expressive power than first-order languages. For example, a set S of sentences is said to be categorical if any two models satisfying S are isomorphic, that is, have the same structure. There are second-order, categorical characterizations of important mathematical structures, including the natural numbers, the real numbers and Euclidean space. It is a consequence of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorems that there is no first-order categorical characterization of any infinite structure. There are also a number of central mathematical notions, such as finitude, countability, minimal closure and well-foundedness, which can be characterized with formulas of second-order languages, but cannot be characterized in first-order languages. Some philosophers argue that second-order logic is not logic. Properties and relations are too obscure for rigorous foundational study, while sets and functions are in the purview of mathematics, not logic; logic should not have an ontology of its own. Other writers disqualify second-order logic because its consequence relation is not effective – there is no recursively enumerable, sound and complete deductive system for second-order logic. The deeper issues underlying the dispute concern the goals and purposes of logical theory. If a logic is to be a calculus, an effective canon of inference, then second-order logic is beyond the pale. If, on the other hand, one aims to codify a standard to which correct reasoning must adhere, and to characterize the descriptive and communicative abilities of informal mathematical practice, then perhaps there is room for second-order logic.


1993 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 511-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. MARQUIS

Abduction is the process of generating the best explanation as to why a fact is observed given what is already known. A real problem in this area is the selective generation of hypotheses that have some reasonable prospect of being valid. In this paper, we propose the notion of skeptical abduction as a model to face this problem. Intuitively, the hypotheses pointed out by skeptical abduction are all the explanations that are consistent with the given knowledge and that are minimal, i.e. not unnecessarily general. Our contribution is twofold. First, we present a formal characterization of skeptical abduction in a logical framework. On this ground, we address the problem of mechanizing skeptical abduction. A new method to compute minimal and consistent hypotheses in propositional logic is put forward. The extent to which skeptical abduction can be mechanized in first—order logic is also investigated. In particular, two classes of first-order formulas in which skeptical abduction is effective are provided. As an illustration, we finally sketch how our notion of skeptical abduction applies as a theoretical tool to some artificial intelligence problems (e.g. diagnosis, machine learning).


2009 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Benedikt ◽  
Luc Segoufin

AbstractThis work deals with the expressive power of logics on finite graphs with access to an additional “arbitrary” linear order. The queries that can be expressed this way are the order-invariant queries for the logic. For the standard logics used in computer science, such as first-order logic, it is known that access to an arbitrary linear order increases the expressiveness of the logic. However, when we look at the separating examples, we find that they have satisfying models whose Gaifman Graph is complex – unbounded in valence and in treewidth. We thus explore the expressiveness of order-invariant queries over well-behaved graphs. We prove that first-order order-invariant queries over strings and trees have no additional expressiveness over first-order logic in the original signature. We also prove new upper bounds on order-invariant queries over bounded treewidth and bounded valence graphs. Our results make use of a new technique of independent interest: the application of algebraic characterizations of definability to show collapse results.


2021 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 455-474
Author(s):  
Dorsaf Laribi ◽  
Afif Masmoudi ◽  
Imen Boutouria

Abstract Having only two parameters, the Gamma-Lindley distribution does not provide enough flexibility for analyzing different types of lifetime data. From this perspective, in order to further enhance its flexibility, we set forward in this paper a new class of distributions named Generalized Gamma-Lindley distribution with four parameters. Its construction is based on certain mixtures of Gamma and Lindley distributions. The truncated moment, as a characterization method, has drawn a little attention in the statistical literature over the great popularity of the classical methods. We attempt to prove that the Generalized Gamma-Lindley distribution is characterized by its truncated moment of the first order statistics. This method rests upon finding a survival function of a distribution, that is a solution of a first order differential equation. This characterization includes as special cases: Gamma, Lindley, Exponential, Gamma-Lindley and Weighted Lindley distributions. Finally, a simulation study is performed to help the reader check whether the available data follow the underlying distribution.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 508-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
PAOLO BOTTONI ◽  
DANIELE GORLA ◽  
STEFANO KASANGIAN ◽  
ANNA LABELLA

The study of algebraic modelling of labelled non-deterministic concurrent processes leads us to consider a category LB, obtained from a complete meet-semilattice B and from B-valued equivalence relations. We prove that, if B has enough properties, then LB presents a two-fold internal logical structure, induced by two doctrines definable on it: one related to its families of subobjects and one to its families of regular subobjects. The first doctrine is Heyting and makes LB a Heyting category, the second one is Boolean. We will see that the difference between these two logical structures, namely the different behaviour of the negation operator, can be interpreted in terms of a distinction between non-deterministic and deterministic behaviours of agents able to perform computations in the context of the same process. Moreover, the sorted first-order logic naturally associated with LB can be extended to a modal/temporal logic, again using the doctrinal setting. Relations are also drawn to other computational models.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1377-1399
Author(s):  
Daniel Găină ◽  
Tomasz Kowalski

Abstract We generalize the characterization of elementary equivalence by Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé games to arbitrary institutions whose sentences are finitary. These include many-sorted first-order logic, higher-order logic with types, as well as a number of other logics arising in connection to specification languages. The gain for the classical case is that the characterization is proved directly for all signatures, including infinite ones.


1985 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosta Došen

AbstractThe purpose of this work is to present Gentzen-style formulations of S5 and S4 based on sequents of higher levels. Sequents of level 1 are like ordinary sequents, sequents of level 2 have collections of sequents of level 1 on the left and right of the turnstile, etc. Rules for modal constants involve sequents of level 2, whereas rules for customary logical constants of first-order logic with identity involve only sequents of level 1. A restriction on Thinning on the right of level 2, which when applied to Thinning on the right of level 1 produces intuitionistic out of classical logic (without changing anything else), produces S4 out of S5 (without changing anything else).This characterization of modal constants with sequents of level 2 is unique in the following sense. If constants which differ only graphically are given a formally identical characterization, they can be shown inter-replaceable (not only uniformly) with the original constants salva provability. Customary characterizations of modal constants with sequents of level 1, as well as characterizations in Hilbert-style axiomatizations, are not unique in this sense. This parallels the case with implication, which is not uniquely characterized in Hilbert-style axiomatizations, but can be uniquely characterized with sequents of level 1.These results bear upon theories of philosophical logic which attempt to characterize logical constants syntactically. They also provide an illustration of how alternative logics differ only in their structural rules, whereas their rules for logical constants are identical.


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