Definite descriptions, A reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, xii + 411 pp. - Gary Ostertag, Introduction, Pp. 1–34. - Bertrand Russell, On denoting, A reprint of 1119. Pp. 35–49. - A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, From Principia mathematica, A reprint of pp. 30–32, 66–71, 173–175 of 1941. Pp. 51–65. - Bertrand Russell, Descriptions, A reprint of pp. 167–180 of 11126. Pp. 67–77. - Stephen Neale, Grammatical form, logical form, and incomplete symbols. A reprint of LXI 1391. Pp. 79–121. - Rudolf Carnap, From Meaning and necessity, A reprint of pp. 32–42 of XIV 237. Pp. 123–133. - P. F. Strawson, On referring, A reprint of XVIII 87, Pp. 135–160. - Karel Lambert, A theory of definite descriptions, A revised reprint of XXXII 252(1, 3) with altered title, Pp. 161–171. (Reprinted from Philosophical applications of free logic, edited by Karel Lambert, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 1991, pp. 17–27). - Keith Donnellan, Reference and definite descriptions, A reprint of XL 276(12), Pp. 173–193. - H. P. Grice, From “Vacuous names,” A reprint of pp. 138–144 of XL 479(7), Pp. 195–200. - Christopher Peacocke, Proper names, reference, and rigid designation, Pp. 201–224. (Reprinted from Meaning, reference and necessity, New studies in semantics, edited by Simon Blackburn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge etc. 1975, pp. 109–132.) - Saul Kripke, Speaker's reference and semantic reference, Pp. 225–256. (Reprinted from Contemporary perspectives in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1979, pp. 6–27; also in Studies in the philosophy of language, edited by Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 2, The University of Minnesota, Morris 1977, pp. 255–276.) - Howard Wettstein, Demonstrative reference and definite descriptions, Pp. 257–273. (Reprinted from Philosophical studies, vol. 40 (1981), pp. 241–257.) - Scott Soames, Incomplete definite descriptions, Pp. 275–308. (Reprinted from Notre Dame journal of formal logic, vol. 27 (1986), pp. 349–375.) - Stephen Neale, Context and communication, Pp. 309–368. (Reprinted from Stephen Neale, Descriptions, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1990, pp. 62–117.) - Stephen Schiffer, Descriptions, indexicals, and belief reports: some dilemmas (but not the ones you expect). Pp. 369–395. (Reprinted from Mind, n.s. vol. 104 (1995), pp. 107–131.)

1999 ◽  
Vol 64 (3) ◽  
pp. 1371-1374
Author(s):  
Delia Graff

Bertrand Russell. My mental development. A reprint of IX 82(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 1–20; also third edition, Tudor Publishing Company, New York 1951, pp. 1-20; also paper-bound reprint of the third edition, Harper Torchbooks, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston, and London, 1963, Vol. I, pp. 1-20. - Hans Reichenbach. Bertrand Russell's logic. A reprint of IX 76(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 21–54; also ibid. 1951, pp. 21-54; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 21-54. - Morris Weitz. Analysis and the unity of Russell's philosophy. A reprint of IX 77(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 55–121; also ibid. 1951, pp. 55-121; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 55-121. - Kurt Göde. Russell's mathematical logic. A reprint of XI 75. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 123–153; also ibid. 1951, pp. 123-153; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 123-153. - James Feibleman. A reply to Bertrand Russell's introduction to the second edition of The principles of mathematics. A reprint of IX 77(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 155–174; also ibid. 1951, pp. 155-174; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 155-174. - G.E. Moore. Russell's “theory of descriptions.” A reprint of IX 78(1). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 175–225; also ibid. 1951, pp. 175-225; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 175-225. - Max Black. Russell's philosophy of language. A reprint of IX 78(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 227–255; also ibid. 1951, pp. 227-255; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 227-255. - Philip P. Wiener. Method in Russell's work on Leibniz. A reprint of IX 82(2). The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 257–276; also ibid. 1951, pp. 257-276; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 257-276. - Ernest Nagel. Russell's philosophy of science. A reprint of IX 79. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 317–349; also ibid. 1951, pp. 317-349; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 317-349. - Andrew Paul Ushenko. Russell's critique of empiricism. A reprint of IX 80. The philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, second edition, The Library of Living Philosophers, Inc., Evanston, Illinois, 1946, pp. 385–417; also ibid. 1951, pp. 385-417; also ibid. 1963, Vol. I, pp. 385-417.

1969 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 495-496
Author(s):  
Ann S. Ferebee

Transfers ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Lucy Baker ◽  
Paola Castañeda ◽  
Matthew Dalstrom ◽  
Ankur Datta ◽  
Tanja Joelsson ◽  
...  

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Dialogue ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 677-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Linsky

Stephen Neale defends Russell's famous theory of definite descriptions against more than 40 years' worth of criticisms beginning long before Strawson's “On Referring.” Ever since Strawson's parting shot in that paper (“… ordinary language has no exact logic”), the theory of descriptions has been a battleground for the larger issue of whether a systematic theory of the semantics of natural language is really possible. Neale provides us with a sketch of part of that project as it currently stands. All of the complexities and irregularities of the use of definite descriptions in natural language can be combined, after all, in a single theory based on an “exact logic.” Neale argues that one can give a Russellian account of “incomplete descriptions” (as in ‘The table is covered with books’), generic uses of ‘the’ (‘The whale is a mammal’), plural descriptions (‘The men carried the piano’) and, of central interest, the purportedly referential uses identified by Donnellan (as in ‘The murderer of Smith is insane’ when it is Jones the accused we have in mind). Neale follows familiar answers to these objections; incorporate demonstratives into the account (to get ‘The table over there …’), distinguish the proposition expressed from the one meant (the “referential” use is what was meant not said), and point out that the problem is not unique to definite descriptions and so cannot be a fault of any particular theory of them (many expressions have generic, plural and “referential” uses).


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