The isomorphism property for nonstandard universes

1995 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 512-516 ◽  
Author(s):  
James H. Schmerl

The κ-isomorphism property (IPκ) for nonstandard universes was introduced by Henson in [4]. There has been some recent effort aimed at more fully understanding this property. Jin and Shelah in [7] have shown that for κ < ⊐ω, IPκ is equivalent to what we will refer to as the κ-resplendence property. Earlier, in [6], Jin asked if IPκ is equivalent to IPℵ0 plus κ-saturation. He answered this question positively for κ = ℵ1. In this note we extend this answer to all κ. We also extend the result of Jin and Shelah to all κ. (Jin also observed this could be done.)In order to strike a balance between the generalities of model theory and the specifics of nonstandard analysis, we will consider models of Zermelo set theory with the Axiom of Choice; we denote this theory by ZC. The axioms of ZC are just those of ZFC but without the replacement scheme. Thus, among the axioms of ZC are the power set axiom, the infinity axiom, the separation axioms and the axiom of choice.Let(V, E) ⊨ ZC. If a ∈ V, we let *a = {x ∈ V: (V,E) ⊨ x ∈ a}. In particular, i ∈ *ω iff i ∈ V and (V,E) ⊨ (i is a natural number). A subset A ⊆ V is internal if A = *a for some a ∈ V.The standard model of ZC consists of those sets of rank at most ω + ω. In other words, if we let V0 be the set of hereditarily finite sets and for n < ω, then (Vω, ∈) is the standard model of ZC, where Vω = ⋃n<ω. Vn.

1994 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenz Halbeisen ◽  
Saharon Shelah

AbstractIn this paper, we consider certain cardinals in ZF (set theory without AC, the axiom of choice). In ZFC (set theory with AC), given any cardinals and , either ≤ or ≤ . However, in ZF this is no longer so. For a given infinite set A consider seq1-1(A), the set of all sequences of A without repetition. We compare |seq1-1(A)|, the cardinality of this set, to ||, the cardinality of the power set of A. What is provable about these two cardinals in ZF? The main result of this paper is that ZF ⊢ ∀A(| seq1-1(A)| ≠ ||), and we show that this is the best possible result. Furthermore, it is provable in ZF that if B is an infinite set, then | fin(B)| < | (B*)| even though the existence for some infinite set B* of a function ƒ from fin(B*) onto (B*) is consistent with ZF.


1973 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 413-421 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.P. Monro

One problem in set theory without the axiom of choice is to find a reasonable way of estimating the size of a non-well-orderable set; in this paper we present evidence which suggests that this may be very hard. Given an arbitrary fixed aleph κ we construct a model of set theory which contains a set X such that if Y ⊆ X then either Y or X - Y is finite, but such that κ can be mapped into S(S(S(X))). So in one sense X is large and in another X is one of the smallest possible infinite sets. (Here S(X) is the power set of X.)


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 447-457
Author(s):  
Michael Rathjen

Abstract While power Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, shares many properties with ordinary Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}$, in several ways it behaves quite differently from ${\textbf{KP}}$. This is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by a result, due to Mathias, to the effect that adding the axiom of constructibility to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ gives rise to a much stronger theory, whereas in the case of ${\textbf{KP}}$, the constructible hierarchy provides an inner model, so that ${\textbf{KP}}$ and ${\textbf{KP}}+V=L$ have the same strength. This paper will be concerned with the relationship between ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ and ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ plus the axiom of choice or even the global axiom of choice, $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$. Since $L$ is the standard vehicle to furnish a model in which this axiom holds, the usual argument for demonstrating that the addition of ${\textbf{AC}}$ or $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ does not increase proof-theoretic strength does not apply in any obvious way. Among other tools, the paper uses techniques from ordinal analysis to show that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ has the same strength as ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, thereby answering a question of Mathias. Moreover, it is shown that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ is conservative over ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ for $\varPi ^1_4$ statements of analysis. The method of ordinal analysis for theories with power set was developed in an earlier paper. The technique allows one to compute witnessing information from infinitary proofs, providing bounds for the transfinite iterations of the power set operation that are provable in a theory. As the theory ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ provides a very useful tool for defining models and realizability models of other theories that are hard to construct without access to a uniform selection mechanism, it is desirable to determine its exact proof-theoretic strength. This knowledge can for instance be used to determine the strength of Feferman’s operational set theory with power set operation as well as constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.


1977 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Pincus ◽  
Robert M. Solovay

Nonprincipal ultrafilters are harder to define in ZFC, and harder to obtain in ZF + DC, than nonprincipal measures.The function μ from P(X) to the closed interval [0, 1] is a measure on X if μ. is finitely additive on disjoint sets and μ(X) = 1. (P is the power set.) μ is nonprincipal if μ ({x}) = 0 for each x Є X. μ is an ultrafilter if Range μ= {0, 1}. The existence of nonprincipal measures and ultrafilters on any infinite X follows from the axiom of choice.Nonprincipal measures cannot necessarily be defined in ZFC. (ZF is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. ZFC is ZF with choice.) In ZF alone they cannot even be proved to exist. This was first established by Solovay [14] using an inaccessible cardinal. In the model of [14] no nonprincipal measure on ω is even ODR (definable from ordinal and real parameters). The HODR (hereditarily ODR) sets of this model form a model of ZF + DC (dependent choice) in which no nonprincipal measure on ω exists. Pincus [8] gave a model with the same properties making no use of an inaccessible. (This model was also known to Solovay.) The second model can be combined with ideas of A. Blass [1] to give a model of ZF + DC in which no nonprincipal measures exist on any set. Using this model one obtains a model of ZFC in which no nonprincipal measure on the set of real numbers is ODR. H. Friedman, in private communication, previously obtained such a model of ZFC by a different method. Our construction will be sketched in 4.1.


2011 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLIVER DEISER

We introduce a new simple first-order framework for theories whose objects are well-orderings (lists). A system ALT (axiomatic list theory) is presented and shown to be equiconsistent with ZFC (Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory with the Axiom of Choice). The theory sheds new light on the power set axiom and on Gödel’s axiom of constructibility. In list theory there are strong arguments favoring Gödel’s axiom, while a bare analogon of the set theoretic power set axiom looks artificial. In fact, there is a natural and attractive modification of ALT where every object is constructible and countable. In order to substantiate our foundational interest in lists, we also compare sets and lists from the perspective of finite objects, arguing that lists are, from a certain point of view, conceptually simpler than sets.


1956 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 350-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliott Mendelson

1. The purpose of this paper is to show that, if the axioms of a system G of set theory are consistent, then it is impossible to prove from them the following weak form of the axiom of choice: (H1) For every denumerable set x of disjoint two-element sets, there is a set y, called a choice set for x, which contains exactly one element in common with each element of x. Among the axioms of the system G, we take, with minor modifications, Axioms A, B, C of Gödel [6]. Clearly, the independence of H1 implies that of all stronger propositions, including the general axiom of choice and the generalized continuum hypothesis.The proof depends upon ideas of Fraenkel and Mostowski, and proceeds in the following manner. Let a be a denumerable set of objects Δ0, Δ1, Δ2, …, the exact nature of which will be specified later. Let μj = {Δ2j, Δ2j+1} for each j, c = {μ0, μ1, μ2, …}, and b = [the sum set of a]. By transfinite induction, construct the class Vc which is the closure of b under the power-set operation. For each j, it is possible to define a 1–1 mapping of Vc onto itself with the following properties. The mapping preserves the ε-relation, or, more precisely, .


1989 ◽  
Vol 21 (62) ◽  
pp. 55-66
Author(s):  
José Alfredo Amor

The so called Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is the sentence: "If A is an infinile set whose cardinal number is K and 2K denotes the cardinal number of the set P(A) of subsets of A (the power set of A), and K + denotes the succesor cardinal of K, then 2K = K +". The Continuum Hypothesis (CH) asserts the particular case K = o. It is clear that GCH implies CH. Another equivalent version of GCH, is the sentence: 'Any subset of the set of subsets of a given infinite set is or of cardinality less or equal than the cardinality of the given set, or of the cardinality of all the set of subsets". Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963, settled the relative consistency of the Axiom of Choice (AC) and of its negation not-AC, respectively, with respecllo the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF). On the other hand, Gödel in 1939, and Cohen in 1963 settled too, the relative consistency of GCH , CH and of its negations not-GCH, not-CH, respectively, with respect to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice (ZF + AC or ZFC). From these results we know that GCH and AC are undecidable sentences in ZF set theory and indeed, the most famous undecidable sentences in ZF; but, which is the relation between them? From the above results, in the theory ZF + AC is not demonstrated GCH; it is clear then that AC doesn't imply GCH in ZF theory, Bul does GCH implies AC in ZF theory? The answer is yes! or equivalently, there is no model of ZF +GCH + not-AC. A very easy proof can be given if we have an adecuate definition of cardinal number of a set, that doesn't depend of AC but depending from the Regularity Axiom, which asserls that aIl sets have a range, which is an ordinal number associated with its constructive complexity. We define the cardinal number of A, denoted |A|, as foIlows: |A|= { The least ordinal number equipotent with A, if A is well orderable The set of all sets equipotent with A and of minimum range, in other case. It is clear that without AC, may be not ordinal cardinals and all cardinals are ordinal cardinals if all sets are well orderable (AC). Now we formulate: GCH*: For all ordinal cardinal I<, 2K = I< + In the paper is demonstrated that this formulation GCH* is implied by the traditional one, and indeed equivalent to it. Lemma, The power set of any well orderable set is well orderable if and only if AC. This is one of the many equivalents of AC in ZF,due lo Rubin, 1960. Proposition. In ZF is a theorem: GCH* implies AC. Supose GCH*. Let A be a well orderable set; then |A| = K an ordinal cardinal, so A is equipotent with K and then P~A) is equipotent with P(K); therefore |P(A)I|= |P(K)| = 2K = K+. But then |P(A)|= K+ and P(A) 'is equipotent with K+ and K+ is an ordinal cardinal; therefore P(A) is well orderable with the well order induced by means of the bijection, from the well order of K+. Corolary: In ZF are theorems: GCH impIies AC and GCH is equivalent to GCH*. We see from this proof, that GCH asserts that the cardinal number of the power set of a well orderable set A is an ordinal, which is equivalent to AC, but GCH asserts also that that ordinal cardinal is |A|+ , the ordinal cardinal succesor of the ordinal cardinal of the well orderable set A.


1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Michaelides Penk

The concept of a topos as a system, or world in which mathematics could be defined and interpreted, was developed by F. W. Lawvere and M. Tierney. Much of their work is embodied in the lecture notes Elementary toposes by A. Kock and G. C. Wraith [6].In an early paper Lawvere set forth a set of axioms for approximately such a system [8]. The topos constructed there is a set-like category that includes among its axioms an axiom of infinity and an axiom of choice.In its final form an elementary topos is freed from any such axioms.The most prominent example of an elementary topos is a set theory with the usual Zermelo-Fraenkel or Godel-Bernays set of axioms.In this paper I have tried to determine what, if any, is the effect of an axiom of choice introduced in a topos, and how are some of the set-theoretic equivalents of such an axiom related in topos theory.Since the set-theoretic membership relation ∈, the notions of an “empty” set and a “power” set are definable in topos theory, it makes sense to talk about a “choice map” that picks a single element out of every nonempty object, provided that these objects can be somehow collected into a single object or “family.” In other words, an analogue of the usual choice axiom can be formulated in elementary topos language; this is axiom AC2 of the text.


1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Cohen

Suppose M is a countable standard transitive model of set theory. P. J. Cohen [2] showed that if κ is an infinite cardinal of M then there is a one-to-one function Fκ from κ into the set of real numbers such that M[Fκ] is a model of set theory with the same cardinals as M.If Tκ is the range of Fκ then Cohen also showed [2] that M[Tκ] fails to satisfy the axiom of choice. We will give an easy proof of this fact.If κ, λ are infinite we will also show that M[Tκ] is elementarily equivalent to M[Tλ] and that (] in M[Fλ]) is elementarily equivalent to (] in M[FK]).Finally we show that there may be an N ∈ M[GK] which is a standard model of set theory (without the axiom of choice) and which has, from the viewpoint of M[GK], more real numbers than ordinals.We write ZFC and ZF for Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, respectively with and without the axiom of choice (AC). GBC is Gödel-Bernays' set theory with AC. DC and ACℵo are respectively the axioms of dependent choice and of countable choice defined in [6].Lower case Greek characters (other than ω) are used as variables over ordinals. When α is an ordinal, R(α) is the set of all sets with rank less than α.


Author(s):  
Alexander R. Pruss

This is a mainly technical chapter concerning the causal embodiment of the Axiom of Choice from set theory. The Axiom of Choice powered a construction of an infinite fair lottery in Chapter 4 and a die-rolling strategy in Chapter 5. For those applications to work, there has to be a causally implementable (though perhaps not compatible with our laws of nature) way to implement the Axiom of Choice—and, for our purposes, it is ideal if that involves infinite causal histories, so the causal finitist can reject it. Such a construction is offered. Moreover, other paradoxes involving the Axiom of Choice are given, including two Dutch Book paradoxes connected with the Banach–Tarski paradox. Again, all this is argued to provide evidence for causal finitism.


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