Abortion & CompromiseAbortion & Dialogue: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and American Law. By Ruth Colker Between Two Absolutes: Public Opinion and the Politics of Abortion. By Elizabeth Adell Cook , Ted G. Jelen , and Clyde Wilcox Contested Lives: The Abortion Debate in an American Community. By Faye D. Ginsburg Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: American Failures, European Challenges. By Mary Ann Glendon Life Itself: Abortion in the American Mind. By Roger Rosenblatt Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes. By Laurence H. Tribe

Polity ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-151
Author(s):  
Susan Behuniak-Long
2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 1031-1047
Author(s):  
Neil A. O’Brian

What explains the alignment of antiabortion positions within the Republican party? I explore this development among voters, activists, and elites before 1980. By 1970, antiabortion attitudes among ordinary voters correlated with conservative views on a range of noneconomic issues including civil rights, Vietnam, feminism and, by 1972, with Republican presidential vote choice. These attitudes predated the parties taking divergent abortion positions. I argue that because racial conservatives and military hawks entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights once the issue gained salience. Likewise, because proabortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that preexisting public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti (pro) abortion movement in a web of conservative (liberal) causes. A key finding is that the white evangelical laity’s support for conservative abortion policies preceded the political mobilization of evangelical leaders into the pro-life movement. I contend the pro-life movement’s alignment with conservatism and the Republican party was less contingent on elite bargaining, and more rooted in the mass public, than existing scholarship suggests.


Author(s):  
Fran Amery

This chapter gives a brief overview of the current terrain of abortion debate in the UK, covering calls for decriminalisation as well as debates on sex-selection, disability and pre-abortion counselling. It argues that the classic image of abortion politics as a war between ‘pro-life’ and ‘pro-choice’ actors cannot adequately accommodate these recent developments – nor does it fit with how abortion debates have actually unfolded in Britain historically. Instead, it offers an interpretation of abortion law as resting on a coalition between government and medical actors formed to govern women’s reproductive decisions. The chapter closes with an overview of the book.


Author(s):  
Fran Amery

A common misunderstanding of the Abortion Act 1967 is that it granted women the ‘right’ to access abortion. In reality, there is no such thing; the current provision of abortion in the United Kingdom rests on a system in which doctors, not women, are the arbiters of abortion access. In recent years, calls for the full decriminalisation of abortion have been given a vigour not seen before. For the first time, MPs and medical associations have moved to back decriminalisation, in line with the demands of pro-choice campaigners across the UK. But at the same time, opponents are mobilising to undermine public faith in both the Abortion Act and abortion providers. In doing so, they have tended to set aside the classic ‘right to life’ arguments, instead focusing on issues such as sex-selective abortion and disability rights. This book makes sense of today’s changed landscape of abortion debate by tracing the evolution of political and parliamentary discourse on abortion from the passage of the Abortion Act in the 1960s to the present. It makes the case that to understand contemporary abortion politics, it is necessary to move beyond a conceptualisation of the debate as characterised by ‘pro-choice’ versus ‘pro-life’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kyle Johnson

Disagreements about abortion are often assumed to reduce to disagreements about fetal personhood (and mindedness). If one believes a fetus is a person (or has a mind), then they are “pro-life.” If one believes a fetus is not a person (or is not minded), they are “pro-choice.” The issue, however, is much more complicated. Not only is it not dichotomous—most everyone believes that abortion is permissible in some circumstances (e.g. to save the mother’s life) and not others (e.g. at nine months of a planned pregnancy)—but scholars on both sides of the issue (e.g. Don Marquis and Judith Thomson) have convincingly argued that fetal personhood (and mindedness) are irrelevant to the debate. To determine the extent to which they are right, this article will define “personhood,” its relationship to mindedness, and explore what science has revealed about the mind before exploring the relevance of both to questions of abortion’s morality and legality. In general, this article does not endorse a particular answer to these questions, but the article should enhance the reader’s ability to develop their own answers in a much more informed way.


Author(s):  
L. J Zigerell ◽  
Heather Marie Rice

This chapter investigates a new set of measures of attitudes about abortion policy. It argues that the standard ANES battery violates several principles of good question wording and also fails to take into account the timing of abortion, which is a central element of American law and current discourse. Strikingly different conclusions about the electorate's views about abortion emerge in the comparison of the standard and new items: whereas the traditional item indicates that a majority of Americans are opposed to abortion in all circumstances, or support it only in the limited rape–incest–life options, the new items suggest a symmetry in abortion attitudes, with as many Americans supporting the extreme pro-choice as the extreme pro-life options.


2009 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ziegler

The Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, arguably the most hotly debated in recent decades, has produced an impressive body of historical scholarship. The leading histories have focused on the evolution of the arguments and alliances that shape abortion debate today, rights-based prolife and pro-choice arguments, alliances between women's rights leaders and public health advocates, and the adoption of pro-choice positions by the Democratic Party and pro-life positions by the Republicans. This orientation is unquestionably a sensible one; rights-based arguments, in play before Roe, have come to dominate the debate after the decision. However, by emphasizing rights-based debate before the decision, the current scholarship has mostly missed a significant change in the rhetoric and coalitions on either side of the debate that was partly produced by Roe itself.


2009 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-240
Author(s):  
Sara L. Crawley ◽  
Rebecca K. Willman ◽  
Leisa Clark ◽  
Clare Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Pro Life ◽  

Utilitas ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-189
Author(s):  
D. W. Haslett

Morally speaking, is abortion murder? This is what I am calling the ‘abortion problem’. I claim that neither pro-life nor pro-choice advocates have the correct solution; that the correct solution is instead one considered correct by relatively few people. But if this solution really is correct, then why, after years of intense debate, is this solution not more widely accepted? Many, no doubt, are precluded from accepting it by religious dogma. But others, I think, fail to arrive at a correct solution because they have been approaching the problem from the wrong theoretical framework. Or they have been approaching it without any theoretical framework at all. That is, they have no theoretical framework beyond that of merely examining their moral intuitions and, if anything is clear so far from the abortion debate, it is that intuitions alone, which differ radically from person to person, are not sufficient to solve the problem. In short: one is unlikely to arrive at the correct solution unless one starts from a sound theoretical framework. I shall, in what follows, sketch what I take to be a sound theoretical framework. Then I shall try to show what solution to the abortion problem follows from it.


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