Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Market with Asymmetric Information

1984 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert W. Rosenthal ◽  
Andrew Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

scholarly journals Mixed Equilibrium in a Pure Location Game: The Case of n≥4$$n \ge 4$$ Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ewerhart
Keyword(s):  
Political Theory ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Spatial Competition ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Equilibrium

AbstractThe Hotelling game of pure location allows interpretations in spatial competition, political theory, and strategic forecasting. In this paper, the doubly symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium for

scholarly journals Biological auctions with multiple rewards

2015 ◽  
Vol 282 (1812) ◽  
pp. 20151041 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes G. Reiter ◽  
Ayush Kanodia ◽  
Raghav Gupta ◽  
Martin A. Nowak ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy ◽  
Fundamental Characteristic ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Multiple Resources ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Evolutionarily Stable ◽  
Competition For Resources

The competition for resources among cells, individuals or species is a fundamental characteristic of evolution. Biological all-pay auctions have been used to model situations where multiple individuals compete for a single resource. However, in many situations multiple resources with various values exist and single reward auctions are not applicable. We generalize the model to multiple rewards and study the evolution of strategies. In biological all-pay auctions the bid of an individual corresponds to its strategy and is equivalent to its payment in the auction. The decreasingly ordered rewards are distributed according to the decreasingly ordered bids of the participating individuals. The reproductive success of an individual is proportional to its fitness given by the sum of the rewards won minus its payments. Hence, successful bidding strategies spread in the population. We find that the results for the multiple reward case are very different from the single reward case. While the mixed strategy equilibrium in the single reward case with more than two players consists of mostly low-bidding individuals, we show that the equilibrium can convert to many high-bidding individuals and a few low-bidding individuals in the multiple reward case. Some reward values lead to a specialization among the individuals where one subpopulation competes for the rewards and the other subpopulation largely avoids costly competitions. Whether the mixed strategy equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) depends on the specific values of the rewards.

scholarly journals Bundling and Competition for Slots

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (5) ◽  
pp. 1957-1985 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doh-Shin Jeon ◽  
Domenico Menicucci
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Digital Goods ◽  
Efficient Technology ◽  
Pure Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Clear Cut ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

We consider competition between sellers selling multiple distinct products to a buyer having k slots. Under independent pricing, a pure strategy equilibrium often does not exist, and equilibrium in mixed strategy is never efficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products, and an efficient “technology-renting” equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods or when sales below marginal cost are banned, all equilibria are efficient. Comparing the mixed-strategy equilibrium with the technology-renting equilibrium reveals that bundling often increases the buyer's surplus. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.(JEL D43, D86, K21, L13, L14, L41, L82)

A Ricardian excursion to Bermuda: an estimation of mixed strategy equilibrium

1994 ◽  
Vol 26 (9) ◽  
pp. 927-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ram Mudambi
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

Game Theory ◽  
2010 ◽  
pp. 235-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. Durlauf ◽  
Lawrence E. Blume
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium

scholarly journals Coordination and Private Information Revelation: Failure of Information Unraveling

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Debdatta Saha ◽  
Prabal Roy Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Coordination Game ◽  
Information Revelation ◽  
Strategic Uncertainty ◽  
Two Agents ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Battle Of The Sexes ◽  
Central Result

This paper examines a persuasion game between two agents with one-sided asymmetric information, where the informed agent can reveal her private information prior to playing a Battle-of-the-Sexes coordination game. We find that in the presence of strategic uncertainty in coordination there exists an equilibrium where there is no 'unraveling' of information. We provide a purification argument for this mixed strategy equilibrium to strengthen the central result, which is robust to several extensions, including both-sided asymmetric information and imprecise information revelation.

Learning a mixed strategy equilibrium in the laboratory

1994 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Bloomfield
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Strategy ◽  
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium
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