Beth’s theorem and Craig’s theorem

Author(s):  
Zeno Swijtink

Beth’s theorem is a central result about definability of non-logical symbols in classical first-order theories. It states that a symbol P is implicitly defined by a theory T if and only if an explicit definition of P in terms of some other expressions of the theory T can be deduced from the theory T. Intuitively, the symbol P is implicitly defined by T if, given the extension of these other symbols, T fixes the extension of the symbol P uniquely. In a precise statement of Beth’s theorem this will be replaced by a condition on the models of T. An explicit definition of a predicate symbol states necessary and sufficient conditions: for example, if P is a one-place predicate symbol, an explicit definition is a sentence of the form (x) (Px ≡φ(x)), where φ(x) is a formula with free variable x in which P does not occur. Thus, Beth’s theorem says something about the expressive power of first-order logic: there is a balance between the syntax (the deducibility of an explicit definition) and the semantics (across models of T the extension of P is uniquely determined by the extension of other symbols). Beth’s definability theorem follows immediately from Craig’s interpolation theorem. For first-order logic with identity, Craig’s theorem says that if φ is deducible from ψ, there is an interpolant θ, a sentence whose non-logical symbols are common to φ and ψ, such that θ is deducible from ψ, while φ is deducible from θ. Craig’s theorem and Beth’s theorem also hold for a number of non-classical logics, such as intuitionistic first-order logic and classical second-order logic, but fail for other logics, such as logics with expressions of infinite length.

2016 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 527-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Bos

The syntax of abstract meaning representations (AMRs) can be defined recursively, and a systematic translation to first-order logic (FOL) can be specified, including a proper treatment of negation. AMRs without recurrent variables are in the decidable two-variable fragment of FOL. The current definition of AMRs has limited expressive power for universal quantification (up to one universal quantifier per sentence). A simple extension of the AMR syntax and translation to FOL provides the means to represent projection and scope phenomena.


1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 545-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Gottlob

AbstractWe here examine the expressive power of first order logic with generalized quantifiers over finite ordered structures. In particular, we address the following problem: Given a family Q of generalized quantifiers expressing a complexity class C, what is the expressive power of first order logic FO(Q) extended by the quantifiers in Q? From previously studied examples, one would expect that FO(Q) captures LC, i.e., logarithmic space relativized to an oracle in C. We show that this is not always true. However, after studying the problem from a general point of view, we derive sufficient conditions on C such that FO(Q) captures LC. These conditions are fulfilled by a large number of relevant complexity classes, in particular, for example, by NP. As an application of this result, it follows that first order logic extended by Henkin quantifiers captures LNP. This answers a question raised by Blass and Gurevich [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic, vol. 32, 1986]. Furthermore we show that for many families Q of generalized quantifiers (including the family of Henkin quantifiers), each FO(Q)-formula can be replaced by an equivalent FO(Q)-formula with only two occurrences of generalized quantifiers. This generalizes and extends an earlier normal-form result by I. A. Stewart [Fundamenta Inform, vol. 18, 1993].


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.


Author(s):  
Rohit Parikh

Church’s theorem, published in 1936, states that the set of valid formulas of first-order logic is not effectively decidable: there is no method or algorithm for deciding which formulas of first-order logic are valid. Church’s paper exhibited an undecidable combinatorial problem P and showed that P was representable in first-order logic. If first-order logic were decidable, P would also be decidable. Since P is undecidable, first-order logic must also be undecidable. Church’s theorem is a negative solution to the decision problem (Entscheidungsproblem), the problem of finding a method for deciding whether a given formula of first-order logic is valid, or satisfiable, or neither. The great contribution of Church (and, independently, Turing) was not merely to prove that there is no method but also to propose a mathematical definition of the notion of ‘effectively solvable problem’, that is, a problem solvable by means of a method or algorithm.


2003 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 319-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Benedikt ◽  
H. Jerome Keisler

AbstractWe settle a number of questions concerning definability in first order logic with an extra predicate symbol ranging over semi-linear sets. We give new results both on the positive and negative side: we show that in first-order logic one cannot query a semi-linear set as to whether or not it contains a line, or whether or not it contains the line segment between two given points. However, we show that some of these queries become definable if one makes small restrictions on the semi-linear sets considered.


1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos ◽  
Vann McGee

The formalism of P(redicate) P(rovability) L(ogic) is the result of adjoining the unary operator □ to first-order logic without identity, constants, or function symbols. The term “provability” indicates that □ is to be “read” as “it is provable in P(eano) A(rithmetic) that…” and that the formulae of predicate provability logic are to be interpreted via formulae of PA as follows.Pr(x), alias Bew(x), is the standard provability predicate of PA. For any formula F of PA, Pr[F] is the formula of PA that expresses the PA-provability of F “of” the values of the variables free in F, i.e., it is the formula of PA with the same free variables as F that expresses the PA-provability of the result of substituting for each variable free in F the numeral for the value of that variable. For the details of the construction of Pr[F], the reader may consult [B2, p. 42]. If F is a sentence of PA, then Pr[F] = Pr(‘F’), the sentence that expresses the PA-provability of F.Let υ1, υ2,… be an enumeration of the variables of PA. An interpretation * of a formula ϕ of PPL is a function which assigns to each predicate symbol P of ϕ a formula P* of the language of arithmetic whose free variables are the first n variables of PA, where n is the degree of P.


2021 ◽  
pp. 8-30
Author(s):  
Salvatore Florio ◽  
Øystein Linnebo

Plural logic is a logical system in which plural terms and predicates figure as primitive expressions alongside the singular resources of ordinary first-order logic. The philosophical significance of this system depends on two of its alleged features: being pure logic and providing more expressive power than first-order logic. This chapter first introduces the language and axioms of plural logic and then analyzes this logic’s main philosophical applications in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, and semantics.


1999 ◽  
Vol Vol. 3 no. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Schwentick ◽  
Klaus Barthelmann

International audience Building on work of Gaifman [Gai82] it is shown that every first-order formula is logically equivalent to a formula of the form ∃ x_1,...,x_l, \forall y, φ where φ is r-local around y, i.e. quantification in φ is restricted to elements of the universe of distance at most r from y. \par From this and related normal forms, variants of the Ehrenfeucht game for first-order and existential monadic second-order logic are developed that restrict the possible strategies for the spoiler, one of the two players. This makes proofs of the existence of a winning strategy for the duplicator, the other player, easier and can thus simplify inexpressibility proofs. \par As another application, automata models are defined that have, on arbitrary classes of relational structures, exactly the expressive power of first-order logic and existential monadic second-order logic, respectively.


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