The Extent of the Judicial Power of the United States

1908 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simeon E. Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power

The International Court of Prize

1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 302-324
Author(s):  
James Brown Scott
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Original Form ◽  
State Action ◽  
International Court ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Hague

On February 15, 1911, the Senate of the United States advised and consented to the ratification of the International Prize Court Convention adopted by the Second Hague Peace Conference and signed by the American delegates October 18, 1907. Although transmitted to the Senate with the various Hague conventions on February 27, 1908, and favorably recommended by the President and Secretary of State, action upon the convention was deferred by the Committee on Foreign Relations because the convention in its original form involved an appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to the international court at The Hague. This feature of the otherwise acceptable convention raised doubts as to its constitutionality, because Article 3, section 1, of the Constitution provides that “ the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court.” An appeal from the Supreme Court to the court at The Hague seemed to some inconsistent with this provision, for a court can not be considered supreme if an appeal lies from its decisions. To this it may be answered that the court to be established at The Hague is not a court of the United States, and, therefore, is not contemplated by the Constitution; for the Hague court is a diplomatic tribunal for the settlement of questions which would otherwise be adjusted by diplomacy, or referred to a mixed commission specially constituted for their determination, or which if not determined by either of these methods, might result in war.

The Judicial Power of the United States.

1941 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 630
Author(s):  
Forrest Revere Black ◽  
Robert Jennings Harris
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power

scholarly journals Essay: Justiciability, Federalism, and the Administrative State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zachary D. Clopton
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Federal Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Federal State ◽  
State Court ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Advisory Opinion

103 Cornell Law Review 1431 (2018)Article III provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to certain justiciable cases and controversies. So if a plaintiff bringing a federal claim lacks constitutional standing or her dispute is moot under Article III, then a federal court should dismiss. But this dismissal need not end the story. This Article suggests a simple, forward-looking reading of case-or-controversy dismissals: they should be understood as invitations to legislators to consider other pathways for adjudication. A case dismissed for lack of standing, for mootness, or for requesting an advisory opinion might be a candidate for resolution in a state court or administrative agency. And although the Supreme Court has frequently policed the delegation of the “judicial power of the United States,” legislative delegations of non-justiciable claims should not transgress those limits. Instead, case-or-controversy dismissals imply that non-Article III options are permissible.This formulation is more than a doctrinal trick. It has normative consequences across a range of dimensions. For one thing, this approach reinvigorates the separation-of-powers purposes of justiciability doctrine by turning our attention from judges to legislators. When courts seemingly use justiciability to curtail private enforcement or access to justice, we could re-interpret the results as revealing a legislative failure to authorize non-Article III options. More affirmatively, case-or controversy dismissals could be focal points for political pressure in favor of more rigorous enforcement of important laws that the federal executive may be shirking. Further, consistent with “new new federalist” accounts, this Article suggests another avenue for federal–state interactivity in the development and enforcement of federal law. This too is of added salience given that private and state enforcement may become even more significant in light of the current occupants of the federal executive branch.

scholarly journals Organizing Court Administration in order to fulfil access to justice under the Covid-19 State of crisis

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. e41891211113
Author(s):  
Ibnu Sina Chandranegara ◽  
Luthfi Marfungah
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Court Administration ◽  
The Law

The Covid-19 pandemic in different countries, particularly in terms of performing their duties and functions, has both direct and indirect implications on the judiciary. This paper calls for a contrast between the implementation of law emergencies in the United States and the judiciary's reflection in Indonesia. The study uses the comparative approach in constitutional law to provide advice, which needs to be avoided in the Indonesian constitutional law by researching legal material and procedures in other countries' constitutional law. This article concludes that the Law of Judicial Power and the Law of Procedure in Indonesia require strict legal material on how procedural law does not give delegates too much technical, regulatory authority to each court during the time of crisis and has the potential to create unequal policies in the future to deal with judicial emergencies so that regulation is necessary.

RESTRICTIONS ON JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN SPEECH: SILENCING CRITICISM OF LIBERAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lino A. Graglia
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Election Campaign ◽  
Judicial Activism ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
The World

Constitutional law in the United States is, for most practical purposes, the product of ‘judicial review’, the power of judges to disallow policy choices made by other officials or institutions of government, ostensibly because those choices are prohibited by the Constitution. This extraordinary and unprecedented power, America's dubious contribution to the science of government, has made American judges the most powerful in the world, not only legislators but super-legislators, legislators with virtually the last word. Because lawmaking power divorced from popular will is tyranny, most states have attempted to reconcile the lawmaking power of judges with representative self-government by subjecting all or some judges to some form of popular election. In all but four such states, judges, encouraged and supported by their fellow lawyers in the organized bar—would-be judges and beneficiaries of judicial power—have responded by adopting codes of judicial ethics that limit what candidates for election to judicial office are permitted to say. The effect is to undermine elections as a control on judicial power by limiting criticism of judicial activism, the misuse of judicial power.

Anti-Monopoly Law

Japanese Law ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 347-386
Author(s):  
Hiroshi Oda
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Business System ◽  
The Us ◽  
Bid Rigging

In 2014, the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law came from the United States. It was dormant for decades until 1990 when the US–Japan SII Talks were completed. Since then, Anti-Monopoly Law was invigorated. The business system in Japan became much more transparent and fairer in the last several decades. Cartels, including bid-rigging, are now under control. In 2014, the Anti-Monopoly Law was substantially amended and its quasi-judicial power was taken away

Customary International Law and U.S. Judicial Power

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
International Law ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
The United States ◽  
Federal Courts ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Third

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.

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