On the Analytical Basis of Non-Euclidian Geometry

1911 ◽  
Vol 33 (1/4) ◽  
pp. 249 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. H. Young
2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 526-539 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefano Orlandini ◽  
Giovanni Moretti ◽  
Andrea Gavioli

Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) considered a series of papers to reform the Fund's nonconcessional lending framework. This culminated in the approval of a major overhaul of the IMF’s lending framework, including the creation of a new Flexible Credit Line (FCL). The changes to the IMF’s lending framework which are described in GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality—Reform Proposalsand GRA Lending Toolkit and Conditionality—Reform Proposals—Revised Proposed Decisions include: • modernizing IMF conditionality for all borrowers, • introducing a new Flexible Credit Line, • enhancing the flexibility of the Fund’s traditional stand-by arrangement, • doubling normal access limits for nonconessional resources, • simplifying cost and maturity structures, and • eliminating certain seldom-used facilities. The series of papers are: Review of Fund Facilities—Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, Conditionality in fund-Supported Programs—Purposes, Modalities and Options for Reform, Charges and Maturities and Proposals for Reform, Supplement 1 and Supplement 2, Review of Fund Facilities—Analytical Basis for Fund Lending and Reform Options, and Review of Limits on Access to Financing in the Credit Tranches and Under the Extended Fund Facility, and Overall Access Limits Under the General Resources Account provide the background on the earlier discussion of reforms in each of these areas.


1934 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 319
Author(s):  
George S. Wehrwein ◽  
John M. Gaus

Policy Papers ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 09 ◽  
Author(s):  

This paper takes a fresh look at the purpose and modalities of conditionality for the use of the Fund’s resources. It is part of a broader review of Fund lending facilities that includes access levels, charges and maturities, the analytical basis for Fund lending, and facilities for low income countries. It aims to explore options for more flexible approaches that would be responsive to the changing needs and circumstances of the Fund’s members while providing adequate safeguards for Fund resources. While these options have been developed with General Resources Account (GRA) facilities in mind as a complement to the companion paper on the analytical framework, they could apply, as appropriate, to facilities and instruments used by low income members.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Greenfield

Abstract We introduce an algorithmic approach to Euclidian geometry6 which provides an experimental framework involving Euclidean constructions and deconstructions thus enabling a foundation2,12 for testing Everett’s interpretation of quantum theory4,5. We contend that the cosmos be modelled as the advance in space time until some event occurs leading to the termination of some phenomenon, in the sense of the algorithmic halting problem14. Our approach involves iterative geometrical constructions using Euclid’s proposition 3 which are equivalent to a Turing machine. Our conjecture is that the postulates of Euclidean geometry, for which we require particular extensions to postulates 2 and 310, are physical principles, and also that our algorithmic approach is identical to quantum theory4,5. We suggest that our conjecture concerning quantum theory and the second law of thermodynamics is that they are mutually dependent, this too being a principle. We suggest a unifying theory for gravitation and sub atomic particles2,7,11,12. We propose a new experiment: the investigation of anomalies in astronomical observations with as example the phenomenon of black holes disappearing when galaxies collide with or without gravitational wave emission8.


2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-141
Author(s):  
Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok

What does it mean for an agreement to have an anticompetitive ‘object’ under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union? Can the European Commission support an ‘object’ case by reference to the agreement parties’ subjective intention, and if so, how? What exactly is the relationship between an agreement’s object and the parties’ subjective intention under competition law? This article is the first to bring insights from Australian and New Zealand cases, as well as analytical jurisprudence, to bear on these underexplored yet important questions affecting the European Union and common law jurisdictions around the world. Using Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal interpretation as the analytical basis, this article argues for a ‘mixed’ conception of the ‘object’ concept which enables an anticompetitive object to be proven either objectively or subjectively. Anticompetitive subjective intention accordingly provides an independent, alternative basis for competition law liability for agreements; the lack of such intention, meanwhile, does not help exculpate parties who are liable based on their objective purpose to restrict competition. This article also argues that voluntariness and evidentiary limits ought to be imposed on the use of anticompetitive subjective intention in the ‘object’ analysis of agreements.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document