Price-Cap versus Rate-of-Return Regulation in a Stochastic-Cost Model

1992 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 564 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ellen M. Pint
2010 ◽  
pp. 523-549
Author(s):  
Massimo Gardina ◽  
Francesca Romana Saule

Questo lavoro intende analizzare gli elementi del processo di regolamentazione del settore del gas naturale, partendo dalle basi teoriche del processo regolatorio presenti nella letteratura economica, per arrivare ad un'osservazione analitica dei metodi di determinazione delle tariffe applicate. Perché regolare un mercato? Quale modello tra rate of return regulation e price cap? La quantificazione delle tariffe segue le finalitŕ primarie della regolamentazione, ovvero il raggiungimento dell'efficienza nei servizi di monopolio naturale, come il trasporto, attraverso un'equa determinazione delle tariffe e l'avvio alla concorrenza nei settori di monopolio di fatto, come la distribuzione, per poter offrire condizioni vantaggiose a tutti i consumatori. I piů importanti strumenti regolatori e di controllo tariffario che sono stati adottati sono il ROR e il price cap. Dall'esplicazione di questi due strumenti, mettendone in luce elementi di qualitŕ e di criticitŕ, č possibile intuire in quale campo operino gli elementi di contabilitŕ e di finanza che costituiscono le ragioni della scelta.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 241-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Parker ◽  
Colin Kirkpatrick

PurposeThe aim of the paper is to examine alternative methods of regulating prices and/or profits of privatised utilities in low‐income countries with a view to identifying their strengths and weaknesses.Design/methodology/approachThe economics of regulation literature has favoured the use of a price cap over rate of return or cost of service regulation because of its greater incentive effects. A third alternative, sliding‐scale regulation, has been put forward as a compromise between the price cap and a controlled rate of return, which is said to combine the merits of both methods. This paper considers the operation of a price cap, rate of return regulation and sliding‐scale regulation in the context of low‐income economies by reviewing the theory in relation to the conditions likely to be found in low‐income economies.FindingsIt is concluded that the case for the use of a price cap is much reduced in low‐income economies. This is because of its information requirements, need for regulatory expertise and, more broadly, the institutional endowment found in many low‐income countries.Research limitations/implicationsIt is recognised that this conclusion is tentative and deserves further research, comparing theory and practice.Practical implicationsCountries need to consider carefully which method of regulation will work best in the context of the institutions of the country, rather than simply copy a method from the developed world.Originality/valueThis is one of the first papers to challenge the prevailing belief that price cap regulation is superior to rate of return regulation in the context of economic development.


1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Liston

Author(s):  
Lidiia Horoshkova ◽  
Vladimir Volkov ◽  
Іevhen Khlobystov

Actuality of research theme. The process of Ukraine's integration into the European Community actualizes the issue of the compliance of the administrative and territorial structure with European principles of regional and local development organization, and the formation of local self-government. Nowadays the problem of developing an effective system of management of the infrastructure united territorial communities (UTCs) formation in the context of administrative and territorial reform implementation based on the principles of decentralization becomes especially acute. Problem statement. Nowadays conditions, the reform of the administrative-territorial structure and the decentralization of power in Ukraine require special attention to the problem of housing and communal services management, since its maintenance is ensured by local authorities and created in the process of reforming the united territorial communities (OTСs). Analysis of the last researches and publications. The modern aspects of decision of problems of development of territorial communities and local self-government such scientists engage in, as Pavliuk A. P., Oliinyk D. I., Batalov O. A., Datsko O. I., Murkovych L. L., Molodozhen Yu. B.and other [1-4]. The results of own researches of problem are in to [5-13]. Selection of unexplored parts of general issue. The new administrative and territorial system should become the basis for constructing a new model of territorial administration, based on the principles of decentralization, subsidiarity, balance of national interests with regional and territorial communities` interests representation, local self-governance widespread, territorial communities` power and autonomy, coherence with natural geographical capacity. That is why the problem of mechanism for managing regional housing and communal services programs and to determine the optimal pricing models taking into account world experience. Task statement, research aim. To search for new mechanisms of efficient pricing management in housing and utilities using world experience and peculiarities of domestic business practices. Method or methodology of realization of research. In the process of realization researches drawn on scientific (analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, analytical grouping) and special (abstracting, economical-mathematical design, etc.) methods of study of the economic phenomena and processes. Exposition of basic material (job performances). In the world practice certain methods of pricing under natural monopoly were formed. The analysis of the essence and peculiarities of these methods to adopt the best practices: а) Rate of return regulation. This is the most traditional approach to set price of goods (services) of natural monopolies. It is based on cost-plus pricing calculation. It is used in Ukraine. b) Price cap regulation (price restrictions). The method`s essence is to set fixed maximum price limitations by the regulatory institution. The institution has the right to set the price, which is lower or equals the limit, and to profit. As the profit does not correlate to costs, there is the stimulating mechanism to cut them. The model assumes quite a long period between tariff revisions – 4-5 years. c) Profit-sharing plan with sliding scale. Unlike the previous method, in which natural monopoly gains significant profits, this method assumes to use the sliding scale of profit distribution between a producer and a consumer. d) Price discrimination. Price discrimination is a pricing strategy that charges customers or their groups’ different prices for the same product or service. Price difference does not depend on production costs or supply costs. Price discrimination is possible if consumers` direct price elasticity of demand is different. Conclusions. The analysis of the natural monopoly`s world pricing practice, including national housing and utilities sector has been carried out. It has been stated that the main methods of monopolistic pricing are: rate of return regulation; price cap regulation (price restrictions); profit-sharing plan with sliding scale; price discrimination; multi-rate tariffs; pricing for different competition forms, compatible with natural monopoly.The obtained findings prove the necessity of modification to the housing and utilities sector’s monopoly market by implementation of competition elements.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 32-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaisa Tahvanainen ◽  
Samuli Honkapuro ◽  
Jarmo Partanen ◽  
Satu Viljainen

2021 ◽  
Vol 147 (8) ◽  
pp. 04021080
Author(s):  
Rachael Sherman ◽  
G. Edward Gibson Jr. ◽  
Edward Merrow ◽  
Kristen Parrish

1981 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 1199-1202 ◽  
Author(s):  
ENRIQUE R. ARZAC ◽  
MATITYAHU MARCUS

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