Cabinet Composition, Collegiality, and Collectivity: Examining Patterns in Cabinet Committee Structure

This article examines one arena of decision-making in cabinet government: cabinet committees. It assesses the relationship between the composition of cabinets – their party make-up – and the structure of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees are groups of ministers tasked with specific policy or coordination responsibilities and can be important mechanisms of policymaking and cabinet management. Thus, the structure of committees informs our understanding of how cabinets differ in their distributions of policy influence among ministers and parties, a central concern in parliamentary government. We investigate two such dimensions: collegiality – interaction among ministers – and collectivity, the (de)centralization of influence. We find that cabinet committees in coalitions are significantly more collegial, on average, than single-party cabinets, though this is driven by minority coalitions. At the same time, influence within cabinet committees is less collectively distributed in most types of coalitions than in single-party cabinets.

Australia: Traditions and Practices

The chapter describes the conventions and practices of Australian government. A variant of the Westminster system, it has a number of characteristics that define its workings and conventions: a written constitution, a federal system with potentially powerful state governments, and a High Court that can interpret that constitution. It also has a brutal political culture. These characteristics explain the ways in which Australian cabinet government differs from the English model from which it was derived, and the vulnerability of Australian prime ministers to removal by their own parties. These factors lead to a different form of parliamentary government with distinctly different practices.

5. Parliamentary government and the legislative process

Each Concentrate revision guide is packed with essential information, key cases, revision tips, exam Q&As, and more. Concentrates show you what to expect in a law exam, what examiners are looking for, and how to achieve extra marks. This chapter first describes the UK legislature. The legislature of the UK is the Queen in Parliament. Parliament is bicameral, meaning that, apart from the Queen, there are two legislative chambers called the House of Lords and the House of Commons. The House of Lords—composed of life peers, senior bishops, and some hereditary peers—is guardian of the constitution through the work of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and protects the constitution and initiates and revises legislation. The House of Commons—composed of constituency representatives organized on party lines under the whip system—is the principal legislative chamber and plays a significant role in scrutinizing the executive. The discussion then turns to the legislative process, covering electoral law, alternative voting systems, and the devolution of the legislative function including the Wales Act 2017.

The Commonwealth of Australia

This chapter traces the development of judicial review in Australia, which was modeled on the U.S. system of judicial review. Australian judicial review evolved out of a need for an umpiring body in federalism and separation of powers cases. Indeed, the original purpose of the Australian High Court under the Australian Constitution was to umpire federalism disputes between the Commonwealth and the six Australian states, which predated the federal government of Australia; and to ensure that the traditionally guaranteed rights and freedoms of British subjects under the common law and responsible parliamentary government were respected regarding Australia’s citizens. The Australian Constitution does not have a Bill of Rights or an enumerated Judicial Review clause, but it does limit and enumerate the broad powers of the Australian federal government. The Framers of the Australian Constitution, like the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, assumed that the courts would have the power of judicial review. As a result, there is, in Australia, judicial review in federalism and separation of powers umpiring cases but not in Bill of Rights cases since there is essentially no Australian Bill of Rights.

ANALISIS KEKUATAN DEMOKRASI DALAM ERA KOALISI KABINET PASCA REFORMASI 1998 DI INDONESIA

This study is motivated by an analysis of the reality of the multi-party presidential system which is the main aspect of the way back in the governance system in Indonesia, starting from the old order until the reform era in 1998, the plurality structure of the party became a forerunner to the survival of the coalition in the formulation of the Indonesian government cabinet. Consideration that is the prospect of seizing seats in the cabinet coalition is usually focused on the opportunity structure (strategy entry), where the strategy entry refers to the calculation of three important considerations that are political calculations, namely the cost of entering the arena (cost of entry), various benefits (benefits of office), and the possibility of obtaining support from voters (probably of receiving electoral support). In the target of realizing the political goals of the coalition parties, the main approach taken is to develop mutual benefits, namely the benefits of enjoying power. So that in formulating indicators of the success of a democratic country, this study also presents a comparison related to the implementation of a presidential government system in the United States and a parliamentary government system in the United Kingdom that has resulted in a democratic and stable government, as well as realizing a multi-party presidential system as a whole and optimizing dual functions businessman in internal political parties.

Constitutional design and destiny of the states: The Weimar Constitution and the St Vitus Day Constitution in comparative perspective

The Weimar Constitution of 1919 and the St Vitus Day Constitution of 1921 were quite different in many aspects. Their comparison is nevertheless of interest not only because it shows some influences of the older one to the younger, but also for the fact that it displays the line of developments of the two countries - Germany and Yugoslavia. If considered from the standpoint of parliamentary government, territorial organization of the two states and some other features the analysis of the respective constitutional developments leads to several conclusions. The two constitutions had their initial shortcomings, but those did not belong to the same area of constitutional law. In Germany they concerned the horizontal separation of powers, whereas in Yugoslavia they belonged to the vertical division of power. Both constitutions under survey ended up in dictatorships. In both countries, attempts were made in the course of history to remedy the initial shortcomings or constructive errors of the two constitutions. In Germany such attempts were successful, which on the contrary was not the case in Yugoslavia. Germany therefore became a well-functioning liberal democracy, while Yugoslavia failed and disappeared.

Parlamente in der Pandemie: Anlass für Verfassungspessimismus?

The pandemic has not led to a crisis of the parliamentary system of government . The Bun­destag in particular has upheld its governmental functions during the Corona crisis . But it could be more open to practice “virtual parliamentarism” . Parliamentary government via the interplay of the Infection Protection Act and statutory ordinances has also shown to be suitable for solving the pandemic; and with regard to the constitutional separation of pow­ers: Especially in a crisis, the executive is only as independent as parliament allows it to be .