The degree of the set of sentences of predicate provability logic that are true under every interpretation

1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos ◽  
Vann McGee
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Provability Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Unary Operator

The formalism of P(redicate) P(rovability) L(ogic) is the result of adjoining the unary operator □ to first-order logic without identity, constants, or function symbols. The term “provability” indicates that □ is to be “read” as “it is provable in P(eano) A(rithmetic) that…” and that the formulae of predicate provability logic are to be interpreted via formulae of PA as follows.Pr(x), alias Bew(x), is the standard provability predicate of PA. For any formula F of PA, Pr[F] is the formula of PA that expresses the PA-provability of F “of” the values of the variables free in F, i.e., it is the formula of PA with the same free variables as F that expresses the PA-provability of the result of substituting for each variable free in F the numeral for the value of that variable. For the details of the construction of Pr[F], the reader may consult [B2, p. 42]. If F is a sentence of PA, then Pr[F] = Pr(‘F’), the sentence that expresses the PA-provability of F.Let υ1, υ2,… be an enumeration of the variables of PA. An interpretation * of a formula ϕ of PPL is a function which assigns to each predicate symbol P of ϕ a formula P* of the language of arithmetic whose free variables are the first n variables of PA, where n is the degree of P.

Definability with a predicate for a semi-linear set

2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Benedikt ◽  
H. Jerome Keisler
Keyword(s):  
Line Segment ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Linear Set ◽  
Negative Side ◽  
First Order ◽  
Linear Sets

AbstractWe settle a number of questions concerning definability in first order logic with an extra predicate symbol ranging over semi-linear sets. We give new results both on the positive and negative side: we show that in first-order logic one cannot query a semi-linear set as to whether or not it contains a line, or whether or not it contains the line segment between two given points. However, we show that some of these queries become definable if one makes small restrictions on the semi-linear sets considered.

On amalgamations of languages with Magidor-Malitz quantifiers

1979 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 549-558
Author(s):  
Carl F. Morgenstern
Keyword(s):  
Universal Algebra ◽  
Model Theory ◽  
Natural Extension ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Countably Compact

In this paper we indicate how compact languages containing the Magidor-Malitz quantifiers Qκn in different cardinalities can be amalgamated to yield more expressive, compact languages.The language Lκ<ω, originally introduced by Magidor and Malitz [9], is a natural extension of the language L(Q) introduced by Mostowski and investigated by Fuhrken [6], [7], Keisler [8] and Vaught [13]. Intuitively, Lκ<ω is first-order logic together with quantifiers Qκn (n ∈ ω) binding n free variables which express “there is a set X of cardinality κ such than any n distinct elements of X satisfy …”, or in other words, iff the relation on determined by φ contains an n-cube of cardinality κ. With these languages one can express a variety of combinatorial statements of the type considered by Erdös and his colleagues, as well as concepts in universal algebra which are beyond the scope of first-order logic. The model theory of Lκ<ω has been further developed by Badger [1], Magidor and Malitz [10] and Shelah [12].We refer to a language as being < κ compact if, given any set of sentences Σ of the language, if Σ is finitely satisfiable and ∣Σ∣ < κ, then Σ has a model. The phrase countably compact is used in place of <ℵ1 compact.

scholarly journals The Triguarded Fragment with Transitivity

10.29007/z359 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Kieronski ◽  
Adam Malinowski
Keyword(s):  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Satisfiability Problem ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Guarded Fragment

The triguarded fragment of first-order logic is an extension of the guarded fragment in which quantification for subformulas with at most two free variables need not be guarded. Thus, it unifies two prominent decidable logics: the guarded fragment and the two-variable fragment. Its satisfiability problem is known to be undecidable in the presence of equality, but becomes decidable when equality is forbidden. We consider an extension of the tri- guarded fragment without equality by transitive relations, allowing them to be used only as guards. We show that the satisfiability problem for the obtained formalism is decidable and 2-ExpTime-complete, that is, it is of the same complexity as for the analogous exten- sion of the classical guarded fragment. In fact, in our satisfiability test we use a decision procedure for the latter as a subroutine. We also show how our approach, consisting in exploiting some existing results on guarded logics, can be used to reprove some known facts, as well as to derive some other new results on triguarded logics.

Abstraction Logic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Obua
Keyword(s):  
Binding Constants ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Algebraic Semantics ◽  
Variable Binding ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Direct Support ◽  
Second Order Logic

Abstraction Logic is introduced as a foundation for Practical Types and Practal. It combines the simplicity of first-order logic with direct support for variable binding constants called abstractions. It also allows free variables to depend on parameters, which means that first-order axiom schemata can be encoded as simple axioms. Conceptually abstraction logic is situated between first-order logic and second-order logic. It is sound with respect to an intuitive and simple algebraic semantics. Completeness holds for both intuitionistic and classical abstraction logic, and all abstraction logics in between and beyond.

Beth’s theorem and Craig’s theorem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zeno Swijtink
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Expressive Power ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Infinite Length ◽  
First Order ◽  
Explicit Definition ◽  
Central Result ◽  
Definition Of

Beth’s theorem is a central result about definability of non-logical symbols in classical first-order theories. It states that a symbol P is implicitly defined by a theory T if and only if an explicit definition of P in terms of some other expressions of the theory T can be deduced from the theory T. Intuitively, the symbol P is implicitly defined by T if, given the extension of these other symbols, T fixes the extension of the symbol P uniquely. In a precise statement of Beth’s theorem this will be replaced by a condition on the models of T. An explicit definition of a predicate symbol states necessary and sufficient conditions: for example, if P is a one-place predicate symbol, an explicit definition is a sentence of the form (x) (Px ≡φ(x)), where φ(x) is a formula with free variable x in which P does not occur. Thus, Beth’s theorem says something about the expressive power of first-order logic: there is a balance between the syntax (the deducibility of an explicit definition) and the semantics (across models of T the extension of P is uniquely determined by the extension of other symbols). Beth’s definability theorem follows immediately from Craig’s interpolation theorem. For first-order logic with identity, Craig’s theorem says that if φ is deducible from ψ, there is an interpolant θ, a sentence whose non-logical symbols are common to φ and ψ, such that θ is deducible from ψ, while φ is deducible from θ. Craig’s theorem and Beth’s theorem also hold for a number of non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic first-order logic and classical second-order logic, but fail for other logics, such as logics with expressions of infinite length.

Gödel’s Proof Based on ω-Consistency

1992 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond M. Smullyan
Keyword(s):  
Predicate Symbol ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Modus Ponens ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Peano Arithmetic ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory

The proof that we have just given of the incompleteness of Peano Arithmetic was based on the underlying assumption that Peano Arithmetic is correct—i.e., that every sentence provable in P.A. is a true sentence. Gödel’s original incompleteness proof involved a much weaker assumption—that of ω-consistency to which we now turn. We consider an arbitrary axiom system S whose formulas are those of Peano Arithmetic, whose axioms include all those of Groups I and II (or alternatively, any set of axioms for first-order logic with identity such that all logically valid formulas are provable from them), and whose inference rules are modus ponens and generalization. (It is also possible to axiomatize first-order logic in such a way that modus ponens is the only inference rule—cf. Quine [1940].) In place of the axioms of Groups III and IV, however, we can take a completely arbitrary set of axioms. Such a system S is an example of what is termed a first-order theory, and we will consider several such theories other than Peano Arithmetic. (For the more general notion of a first-order theory, the key difference is that we do not necessarily start with + and × as the undefined function symbols, nor do we necessarily take ≤ as the undefined predicate symbol. Arbitrary function symbols and predicate symbols can be taken, however, as the undefined function and predicate symbols—cf. Tarski [1953] for details. However, the only theories (or “systems”, as we will call them) that we will have occasion to consider are those whose formulas are those of P.A.) S is called simply consistent (or just “consistent” for short) if no sentence is both provable and refutable in S.

scholarly journals An elementary definability theorem for first order logic

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 1028-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Butz ◽  
I. Moerdijk
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Definable Subset ◽  
Boolean Valued Model

In this paper, we will present a definability theorem for first order logic. This theorem is very easy to state, and its proof only uses elementary tools. To explain the theorem, let us first observe that if M is a model of a theory T in a language , then, clearly, any definable subset S ⊂ M (i.e., a subset S = {a ∣ M ⊨ φ(a)} defined by some formula φ) is invariant under all automorphisms of M. The same is of course true for subsets of Mn defined by formulas with n free variables.Our theorem states that, if one allows Boolean valued models, the converse holds. More precisely, for any theory T we will construct a Boolean valued model M, in which precisely the T -provable formulas hold, and in which every (Boolean valued) subset which is invariant under all automorphisms of M is definable by a formula .Our presentation is entirely selfcontained, and only requires familiarity with the most elementary properties of model theory. In particular, we have added a first section in which we review the basic definitions concerning Boolean valued models.

Axiomatizability by a schema

1968 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 473-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Vaught
Keyword(s):  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Relation Symbol ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables

A theory T is axiomatizable by a schema if there is a formula Γ, involving symbols of T plus a new relation symbol R, such that the set of all (universal closures of) instances of Γ in T is a set of axioms for T. (It is understood that, if R has n places, an instance of Γ in T is obtained by properly substituting for R in Γ a formula of T which has n selected free variables and is allowed to have any number of other free variables as parameters.) Obviously, the notion is unchanged if finitely many Γ's, each involving several new R's, are allowed instead. All theories we consider are assumed to be theories in the first-order logic with equality (as in [8]), to have finitely many nonlogical symbols, and to be recursively axiomatizable.

Abstraction Logic

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Obua
Keyword(s):  
Binding Constants ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Algebraic Semantics ◽  
Variable Binding ◽  
First Order ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Direct Support ◽  
Second Order Logic

Abstraction Logic is introduced as a foundation for Practical Types and Practal. It combines the simplicity of first-order logic with direct support for variable binding constants called abstractions. It also allows free variables to depend on parameters, which means that first-order axiom schemata can be encoded as simple axioms. Conceptually abstraction logic is situated between first-order logic and second-order logic. It is sound and complete with respect to an intuitive and simple algebraic semantics.

First-Order Logic Reasoning Support for the Semantic Web

2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 3091-3099 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Hong XU ◽  
Jian ZHANG
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Web ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
First Order ◽  
Logic Reasoning
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document