Undecidability in diagonalizable algebras

1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Yu. Shavrukov

AbstractIf a formal theory T is able to reason about its own syntax, then the diagonalizable algebra of T is defined as its Lindenbaum sentence algebra endowed with a unary operator □ which sends a sentence φ to the sentence □φ asserting the provability of φ in T. We prove that the first order theories of diagonalizable algebras of a wide class of theories are undecidable and establish some related results.

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne D. Blizard

The two statements “Two different objects cannot occupy the same place at the same time” and “An object cannot be in two different places at the same time” are axioms of our everyday understanding of objects, space and time. We develop a first-order theory OST (Objects, Space and Time) in which formal equivalents of these two statements are taken as axioms. Using the theory OST, we uncover other fundamental principles of objects, space and time. We attempt to understand the logical nature of these principles, to investigate their formal consequences, and to identify logical alternatives to them. For easy reference, all of the nonlogical axioms of OST are listed together at the end of §2. In §3, we introduce two possible extensions of OST.


1981 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 943-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvia Richardson ◽  
Denis Hemon

Consider two stochastically independent, stationary Gaussian lattice processes with zero means, {X(u), u (Z 2} and {Y(u), u (Z 2}. An asymptotic expression for the variance of the sample correlation between {X(u)} and {Y(u)} over a finite square is derived. This expression also holds for a wide class of domains in Z 2. As an illustration, the asymptotic variance of the correlation between two first-order autonormal schemes is evaluated.


1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham Robinson

The notion of algebraic closedness plays an important part in the theory of commutative fields. The corresponding notion in the theory of ordered fields is (not only intuitively but in a sense which can be made precise in a metamathematical framework, compare [4]) that of a real closed ordered field. Several suggestions have been made (see [2] and [8]) for the formulation of corresponding concepts in the theory of groups and in the theory of skew fields (division rings, noncommutative fields). Here we present a concept of this kind, which preserves the principal metamathematical properties of algebraically closed commutative fields and which applies to a wide class of first order theories K, including the theories of commutative and of skew fields and the theories of commutative and of general groups.


1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Boolos ◽  
Vann McGee

The formalism of P(redicate) P(rovability) L(ogic) is the result of adjoining the unary operator □ to first-order logic without identity, constants, or function symbols. The term “provability” indicates that □ is to be “read” as “it is provable in P(eano) A(rithmetic) that…” and that the formulae of predicate provability logic are to be interpreted via formulae of PA as follows.Pr(x), alias Bew(x), is the standard provability predicate of PA. For any formula F of PA, Pr[F] is the formula of PA that expresses the PA-provability of F “of” the values of the variables free in F, i.e., it is the formula of PA with the same free variables as F that expresses the PA-provability of the result of substituting for each variable free in F the numeral for the value of that variable. For the details of the construction of Pr[F], the reader may consult [B2, p. 42]. If F is a sentence of PA, then Pr[F] = Pr(‘F’), the sentence that expresses the PA-provability of F.Let υ1, υ2,… be an enumeration of the variables of PA. An interpretation * of a formula ϕ of PPL is a function which assigns to each predicate symbol P of ϕ a formula P* of the language of arithmetic whose free variables are the first n variables of PA, where n is the degree of P.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Mai

English distinguishes between singular quantifiers like "a donkey" and plural quantifiers like "some donkeys". Pluralists hold that plural quantifiers range in an unusual, irreducibly plural, way over common objects, namely individuals from first-order domains and not over set-like objects. The favoured framework of pluralism is plural first-order logic, PFO, an interpreted first-order language that is capable of expressing plural quantification. Pluralists argue for their position by claiming that the standard formal theory based on PFO is both ontologically neutral and really logic. These properties are supposed to yield many important applications concerning second-order logic and set theory that alternative theories supposedly cannot deliver. I will show that there are serious reasons for rejecting at least the claim of ontological innocence. Doubt about innocence arises on account of the fact that, when properly spelled out, the PFO-semantics for plural quantifiers is committed to set-like objects. The correctness of my worries presupposes the principle that for every plurality there is a coextensive set. Pluralists might reply that this principle leads straight to paradox. However, as I will argue, the true culprit of the paradox is the assumption that every definite condition determines a plurality.


2014 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1133-1147 ◽  
Author(s):  
TRISTAN KUIJPERS ◽  
EVA LEENKNEGT

AbstractWe prove a p-adic, local version of the Monotonicity Theorem for P-minimal structures. The existence of such a theorem was originally conjectured by Haskell and Macpherson. We approach the problem by considering the first order strict derivative. In particular, we show that, for a wide class of P-minimal structures, the definable functions f : K → K are almost everywhere strictly differentiable and satisfy the Local Jacobian Property.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Pawel Pawlowski ◽  
Rafal Urbaniak
Keyword(s):  

BAT is a logic built to capture the inferential behavior of informal provability. Ultimately, the logic is meant to be used in an arithmetical setting. To reach this stage it has to be extended to a first-order version. In this paper we provide such an extension. We do so by constructing non-deterministic three-valued models that interpret quantifiers as some sorts of infinite disjunctions and conjunctions. We also elaborate on the semantical properties of the first-order system and consider a couple of its strengthenings. It turns out that obtaining a sensible strengthening is not straightforward. We prove that most strategies commonly used for strengthening non-deterministic logics fail in our case. Nevertheless, we identify one method of extending the system which does not.


1981 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 943-948 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvia Richardson ◽  
Denis Hemon

Consider two stochastically independent, stationary Gaussian lattice processes with zero means, {X(u), u (Z2} and {Y(u), u (Z2}. An asymptotic expression for the variance of the sample correlation between {X(u)} and {Y(u)} over a finite square is derived. This expression also holds for a wide class of domains in Z2. As an illustration, the asymptotic variance of the correlation between two first-order autonormal schemes is evaluated.


2009 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-149
Author(s):  
Pawel Garbacz ◽  

The paper contains a first order formal theory pertaining to artefact designs, designs which are construed as the results of designing activities. The theory is based on a minimal ontology of states of affairs and it is inspired by the ideas of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden. After differentiating the philosophical notion of design from the engineering notion of design specifications, I then go on to argue that the philosophical category of artefact designs may be compared with Ingarden’s category of intentional states of affairs. At least some artefacts are found to be determined by more than one design. I also show how this ontological framework allows for the distinction between artefact tokens and artefact types. That leads to a proposal on how to define a criterion of identity for artefact types. The proposed theory serves as a basis both for a better understanding of what artefacts are and for the construction of computer-readable models of design specifications.


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