September 11 and the Bush Administration:

2017 ◽  
pp. 67-88
Author(s):  
Walter E. Davis
2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (02) ◽  
pp. 473-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard N. Magliocca

This essay places George W. Bush's presidency and the Bush administration in some historical context by applying the model of “political time” developed in recent books by Stephen Skowronek (2008) and Keith Whittington (2007). My thesis is that Bush's political failure during his second term was largely the result of structural tensions created by the attacks of September 11, 2001, that no leader could have overcome. This argument is an extension of Skowronek's and Whittington's views that the executive branch's relationship to other governing institutions is shaped primarily by the president's relative position in the party system. In essence, 9/11 undermined the coalition forged by Ronald Reagan by pushing President George W. Bush to pursue radical change. These actions could not be squared with his need, as the leader of the majority party, to maintain electoral stability. A presidency divided against itself in this way cannot, and did not, stand.


Asian Survey ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert Rozman ◽  
Noah Rozman

The fallout from September 11 continued to recast U.S. relations with both Southeast and Northeast Asia. Alarm over Islamic terrorist groups such as the perpetrators of the Bali disco bombing and development of nuclear weapons by North Korea eclipsed concern with China's relentless rise and Japan's deepening economic morass. The Bush administration looked to the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to root out conspiratorial cells, and to South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia to pressure Pyongyang. After Bush branded North Korea as part of the "axis of evil," a conciliatory tone prevailed toward all who could help in containing the nation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farzana Bhatty

"The media are crucial to our worldview, thus, this paper will demonstrate how American television news media was used to present and define an enemy immediately following the events of September 11. Furthermore, this paper will problematize the stereotypes associated with the enemy, and bring into the forefront the reasons for and consequences of establishing and maintaining an enemy "Other," specifically questionable political actions by US President George W. Bush and his administration. As the violent events of one day became showcased in the media, this facilitated the implementation of restrictive and pervasive laws and legislation, which were part of a larger initiative by the Bush administration to incite fear and apprehension surrounding a new enemy"--From the Introduction page 1.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Farzana Bhatty

"The media are crucial to our worldview, thus, this paper will demonstrate how American television news media was used to present and define an enemy immediately following the events of September 11. Furthermore, this paper will problematize the stereotypes associated with the enemy, and bring into the forefront the reasons for and consequences of establishing and maintaining an enemy "Other," specifically questionable political actions by US President George W. Bush and his administration. As the violent events of one day became showcased in the media, this facilitated the implementation of restrictive and pervasive laws and legislation, which were part of a larger initiative by the Bush administration to incite fear and apprehension surrounding a new enemy"--From the Introduction page 1.


2021 ◽  
pp. 125-158
Author(s):  
William L. d'Ambruoso

Immediately following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, members of the George W. Bush administration signaled that current rules regarding intelligence, detention, and interrogation were too confining. With approval from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the president declared that the Geneva Conventions’ detention and interrogation guidelines would not apply to Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. The problem with Geneva, administration lawyers argued, was that it would tie interrogators’ hands. The CIA and the military wanted an explicit legal blessing for their interrogation programs. They got it in the form of a series of memos by the OLC and military lawyers, who defined torture in exceedingly narrow terms. The result was “enhanced interrogation,” which the administration claimed did not amount to torture but was still a sufficiently “tough” program to break hardened terrorists.


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