scholarly journals Where does implementation lie? Assessing the determinants of delegation and discretion in post-Maastricht European Union

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Marta Migliorati

Abstract Drawing on a principal–agent framework the article analyses the European Union (EU) politics of delegation in the post-Maastricht era. By means of statistical analysis, it tests the impact of several variables upon the selection of national and supranational agents, as well as on the discretion they enjoy, on the basis of a recently collected data set of EU laws. Findings reveal that pooling and policy complexity favour the involvement of supranational actors in the implementation of EU laws. Moreover, the degree of supranational integration of a policy affects the likelihood of choosing supranational implementers. On the one hand, the Commission enjoys higher discretion vis-à-vis national actors when qualified majority voting applies, and when higher levels of conflict in the Council of Ministers is present. On the other, conflict between the European Parliament and the Council under codecision seems associated with lower supranational discretion, although the result needs further corroboration.


1995 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. J. Johnston

Conflict within the British Conservative Party over the European Union provided a great deal of copy for media political coverage during 1992–94. It was undoubtedly responsible for severely damaging the prime minister's reputation within his party and the country. In July 1993, he could only achieve ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by making voting for it an issue of confidence in the House of Commons, thereby obtaining the support of most ‘Eurosceptic’ Conservative MPs. Nine months later, failure to achieve the United Kingdom's goal regarding voting procedures in the Council of Ministers following enlargement of the EU in 1995 led to several calls for his resignation from among his own party's MPs, including one in the House itself.



Author(s):  
Ainhoa LASA LÓPEZ

LABURPENA: Artikulu honetan, Europar Batasuneko botere-artikulazio berriak erkidegotan osatutako Espainian zer eragin daukan aztertuko dugu. Europa mailako politika-ekonomia erlazioak funtsezko bi koordenatu izan behar ditu ezinbestean. Alde batetik, Europako konstituzio-ordena ez dela gizartearen konstituzionalismoaren koordenatuetan ernatutako ordenaren berdina. Bestetik, Europako konstituzio ekonomikoa Europa bat egiteko proiektuak berarekin dakartzan aldaketa berriak gorpuzteko eremua dela. Izan ere, funtsean, Europako konstituzio ekonomikoa plataforma ezin hobea delako boterearen artikulazioa berria nola artikulatu asmatzeko, Europa guztirako. RESUMEN: el objetivo de este artículo es analizar el impacto que tiene la nueva articulación del poder en la Unión Europea en el Estado español de las autonomías. La relación política-economía a nivel europeo debe tener en cuenta dos coordenadas fundamentales. Por una parte, la consideración del orden constitucional europeo como un orden distinto al gestado bajo las coordenadas del constitucionalismo social. Por otra, la caracterización de la constitución económica europea como ámbito de materialización de las nuevas transformaciones que incorpora el proyecto de integración europeo. Fundamentalmente, porque la constitución económica europea representa la plataforma idónea desde la que dilucidar la nueva articulación del poder desde el espacio supranacional europeo. ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to analyse the impact of the new articula tion of power in the European Union in the Spanish state of autonomies. The relationship between politics and economy at European level must take into consideration two fundamental coordinates. On the one hand, the Euro pean constitucional system appears as a system opposite to that of social constitutionalism. Moreover, the characterization of the European economic constitution as a field of realization of the new transformations incorporated by the European project. Specially, because this represents the ideal platform in order to analyse the new articulation of power from European supranational space.



IG ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-131
Author(s):  
Miriam Hartlapp

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.



2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (164) ◽  
pp. 724-742
Author(s):  
Ovidiu Constantin Bunget ◽  
Alin-Constantin Dumitrescu ◽  
Rodica Gabriela Blidisel ◽  
Oana Alina Bogdan ◽  
Valentin Burca ◽  
...  

The audit market, developed out of the need to strengthen the credibility and the quality of financial reporting, has led since the 1980s to a concentration around large audit firms, the dominance effect being marked on the one hand by the auditor’s increasing reputation and notoriety, and on the other hand by the client’s association with a reputed auditor, which contributes to improving the company’s image on the market. In this context, a major issue is represented by the level of the fees charged, as they represent key elements that may affect the auditor’s independence. Moreover, a sensitive aspect is the relationship between the fee charged for financial audit services and the one for non-audit services and the compensation practices between them. The European Commission wants to facilitate competition in an overly concentrated market and also provide the opportunity for small and medium-sized audit firms to become active players in the large corporate audit market through joint audit, in which at least one of the audit firms is not part of the Big4 group. The mandatory audit firm rotation and the limitation on the non-audit services provided are the main aspects of the recent audit reform that directly influences the fee level. The main purpose of this study is to analyse whether there is a pattern of audit costs at the community level. In this context, this paper aims to assess the uniformity of audit costs, namely to determine the structure of the audit market in the European Union. The research involves data set comparison methods, by analysing a sample of 2,896 firms listed on the stock exchange in 35 different states over the period 2013-2021.



Author(s):  
Finn Laursen

The Nice Treaty negotiated during the year 2000, signed in 2001 and in force from 2003, focused on institutional changes considered necessary, especially by the larger member states, for the anticipated large enlargement of the European Union with several central and eastern European countries. Efforts to adopt such changes in the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1996–1997 had failed. The Nice Treaty therefore dealt with what was known as the “Amsterdam leftovers,” namely size and composition of the European Commission, reweighting of votes in the Council of Ministers, and increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council. Concerning the reweighting of votes the intergovernmental conference agreed to increase the number of votes per member state, but the larger member states got a relatively larger increase that the smaller member states. This should make it more difficult for the smaller member states to dominate in the future, something feared by the larger states. Concerning the Commission, it was decided that each member state would nominate one commissioner in the future from January 1, 2005. When the membership of the union reached 27 the size would have to be reduced. How much and how would be decided later. Concerning the use of qualified majority voting the decision was to extend the use to some policy areas from the entry into force of the new treaty and for some policy areas considered more controversial the extension would take place later. For the most controversial areas no extension to qualified majority voting was considered. During the intergovernmental conference, which negotiated the new treaty, the topic of “enhanced cooperation” was added. Most of these topics were quite controversial, and afterward there was a feeling that the treaty did not adequately deal with all the issues. This in turn led to further efforts to improve the institutions, first in the failed Constitutional Treaty (2004) and eventually in the successful Lisbon Treaty (2007).



2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Michael Fehling

Abstract Energy transition in the European Union (EU) and its Member States involves questions of federalism, which are subject to various perspectives. The distribution of powers cannot be properly understood using classical legal methodology alone because Articles 192 to 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain too many ambiguous political compromises. On the one hand, Article 192(1) TFEU (on the environment) and Article 194(1) and (2)(1) TFEU (on energy) enable EU legislation on energy transition through the ordinary legislative procedure, including majority voting in the European Parliament and the Council. On the other hand, there are significant textual limits for EU action in neighbouring provisions with a ‘sovereignty exception’ for the Member States in both Article 192(2) and Article 194(2)(2) TFEU. This article argues that, in the light of the Paris Agreement, the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States should, in case of doubt, be understood in such a way that effective climate protection becomes possible. Because under Article 191(1) TFEU the EU is to promote measures at the international level to combat climate change, such an international law-friendly interpretation is part of a legitimate teleological approach. Economic theories of federalism and innovation research in the social sciences help us to understand which aspects of economic or innovation theory can promote effectiveness in this respect. It is necessary to interpret the distribution of competences in a dynamic way, thereby slightly shifting the limits of interpretation.



2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christophe Crombez ◽  
Simon Hix

This article develops a game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that suggests that the amount of legislative activity depends on the size of the gridlock interval. This is consistent with Krehbiel's study of US politics. This interval depends on two factors: (1) the preference configuration of the political actors and (2) the legislative procedures used in a particular period. Actors’ preferences and procedures are not expected to have any effect beyond their impact on the gridlock interval. The study predicts smaller gridlock intervals, and thus more legislative activity, under the co-decision (consultation) procedure when the pivotal member states and the European Parliament (Commission) are closer to each other. More activity is expected under qualified majority voting in the Council than under unanimity. The results find support for these propositions in an empirical analysis of EU legislative activity between 1979 and 2009.



2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Wimmel

This article examines the impact of national borders on public discourses, based on a case study of the struggle surrounding Turkey’s application to join the European Union (EU). Comparing opinions, reasons and interpretation patterns in quality press commentaries about enlarging the EU beyond the Bosphorus, the article confirms the importance and robustness of national cleavages between the German and the French public spheres on the one hand and the British public sphere on the other. Whereas Turkish membership was predominantly rejected on the continent, the British commentators strongly and almost unanimously supported Ankara’s request. These similarities and divergences, I argue, are first and foremost the result of competing visions of Europe’s finality, especially regarding various constitutional ideas and cultural principles. Against this background, the Turkey question was partly exploited as an instrument to advance or to suppress different concepts on the future of European integration.



1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Jupille

Analysts of the European Union (EU) and international bargaining have generally failed to appreciate how the shift within the EU from unanimity to qualified majority voting has affected European bargaining positions and international outcomes. I analyze the international effects of changes in EU decision-making rules with a simple spatial model and assess the utility of the model in two cases of environmental bargaining that span the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The EU can decisively shape international outcomes by concentrating the weight of its fifteen member states on a single substantive position and rendering that position critical to any internationally negotiated agreement. The findings generalize to numerous areas of EU external relations and suggest that analysts should attend specifically to the EU and more generally to domestic and regional institutional factors in explaining international bargaining outcomes.



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