The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Tsebelis

The European Parliament under the current cooperation procedure has an important power: it can make proposals that, if accepted by the Commission of the European Communities, are easier for the Council of Ministers to accept than to modify, since only qualified majority is required for acceptance, whereas full unanimity for modification. The importance of this power, which I call the power of the conditional agenda setter, has not been recognized in previous scholarly work. For structural reasons explained in the text, this power is likely to increase in the future. I conclude by arguing that the conditional delegation of power to international actors (the European Parliament, Commission, and the Court of Justice) is a frequent phenomenon in European institutions. This delegation presents three important advantages: it makes possible the selection of one among many possible equilibria, it accelerates European integration, and it diffuses responsibility for politically unpopular measures.

Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

The aims of this chapter are threefold. It first briefly considers the events that have led to the creation of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU). Secondly, it introduces the reader to the principal institutions of the Union: the European Council; the Council of Ministers; the European Commission; the European Parliament; and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of each of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates, where appropriate, the nature of the institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty by the member states.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter focuses on the institutions responsible for executing the different tasks of the European Union (EU). The main seven institutions are complemented by two advisory bodies, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), which are responsible for gathering inputs for use in decision-making. The initial institutions of the Commission, Council, European Parliament, and Court of Justice were expanded to five to include the European Council, Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank in 2009 with the entry into force of the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties. This chapter also describes the roles and responsibilities of the institutions, including the Council of Ministers of the European Union, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice (CoJ).


Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth

This chapter has three aims. It first briefly considers the origins of the what is now the European Union (EU). Secondly, it discusses the institutions of the Union, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice of the EU and General Court. The nature and functions of these bodies is considered. Thirdly, the chapter indicates the nature of institutional reforms which have occurred following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.


Politics ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 026339572110350
Author(s):  
Katjana Gattermann ◽  
Claes H de Vreese ◽  
Wouter van der Brug

The dominant perspective of European Parliament (EP) elections is that these are second-order national elections where little is at stake. This Special Issue asks whether this perspective is still valid in view of increased politicization of European integration and in view of the higher turnout levels at the last EP elections. This introduction provides a general framework for the Special Issue and reflects upon some of its main findings. We argue that EP elections can only be considered first-order if they are primarily about the policies, rather than the polity. Some of the contributions in this Special Issue suggest that this is indeed the case. We reflect upon this and argue that there are reasons to expect that EP elections will become more first order in the future.


Author(s):  
Margot Horspool ◽  
Matthew Humphreys ◽  
Michael Wells-Greco

This chapter discusses the composition, functions and jurisdiction of European Courts. It discusses indirect actions (preliminary rulings) and direct actions, i.e. actions brought by or against the European Institutions and the Member States, and between the Member States. The Courts are the CJEU which includes the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts. The chapter discusses rules of procedure, judicial activism, preliminary rulings, the jurisdiction of national courts, discretionary and mandatory references, when national courts should refer, whether, interim measures, effects of preliminary rules, and the future of preliminary rulings.


Author(s):  
Richard Corbett ◽  
John Peterson ◽  
Daniel Kenealy

This chapter examines five of the European Union's key institutions: the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. It draws analogies to these institutions' counterparts at the national level while also highlighting their distinct and unique features. It discusses the structures and formal powers of the five EU institutions and how they ‘squeeze’ influence out of their limited Treaty prerogatives. It concludes by explaining why these institutions matter in determining EU politics and policy more generally, focusing on three central themes: the extent to which the EU is an experiment in motion; the importance of power sharing and consensus; and the capacity of the EU structures to cope with the Union's expanding size and scope.


2019 ◽  
pp. 43-71
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses the EU’s institutional framework. This includes the Commission; the Council (of Ministers) of the European Union; the European Council; the European Parliament; the Court of Justice of the European Union; the Union’s advisory bodies; other Union bodies; and Union financing.


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter discusses the EU’s institutional framework. These include the Commission; the Council (of Ministers) of the European Union; the European Council; the European Parliament; the Court of Justice of the European Union; the Union’s advisory bodies; other Union bodies; and Union financing.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marta Migliorati

Abstract Drawing on a principal–agent framework the article analyses the European Union (EU) politics of delegation in the post-Maastricht era. By means of statistical analysis, it tests the impact of several variables upon the selection of national and supranational agents, as well as on the discretion they enjoy, on the basis of a recently collected data set of EU laws. Findings reveal that pooling and policy complexity favour the involvement of supranational actors in the implementation of EU laws. Moreover, the degree of supranational integration of a policy affects the likelihood of choosing supranational implementers. On the one hand, the Commission enjoys higher discretion vis-à-vis national actors when qualified majority voting applies, and when higher levels of conflict in the Council of Ministers is present. On the other, conflict between the European Parliament and the Council under codecision seems associated with lower supranational discretion, although the result needs further corroboration.


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