Value Relevance of FAS No. 157 Fair Value Hierarchy Information and the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 1375-1410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Joon Song ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Han Yi

ABSTRACT: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (FAS No. 157), Fair Value Measurements, prioritizes the source of information used in fair value measurements into three levels: (1) Level 1 (observable inputs from quoted prices in active markets), (2) Level 2 (indirectly observable inputs from quoted prices of comparable items in active markets, identical items in inactive markets, or other market-related information), and (3) Level 3 (unobservable, firm-generated inputs). Using quarterly reports of banking firms in 2008, we find that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair values is greater than the value relevance of Level 3 fair values. In addition, we find evidence that the value relevance of fair values (especially Level 3 fair values) is greater for firms with strong corporate governance. Overall, our results support the relevance of fair value measurements under FAS No. 157, but weaker corporate governance mechanisms may reduce the relevance of these measures.

2015 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 207-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Lawrence ◽  
Subprasiri Siriviriyakul ◽  
Richard G Sloan

ABSTRACT Prior research examining the ASC 820 fair value hierarchy concludes that Level 3 fair value measurements are significantly less value-relevant than Level 1 and Level 2 fair value measurements. We reevaluate this conclusion using the closed-end fund setting, in which fair value measurements are available for substantially all assets. Contrary to prior research, we find that Level 3 fair values are of similar value relevance to Level 1 and Level 2 fair values. Our findings suggest that the results in previous research are attributable to correlated omitted variable bias arising from the absence of fair value data for most assets. JEL Classifications: M41; G12; G29. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.


2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 33-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
Yang Xu ◽  
Han S. Yi

SUMMARY: Using publicly traded bank holding company data from 2008 through 2011, this paper documents that the proportions of fair-valued assets held by banks are positively associated with audit fees. The positive association between audit fees and the proportions of total assets that are fair-valued using Level 3 inputs is greater than its positive association with the proportions of total assets that are fair-valued using Level 1 or Level 2 inputs. These results are consistent with a hypothesized scenario in which audit effort increases in the difficulty of verifying asset fair values. We also document that bank specialist auditors, defined as in Behn, Choi, and Kang (2008), charge lower audit fees to bank clients on average, suggesting cost efficiencies passed to clients as lower fees. However, bank expert auditors charge more for auditing the proportions of total assets that are fair-valued. Overall, the results support concerns expressed by some observers that greater use of fair value measurements for financial instruments will trigger increased audit fees. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 136
Author(s):  
Hui-Wen Hsu

This project examines whether CEO overconfidence affects firm's fair value reporting. Moreover, prior literature indicates effective corporate governance mechanisms ameliorate the adverse impact of CEO overconfidence. Thus, this paper further investigates whether effective corporate governance will mitigate the association between CEO overconfidence and level 3 fair values. Using a US sample drawn from 2008 to 2011, the results of this paper show that firms with higher CEO overconfidence report more Level 3 fair values and gains from Level 3 fair values. The results also indicates that the positive relationship between higher CEO overconfidence and Level 3 fair values reporting is attenuated for firms with high corporate governance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1001-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Fortin ◽  
Ahmad Hammami ◽  
Michel Magnan

PurposeThis study examines the long-term link between fair valuation uncertainty and discounts/premia in closed-end funds. This study argues that, in exploring the close-end funds puzzle, prior research generally omits to consider the uncertainty surrounding the measurement of funds' financial disclosure, as reflected in the fair value hierarchy, when investment specialty differs across funds.Design/methodology/approachRegressions were employed to explore how the fair value hierarchy affects closed-end funds' discounts/premia when investment specialty differs. The authors also examine the effects pre- and post-2012 to explore if that relationship changes due to the additional disclosure requirements enacted at the end of 2011.FindingsThe authors find that the three levels of the fair value hierarchy have effects that vary according to a fund's specialty. For equity specialized funds, Level 3 significantly increases discounts and decreases premia, suggesting the impact of valuation uncertainty that underlies Level 3 estimates; this relationship disappears (decreases in severity) for premia (discount) experiencing funds post-2012. In contrast, Level 1 and Level 2 do not have any significant effect on discounts or premia except that post-2012, Level 2 begins to display discount decreasing effects. For bond specialized funds, no significant association was noted between premia and any of the fair value levels except that post-2012, Level 3 begins to display premium increasing effects. However, results are different for discounts. The authors note that Level 1 valuations significantly increase discounts, but only post-2012; Level 2 valuations significantly decrease discounts (pre- and post-2012), consistent with such estimates incorporating unique and relevant information; and Level 3 valuations do not have a significant effect on discounts.Originality/valueThe results of this study revisit prior evidence and indicate that results about the effects of fair value measurement and the closed-end funds' puzzle are sensitive to the period length being considered and the investment specialty of the fund. The authors also note that additional disclosure regarding Level 3 valuation inputs decreases market concern for valuation uncertainty and increases the liquidity benefits of investing in Level 3 carrying funds.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Wray Bradley ◽  
Li Sun

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the relation between managerial ability and fair value inputs (measured as fair value intensity) for nonfinancial firms. Design/methodology/approach This study uses regression analysis to investigate the impact of managerial ability on the level of fair value inputs. Findings This study finds significant and positive relations between managerial ability and use of Level 1 and Level 2 fair value inputs. On the other hand, this study finds an insignificant relation between managerial ability and Level 3 inputs. Originality/value The findings contribute to two research streams. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is perhaps the first study that directly examines the link between managerial ability and fair value inputs.


Author(s):  
Giulio Anselmi

The paper investigates the impact of fair value accounting for illiquid assets (so-called ‘Level 2’ and ‘Level 3’ assets by accounting rules) on banks’ valuation and focuses on the change in relative weight of Level 3 (the most opaque and illiquid assets) with respect to Level 2 assets. The boundary between Level 3 and Level 2 assets is blurred and less clear than the one between Level 1 and Level 2 assets. Such unclear borderline entails corporate governance issues and provides room for opportunistic behavior by managers to opt for less transparent instruments. The paper proposes the change in Level 3-to-Level 2 assets ratio as a new measure to capture deviations in the opacity of bank assets and suggests a negative relationship between this ratio and bank’s price-to-book value. The rationale behind this relationship is that market participants interpret growth in Level 3-to-Level 2 assets ratio as an increase in bank’s opacity, since Level 3 assets might be as illiquid as Level 2 assets with the benefit of a less transparent model-based valuation technique. Based on a sample of 33 European banks from 2009 to 2018, I find that an increase of 100[Formula: see text]bps in Level 3-to-Level 2 assets ratio is linked to a decrease of about 74[Formula: see text]bps in the price-to-book value. Results are robust for different measures of firm relative valuation and using a different measure of illiquidity in fair value assets holdings (Level 2-to-Level 1 assets ratio).


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Velte

The purpose of this paper is the link between women on management board and the value relevance of fair value accounting according to IFRS 13. The empirical quantitative study covers a sample of German companies listed at the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange for the business years 2013-2015 (411 firm-year observations). Value relevance is measured by the modified Ohlson (1995) model and we separate fair value accounting in level 1, level 2 and level 3 fair values. Multiple regressions state that female members in the man-agement board do have a positive impact on the value relevance of fair value accounting according to IFRS 13. Surprisingly, gender diversity only has a significant impact on the value relevance of fair valued assets on level 1 and 2 (“mark to market”) but not on level 3 (“mark to model”).


Author(s):  
G. M. Wali Ullah ◽  
Sarwar Uddin Ahmed ◽  
Samiul Parvez Ahmed ◽  
Kazi Md. Jamshed

Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager's decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision-making assistance on corporate affairs. Corporate governance practices in Bangladesh are gradually being introduced in most companies and organizations (Du, 2006). However, Bangladesh has fallen behind its neighboring countries and global economy in corporate governance (Gillibrand, 2004). Corporate governance structure is mainly considered ambiguous. Specific governance structures or practices will not necessarily fit all companies at all times. Firms with strong corporate governance mechanisms are generally associated with better financial performance, higher firm valuation and higher stock returns. Unfortunately, investors in Bangladesh have a little information about how these corporate values affect the performance of the Multinational Companies (MNCs). This study aims to provide a quantitative contribution to the literature by examining the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial performance from the perspective of MNCs. A panel data based Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression model was used to measure the quantitative significance of various corporate governance related variables on MNC performance, as identified through a detailed literature review.


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