Dietrich von Hildebrand on the Fundamental Freedom of Persons

2017 ◽  
pp. 194-220
Keyword(s):  
Yuridika ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Herlambang Perdana Wiratraman ◽  
Sébastien Lafrance

This paper explores the similarities and differences in Indonesia and Canada regarding the constitutionally protected freedom of expression. While one may expect that both countries do not have much in common from a general standpoint, both do have several similarities in their approach to the interpretation and application of that freedom. The exercise of freedom of expression is also examined through the spectrum of jurisprudential examples from both countries, more specifically in the context of ‘hate speech’, ‘artistic expression’ and ‘language expression’.In addition, the social reality of both countries underlying the freedom of expression is uncovered. Further, the limitations imposed in both countries on that fundamental freedom are also discussed. Learning from the exercise that consisted in this paper to compare relevant laws of two countries, and despite the differences between their respective legal traditions, this study argues that freedom of expression, in two different countries such as Indonesia and Canada, can play a more effective role in a society with a multicultural character that complies with the rule of law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 486-521
Author(s):  
Thomas Albrecht

Thomas Albrecht, “‘That Free Play of Human Affection’: The Humanist Ethics of Walter Pater’s The Renaissance” (pp. 486–521) This essay aims to refute received, persistent misconceptions of Walter Pater’s Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873), and of aestheticism generally, as an asocial and amoral sensualism, and as a deliberate separating of art from human lives and the world. Contrary to these misconceptions, it finds a humanist ethical vision in The Renaissance, specifically in the essays Pater devotes to Botticelli, Michelangelo, and Leonardo da Vinci. Drawing on an established post-Enlightenment, post-Romantic tradition of Victorian secular humanism, Pater defines this vision in terms of human sympathies for the feelings and suffering of other persons. And he defines it in aesthetic terms, in terms of art’s unique capacity to depict human feelings and suffering, and thereby to arouse sympathies in the viewer. At the same time, the essay contends that Pater in The Renaissance also defines his ethical vision in a more unprecedented, radical way. Beyond the solicitation of human sympathies, he frames it in terms of a fundamental uncertainty and unpredictability, a fundamental freedom and singularity, of human ethical relationships and responses. For Pater, this uncertainty and freedom are the qualities that make an ethics genuinely ethical. Pater finds these qualities, and this kind of genuine ethics, epitomized in the unpredictability and freedom of human aesthetic responses, including his own, to art and beauty.


2008 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-91
Author(s):  
Keith E. Whittington

The idea of a constitutional freedom of association was embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court in the mid-twentieth century as implicit in the First Amendment. Although initially endorsed by the Court as a fundamental freedom that was necessarily entwined with the freedom of speech when confronted with cases in the 1930s and 1940s of local government officials cracking down on speakers and assemblies discussing strikes and labor unions, the justices were far more divided and skeptical of freedom of association claims in cases from the mid-1940s through the early 1960s when state and national government officials were pursuing a variety of anticommunist measures. This article examines the early jurisprudential development of the constitutional freedom of association and its grounding in the First Amendment, and suggests some of the limits that the notion always carried with it. Politics and jurisprudence combined to limit its applicability in the anticommunism cases.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 169-175
Author(s):  
Esmeralda Thomai

Abstract The goal of this article and of the analysis itself on which it is based, is to identify weaknesses in penitentiary legislation in force in the Republic of Albania, in order that the penal policy of the Albanian state, should respect the principles on which will be based to be effective. At the end of 2015 the number of persons who have been sentence to life imprisonment in Albanian prisons has been 159 people, convicted in 2895 of the total prison who were serving a sentence in Albanian prisons. The number of those sentenced to capital punishment has increased, compared with the statistics of 3-4 years ago. Albanian law on the punishment of life imprisonment presents serious problems in the modalities of execution of the punishment, violating the right and fundamental freedom of man, that lives in liberty, and break up the Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits placing under cruel punishments, inhuman and degrading. The Republic of Albania will need as soon as possible to change its legislation concerning the category of persons sentenced to life imprisonment. Condemned to life imprisonment, according to each individual case and referred to progress in the sentence, in view of the disappearance of the potential for recidivism and in view of correction, after the expiry of a time limit prescribed by law,they should have the right and opportunity in court jurisdiction to address the real execution of criminal sentences for the benefit of supervised freedom or conditional one. In this way, the hope of life again in freedom, will make the convicts to life imprisonment interested to educate themselves, by all the values that will be in accordance with social rules.


2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-239
Author(s):  
Matthias Jacobs ◽  
Mehrdad Payandeh

AbstractThe Federal Constitutional Court has decided that the prohibition to strike for career civil servants, as it has traditionally been part of the German legal order, is in compliance with the German Constitution. The Court thereby put a (provisional) end to a long-lasting debate on how to solve the tension between the fundamental freedom to form associations under Article 9(3) of the Basic Law, which arguably encompasses a right to strike, and Article 33(5) of the Basic Law, which protects the traditional principles of the career civil servants, which arguably encompasses the prohibition to strike. Through recognizing that the ban on strike action by career civil servants is not only allowed but required under the German Constitution, the Constitutional Court navigates the German legal order on a potential collision course with the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, the Constitutional Court on the one hand reaffirms the openness of the German constitutional order towards international law in general and human rights and the European Convention on Human Rights in particular. On the other hand, the Court somehow marginalizes the role of the European Court of Human Rights and threatens to not follow the Court should it hold that the European Convention on Human Rights demands a right to strike also for career civil servants.


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