Alan Ross Anderson and Omar Khayyam Moore. The formal analysis of normative concepts. American sociological review, vol. 22 (1957), pp. 9–17. - Alan Ross Anderson. A reduction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic. Mind, n.s. vol. 67 (1958), pp. 100–103. - Alan Ross Anderson. The logic of norms. Logique et analyse (Louvain), n.s. vol. 1 (1958), pp. 84–91.

1959 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-178
Author(s):  
A. N. Prior
Author(s):  
Marvin Belzer

Deontic logic is the investigation of the logic of normative concepts, especially obligation (‘ought’, ‘should’, ‘must’), permission (‘may’) and prohibition (‘ought not’, ‘forbidden’). Deontic logic differs from normative legal theory and ethics in that it does not attempt to determine which principles hold, nor what obligations exist, for any given system. Rather it seeks to develop a formal language that can adequately represent the normative expressions of natural languages, and to regiment such expressions in a logical system. The theorems of deontic logic specify relationships both among normative concepts (for example, whatever is obligatory is permissible) and between normative and non-normative concepts (for example, whatever is obligatory is possible). Contemporary research beginning with von Wright treats deontic logic as a branch of modal logic, in so far as (as was noted already by medieval logicians) the logical relations between the obligatory, permissible and forbidden to some extent parallel those between the necessary, possible and impossible (concepts treated in ‘alethic’ modal logic).


Georg Henrik von Wright. Form and content in logic. A revised reprint of XV 58(2), 199(2), 280(2). Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 1–21. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On the idea of logical truth (I). A revised reprint of XV 58(1), 199(1), 280(1). Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 22–43. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On double quantification. A revised reprint of XVII 201. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 44–57. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Deontic logic. A revised reprint of XVII 140. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 58–74. - Georg Henrik von Wright. Interpretations of modal logic. A revised reprint of XVIII 176. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 75–88. - Georg Henrik von Wright. A new system of modal logic. A revised version of XIX 66. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 89–126. - Georg Henrik von Wright. On conditionals. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 127–165. - Georg Henrik von Wright. The concept of entailment. Logical studies. International library of psychology, philosophy and scientific method. The Humanities Press, Inc., New York, and Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 166–191.

1970 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-462
Author(s):  
Timothy Smiley

1963 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

The purpose of this paper is to provide a partial logical analysis of a few concepts that may be classified as value concepts or as concepts that are closely related to value concepts. Among the concepts that will be considered are striving for, doing, believing, knowing, desiring, ability to do, obligation to do, and value for. Familiarity will be assumed with the concepts of logical necessity, logical possibility, and strict implication as formalized in standard systems of modal logic (such as S4), and with the concepts of obligation and permission as formalized in systems of deontic logic. It will also be assumed that quantifiers over propositions have been included in extensions of these systems.


Author(s):  
Ilkka Niiniluoto

G.H. von Wright was one of the most influential analytic philosophers of the twentieth century. Born in Helsinki, Finland, von Wright did his early work on logic, probability and induction under the influence of logical empiricism. In 1948–51 he served as Ludwig Wittgenstein’s successor at Cambridge, but returned to his homeland and later became a member of the Academy of Finland. He did pioneering work on the new applications of logic: modal logic, deontic logic, the logic of norms and action, preference logic, tense logic, causality and determinism. In the 1970s his ideas about the explanation and understanding of human action helped to establish new links between the analytic tradition and Continental hermeneutics. Von Wright’s later works, which are eloquent books and essays written originally in his two native languages (Swedish and Finnish), deal with issues of humanism and human welfare, history and future, technology and ecology.


2019 ◽  
Vol 177 (4) ◽  
pp. 1085-1109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allard Tamminga ◽  
Frank Hindriks

Abstract Individualists claim that collective obligations are reducible to the individual obligations of the collective’s members. Collectivists deny this. We set out to discover who is right by way of a deontic logic of collective action that models collective actions, abilities, obligations, and their interrelations. On the basis of our formal analysis, we argue that when assessing the obligations of an individual agent, we need to distinguish individual obligations from member obligations. If a collective has a collective obligation to bring about a particular state of affairs, then it might be that no individual in the collective has an individual obligation to bring about that state of affairs. What follows from a collective obligation is that each member of the collective has a member obligation to help ensure that the collective fulfills its collective obligation. In conclusion, we argue that our formal analysis supports collectivism.


Mind ◽  
1958 ◽  
Vol LXVII (265) ◽  
pp. 100-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALAN ROSS ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Efstratios Kontopoulos ◽  
Nick Bassiliades ◽  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Grigoris Antoniou

Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic formalism that deals with incomplete and conflicting information, whereas modal logic deals with the concepts of necessity and possibility. These types of logics play a significant role in the emerging Semantic Web, which enriches the available Web information with meaning, leading to better cooperation between end-users and applications. Defeasible and modal logics, in general, and, particularly, deontic logic provide means for modeling agent communities, where each agent is characterized by its cognitive profile and normative system, as well as policies, which define privacy requirements, access permissions, and individual rights. Toward this direction, this article discusses the extension of DR-DEVICE, a Semantic Web-aware defeasible reasoner, with a mechanism for expressing modal logic operators, while testing the implementation via deontic logic operators, concerned with obligations, permissions, and related concepts. The motivation behind this work is to develop a practical defeasible reasoner for the Semantic Web that takes advantage of the expressive power offered by modal logics, accompanied by the flexibility to define diverse agent behaviours. A further incentive is to study the various motivational notions of deontic logic and discuss the cognitive state of agents, as well as the interactions among them.


Semantic Web ◽  
2013 ◽  
pp. 140-167
Author(s):  
Efstratios Kontopoulos ◽  
Nick Bassiliades ◽  
Guido Governatori ◽  
Grigoris Antoniou

Defeasible logic is a non-monotonic formalism that deals with incomplete and conflicting information, whereas modal logic deals with the concepts of necessity and possibility. These types of logics play a significant role in the emerging Semantic Web, which enriches the available Web information with meaning, leading to better cooperation between end-users and applications. Defeasible and modal logics, in general, and, particularly, deontic logic provide means for modeling agent communities, where each agent is characterized by its cognitive profile and normative system, as well as policies, which define privacy requirements, access permissions, and individual rights. Toward this direction, this article discusses the extension of DR-DEVICE, a Semantic Web-aware defeasible reasoner, with a mechanism for expressing modal logic operators, while testing the implementation via deontic logic operators, concerned with obligations, permissions, and related concepts. The motivation behind this work is to develop a practical defeasible reasoner for the Semantic Web that takes advantage of the expressive power offered by modal logics, accompanied by the flexibility to define diverse agent behaviours. A further incentive is to study the various motivational notions of deontic logic and discuss the cognitive state of agents, as well as the interactions among them.


2002 ◽  
Vol 04 (03) ◽  
pp. 213-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
OSAMU KATAI ◽  
KENTARO TODA ◽  
HIROSHI KAWAKAMI

Focusing on the interaction among members' attitudes toward issues of common concern and members' expectance toward other members' attitudes, type classification of societal conflicts and their degree of strength are clarified. For the purpose, a vigorous theoretical framework for the examination of interrelationships among various normative concepts such as obligation, permission, prohibition, etc. is introduced, on the basis of the general theory on norms, deontic logic. By presuming several plausible laws on the way of the resolution of these conflicts and by introducing a two-dimensional representation of the conflicts with one axis representing the degree of imbalance and the other axis representing the cohesiveness of systems, a characterization method of conflict resolution processes is obtained, through which prediction and analysis of actual resolution processes can be done.


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