CEO Financial Background and Audit Pricing

2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 325-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachana Kalelkar ◽  
Sarfraz Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Fixed Effect Model ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Advantages And Disadvantages

SYNOPSIS Accounting scholars theorize that audit price is a function of a client's audit and business risk. Existing research finds that the functional expertise of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in finance improves financial reporting quality (Matsunaga, Wang, and Yeung 2013), increases profitability, and reduces the likelihood of firm failure (Custodio and Metzger 2014). These factors suggest that auditors' engagement risk decreases when incumbent CEOs possess financial expertise, raising the likelihood that auditors will charge these firms lower fees. In this study, we examine whether CEOs' work experience in accounting- and finance-related jobs affects audit fees. Using a panel of U.S. firms between 2004 and 2013, we find that firms that have a financial expert CEO pay lower audit fees. Our results are robust to various specifications, including firm-fixed effect model and specifications that control for other CEO- and Chief Financial Officer (CFO)-specific and audit committee characteristics. Our findings thus add to the literature on the advantages and disadvantages of a functional background of top managers and how this background can create value for a firm through savings in audit fees.

The impact of demographic characteristics of CEOs and directors on audit fees and audit delay

2015 ◽  
Vol 30 (8/9) ◽  
pp. 963-997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maretno Agus Harjoto ◽  
Indrarini Laksmana ◽  
Robert Lee
Keyword(s):  
Ethnic Minority ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Top Executives ◽  
The Us ◽  
Female Ceos ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of gender and ethnicity of CEO and audit committee members (directors) on audit fees and audit delay in the US firms. Design/methodology/approach – Audit-related corporate governance literature has extensively examined the determinants of audit fees and audit delay by focusing on board characteristics, specifically board independence, diligence and expertise. The authors provide empirical evidence that gender and ethnicity diversity in corporate leadership and boardrooms influence a firm’s audit fees and audit delay. Findings – This study finds that firms with female and ethnic minority CEOs pay significantly higher audit fees than those with male Caucasian CEOs. The authors also find that firms with a higher percentage of ethnic minority directors on their audit committee pay significantly higher audit fees. Further, the authors find that firms with female CEOs have shorter audit delay than firms with male CEOs and firms with a higher percentage of female and ethnic minority directors on their audit committee are associated with shorter audit delay. Results indicate that female CEOs and both female and ethnic minority directors are sensitive to the market pressure to avoid audit delay. Research limitations/implications – The results suggest that gender and ethnic diversity could improve audit quality and the firms’ overall financial reporting quality. Practical implications – This study provides insights to regulators and policy-makers interested in increasing diversity within a firm’s board and top executives. Recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the European Commission have been pressing publicly traded companies to improve diversity among their directors. This study provides evidence and perspective on how diversity can enhance financial reporting quality measured by audit fees and audit delay. Originality/value – Previous studies have not given much attention on the impact of racial ethnicity in addition to gender characteristics of top executives and audit committee directors on audit fees and audit delay.

scholarly journals Are CEO experience and financial expertise associated with financial restatements?

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-281
Author(s):  
Zabihollah Rezaee ◽  
Kaveh Asiaei ◽  
Toktam Safdel Delooie
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Director General ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Financial Expertise ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Financial Expert

Este estudio examina si la experiencia del director general (CEO) y los conocimientos financieros afectan a las reformulaciones financieras (FR), y cómo lo hacen, investigando una muestra de empresas iraníes que cotizan en bolsa entre 2008 y 2017. Definimos a los consejeros delegados con experiencia como aquellos que son contratados desde dentro de la empresa y a los consejeros delegados expertos en finanzas como aquellos que poseen una cualificación contable o tienen experiencia laboral como auditor, director financiero (CFO), controlador u otros puestos relacionados con la contabilidad. Encontramos que FR está positivamente asociado a los CEOs con información privilegiada (CEOs con más experiencia interna), y negativamente asociado a la experiencia financiera del CEO. Además, encontramos que la experiencia del CEO se asocia negativamente con FR cuando el CEO es un experto financiero. Este resultado pone de manifiesto la importancia de la experiencia financiera de los altos ejecutivos. Además, nuestros resultados muestran que los directores generales con información privilegiada pueden mejorar la calidad de la información financiera reduciendo FR cuando tienen mayor poder de decisión. Este estudio contribuye a la literatura sobre las características de los directores generales y la información financiera. Los resultados ofrecen importantes implicaciones para los responsables políticos y los consejos de administración de las economías emergentes en lo que respecta a la exigencia de nombrar a altos directivos con conocimientos financieros. This study examines whether and how Chief Executive Officer (CEO) experience and financial expertise affect financial restatements (FR) by investigating a sample of Iranian listed companies from 2008 to 2017. We define experienced CEOs as those who are hired from inside the firm and financial expert CEOs as those who hold an accounting qualification or have work experience as an auditor, chief financial officer (CFO), controller, and or other accounting-related positions. We find that FR is positively associated with insider CEOs (CEOs with more internal experience), and negatively associated with CEO financial expertise. Moreover, we find that CEO experience is negatively associated with FR when the CEO is a financial expert. This result highlights the importance of financial background for senior executives. Further, our results show that insider CEOs can improve the financial reporting quality through reducing FR when they have higher decision-making power. This study contributes to the literature on CEO characteristics and financial reporting. The results provide important implications for policymakers and the board of directors in emerging economies regarding the requirement to appoint top managers with financial expertise.

SEC enforcement actions getting up close and personal

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-132
Author(s):  
Matthew E. Kaplan ◽  
Alan H. Paley ◽  
Jonathan R. Tuttle
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Chief Financial Officers ◽  
Securities Fraud ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Executive Officers

Purpose To alert public company management and directors to several recent SEC enforcement actions involving executives and other senior personnel arising out of securities law violations. Design/methodology/approach Reviews a series of enforcement actions against four chief executive officers, four chief financial officers, an audit committee chair, and one outside auditor (BDO USA LLC) and five of its partners arising out of securities law violations by four different corporations (MusclePharm Corporation, Bankrate, Inc., KIT Digital, Inc. and General Employment Enterprises, Inc.). Each of the actions involved financial reporting and disclosure violations. Also highlights the need for directors and senior management to maintain a sharp focus on their company’s controls and disclosure practices. Findings The SEC’S actions may portend renewed determination by the agency to hold executives and directors, as well as outside professionals, accountable for securities fraud and disclosure violations committed by corporations. Originality/value Practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers.

Financial reporting quality, audit fees and risk committees

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Ummya Salma ◽  
Jamal Roudaki ◽  
Siata Tavite
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Risk ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Matching Techniques

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the association between the existence of a risk committee (RC) in a firm and financial reporting quality. We also investigate whether having an RC has an effect on audit pricing. We argue that the existence of an RC in a firm contributes to higher financial reporting quality and this, eventually, affects audit pricing.Design/methodology/approachThis study uses two different proxies for RC measures and investigates the impact on financial reporting quality and audit pricing. Multivariate regression analysis and propensity score matching techniques are both applied to data from the Australian Stock Exchange's listed companies for the years 2001–2013.FindingsThe results indicate that the existence of an RC reduces the discretionary accruals; this means the financial reporting quality improves when RCs are in operation. Our findings also indicate that the existence of an RC increases audit fees.Practical implicationsThe findings from this study will be beneficial to the regulatory authorities responsible for improving the compliance of corporate governance (CG). An RC can serve as a risk-mitigating tool in the investment decision-making process. Finally, the results are beneficial for the development of best practices in CG by promoting the existence of an RC.Originality/valueThis study goes beyond the traditional focus on CG as we use the existence of an RC as an indicator of better governance practices to mitigate financial and non-financial risk factors. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is among the first to investigate the consequences for firms operating with RCs. This issue has implications for investors, auditors, directors and regulators.

Evidence on the relation between audit committee financial expertise and internal audit function effectiveness

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Atef Oussii ◽  
Neila Boulila
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Internal Audit ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Certified Public Accountant ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Internal Audit Function ◽  
Financial Expertise

PurposeThe purpose of this paper aims to investigate whether the source of audit committee accounting expertise influences the internal audit function (IAF) effectiveness in the Tunisian setting.Design/methodology/approachIn the analysis, the authors conduct a survey of chief internal auditors from Tunisian listed companies. Then, a multivariate regression analysis is performed in order to analyze the relationship between audit committee financial expertise and IAF effectiveness.FindingsThe findings of the present study show that audit committee accounting financial expertise is most likely to be positively associated with the implementation of internal audit report recommendations. The authors also find that only financial expertise gained from accounting education and experience (e.g. an audit committee member with experience as a certified public accountant, auditor, chief financial officer or chief accounting officer) is associated with a stronger implementation of IAF recommendations, but not financial expertise gained from work experience in finance positions.Practical implicationsThese results may have implications for regulatory bodies. They can provide a better understanding of the role of the audit committee expertise in monitoring internal audit processes. The major contribution of this study is that the audit committee's oversight role is strengthened if the committee members have accounting and auditing expertise.Originality/valueThe study extends prior literature by providing evidence that the source of audit committee accounting financial expertise enhances internal audit effectiveness beyond the outcomes it has on financial reporting quality. The study also contributes to the ongoing debate in the corporate governance literature concerning the definition of the financial expertise of audit committee members.

Boardroom Backscratching and Audit Fees

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Hanlon ◽  
Mehdi Khedmati ◽  
Edwin KiaYang Lim
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Policy Development ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Risk Premiums ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
The Impact

SUMMARY This study investigates the impact of backscratching between the CEO and directors on a firm's future performance, financial reporting quality, and audit fees. We find that the presence and extent of boardroom backscratching are associated with weaker future performance, poorer quality financial reporting, and higher audit fees. We attribute these findings to backscratching firms' increased business and information risks inducing auditors to exert greater effort and charge risk premiums in response to heightened audit engagement risks. We observe consistent results when extending our investigation to backscratching between the CEO and audit committee and between the CEO and the CFO, given that the audit committee and the CFO influence financial reporting quality. Finally, we provide evidence that backscratching firms display greater audit report lag and a higher likelihood of receiving a going concern audit opinion. Our study offers insights to regulators concerning policy development to strengthen board effectiveness and remuneration disclosures.

Audit committee attributes and cosmetic accounting in Nigeria

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-206
Author(s):  
Hussaini Bala ◽  
Noor Afza Amran ◽  
Hasnah Shaari
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Audit Committees ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Expertise

Purpose The literature on the influence of audit committees (ACs) and cosmetic accounting (CSA) is scarce. This paper aims to examine the influence of AC attributes on CSA and how this relationship is moderated by the audit price (AUPR). Design/methodology/approach The study used pooled logistic regressions to analyse 624 firm-year observations of listed companies in Nigeria from 2008 to 2016. Findings The results show that AC financial accounting expertise, AC legal expertise and female AC membership were negatively related to CSA. The negative relationship is highly pronounced when a firm incurs higher audit fees. Results for the robustness checks were similar, even with changes to the measurements of dependent and independent variables and alternative estimation. Practical implications This study can benefit policymakers and regulators, enabling them to better appreciate the importance of AC attributes and AUPR in curtailing artificial manipulation and enhancing financial reporting quality. Social implications This study can benefit policymakers and regulators, enabling them to better appreciate the importance of AC attributes and AUPR in curtailing artificial manipulation and enhancing financial reporting quality. Originality/value The findings provide an initial insight into the moderating effect of AUPR on the relationship between AC attributes and CSA.

Politically Connected Boards and Audit Pricing: U.S. Evidence

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keval Amin ◽  
Chansog Francis Kim ◽  
Zhifeng Yang ◽  
FeiTeng Ye
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Fixed Effects Model ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates the impact of political connections, as measured by having directors that previously held political positions, on the pricing of audits. We document that auditors charge higher fees to politically connected firms than to similar non-connected firms. Our findings are robust to a battery of additional analyses including (1) propensity score matching, (2) entropy balancing, (3) changes analysis, and (4) a fixed effects model with transaction-based measures of political connections (i.e., campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures) in the model. The effect of political connections on audit fees is mitigated by independent monitoring. Moreover, the main effect is stronger in firms with more complicated operational structures and higher litigation risk, but weaker for distressed firms. Although our findings suggest that auditors exert greater effort at politically connected clients, we show that connected clients report significantly higher discretionary accruals, consistent with auditors' incremental effort being insufficient to fully offset the audit risk inherent in these engagements. Collectively, our study sheds light on how auditors perceive political connections and their impact on financial reporting quality.

Effect of audit and compensation committee membership overlap on audit fees

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachana Kalelkar
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Committee Member ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Audit Pricing ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Committee Membership

Purpose Recent studies document that approximately two-thirds of sample firms have at least one audit committee member serving on their compensation committee (Liao and Hsu, 2013). Prior studies on overlap membership document that presence of audit committee members on compensation committee affects the reporting quality. Since auditors’ audit risk is affected by reporting quality. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the auditors perceive the overlap of audit and compensation committee members when pricing audit fees. Design/methodology/approach The author use a sample from 2007 to 2012 and run an OLS regression. Findings The author find a negative association between overlap membership and audit fees. The results are robust after controlling for selection bias, alternate measurement of overlap membership, and an alternate pre- and post-overlap membership test. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between overlap membership and audit fees is explained by lower audit risk and not by lower brand premium of non-Big4 auditors and that the benefit of overlapping membership increases when the audit committee size is large. Practical implications The findings suggest that firms with large audit committee can improve their reporting and lower their audit fees by having audit committee members on compensation committee. Originality/value The findings contribute to the literature on the consequences of overlap membership and on the ongoing debate about the extent that common membership enhances audit committee monitoring. It also adds to the limited literature on audit committee and audit pricing.

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