The Continuing Spirit of the Brown Decision of the Supreme Court

2020 ◽  
pp. 28-37
Author(s):  
CHARLES V. WILLIE
Author(s):  
J. Harvie Wilkinson

Southern school desegregation after Brown progressed through four successive stages. The first might be termed absolute defiance, lasting from 1955 until the collapse of Virginia’s massive resistance in 1959. The second was token compliance, stretching from 1959 until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With that act, a third phase of modest integration began with the efforts of southern school officials to avoid fund cutoffs by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The 1968 Supreme Court decision of Green v. County School Board commenced a fourth phase of massive integration during which the South became the most integrated section of the country. Yet even as the fourth phase developed, a fifth—that of resegregation— was emerging in some southern localities. Breaks in history, of course, are never so neat as their chroniclers might wish. During the defiant stage, for example, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Florida practiced token compliance. And during much of the token compliance stage, Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina practiced total defiance. The different phases thus express only regional momentum as a whole and not the progress, or lack thereof, of a particular state. Even as a gauge of regional momentum, moreover, these phases are imperfect, given wide differences in temperament between the Deep and Upper South. These differences, particularly at first, were important. “In terms of immediate progress toward desegregation in the South,” noted Numan Bartley, “there was precious little to choose between the complex machinations of upper South states and the bellicose interposition of Virginia and the Deep South. But in terms of the future of the Brown decision, the difference was considerable. States of the upper South, with the exception of Virginia, accepted the validity of the Supreme Court decree and aimed to evade its consequences; Deep South states refused to accede any legitimacy to the decision.” Prior to the Kennedy presidency, this division “helped to keep alive the principle of Brown v. Board of Education in the South.” From 1955 to 1968 the Supreme Court remained largely inactive in school desegregation.


Author(s):  
Derrick Bell

Yale Law School Professor Alexander Bickel was a major consti­tutional scholar of his time. When, in 1970, he questioned the long-term viability of the Brown decision in a highly praised book, civil rights lawyers and liberal scholars were annoyed. Few of us at that time had any doubts that we would eventually prevail in eradicating segrega­tion “root and branch” from the public schools. Now, more than three decades later, Professor Bickel’s prediction, heavily criticized at the time, has become an unhappy but all too accurate reality. In this chapter I will examine the resistance by whites and the rigidity by civil rights lawyers and leaders that combined to transform Bickel’s prediction into prophesy. Even the optimists among us had continuing reasons to regret the “all deliberate speed” standard for implementing Brown I. The Supreme Court insisted in Brown II that its unique-compliance formula was intended to do no more than allow time for the necessary adminis­trative changes that transformation to a desegregated school system required. After a decade of experience with the standard, Judge Robert L. Carter, former NAACP General Counsel, surmised that the formula actually permitted movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept.1 Until Brown II, Carter said, constitutional rights had been defined as personal and present, but under the guise of judicial statesmanship, “the Warren Court sacri­ficed individual and immediate vindication of the newly discovered right of blacks to a desegregated education in favor of a remedy more palatable to whites.” Carter suggests that the Court failed to realize the depth or nature of the problem, and by attempting to regulate the pace of desegrega­tion so as to convey a show of compassion and understanding for the white South, it not only failed to develop a willingness to comply, but instead aroused the hope that resistance to the constitutional imper­ative would succeed. As had happened so frequently before, southern politicians began waving the Confederate flag and equating the Brown decision with a Supreme Court-led attack on states’ rights. Highway billboards called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren, and candidates were elected to office on campaigns based on little more than shouting “Never.”


2004 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marybeth Gasman

When the Supreme Court handed down its historic decision in the Spring of 1954, there was a rash of predictions and advocacies of the demise of Negro institutions of higher education. Relaxed and sober discussion and analysis have brought more sophistication relative to this group of colleges and universities.—Robert C. Weaver, 1960


1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-203
Author(s):  
Kendra Carlson

The Supreme Court of California held, in Delaney v. Baker, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610 (1999), that the heightened remedies available under the Elder Abuse Act (Act), Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15657,15657.2 (West 1998), apply to health care providers who engage in reckless neglect of an elder adult. The court interpreted two sections of the Act: (1) section 15657, which provides for enhanced remedies for reckless neglect; and (2) section 15657.2, which limits recovery for actions based on “professional negligence.” The court held that reckless neglect is distinct from professional negligence and therefore the restrictions on remedies against health care providers for professional negligence are inapplicable.Kay Delaney sued Meadowood, a skilled nursing facility (SNF), after a resident, her mother, died. Evidence at trial indicated that Rose Wallien, the decedent, was left lying in her own urine and feces for extended periods of time and had stage I11 and IV pressure sores on her ankles, feet, and buttocks at the time of her death.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-13
Author(s):  
LuAnn Haley ◽  
Marjorie Eskay-Auerbach

Abstract Pennsylvania adopted the impairment rating provisions described in the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) in 1996 as an exposure cap for employers seeking predictability and cost control in workers’ compensation claims. In 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down the Protz decision, which held that requiring physicians to apply the methodology set forth in the most recent edition of the AMA Guides reflected an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the American Medical Association. The decision eliminates the impairment-rating evaluation (IRE) mechanism under which claimants were assigned an impairment rating under the most recent edition of the AMA Guides. The AMA Guides periodically are revised to include the most recent scientific evidence regarding impairment ratings, and the AMA Guides, Sixth Edition, acknowledges that impairment is a complex concept that is not yet defined in a way that readily permits an evidence-based definition of assessment. The AMA Guides should not be considered standards frozen in time simply to withstand future scrutiny by the courts; instead, workers’ compensation acts could state that when a new edition of the AMA Guides is published, the legislature shall review and consider adopting the new edition. It appears unlikely that the Protz decision will be followed in other jurisdictions: Challenges to using the AMA Guides in assessing workers’ compensation claims have been attempted in three states, and all attempts failed.


Author(s):  
Elliot E. Slotnick ◽  
Jennifer A. Segal

1988 ◽  
Vol 43 (12) ◽  
pp. 1019-1028 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald N. Bersoff ◽  
Laurel P. Malson ◽  
Donald B. Verrilli

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